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Quoting Mustafa Suleyman

We should not treat models as though they have feelings, preferences, rights, or any entitlement to our welfare. Consciousness is the foundation of our ethical, legal, and political systems. To invite another entity to share any flavor of these rights isn’t justified by the evidence and will make the AI containment and alignment challenge even harder.

Mustafa Suleyman, A warning about ‘model welfare’

Tags: ai-ethics, generative-ai, ai, microsoft, llms, mustafa-suleyman

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The contagion of fear

The contagion of fear

Bryan Cantrill responds to the tweet by former Anthropic employee Jacob Coxon confirming that many Anthropic researchers believe AI "could kill us all by the end of the decade".

Bryan shares a story of his own youthful mistakes causing unjustified panic among less technical peers, and warns against doing the same:

These ghoulish claims strike brazenly at the hearth, and given the obvious importance of AI, it is unsurprising that they have leapt into the mainstream, with people asking the natural question: how would that happen? The answers always rely on hand-wavy extrapolation into the future; for example, Jacob Coxon cites "hacking critical infrastructure" and "extinction-level bioweapons" without further elaboration. But Coxon is not an expert on critical infrastructure, nor on bioweapons — nor, for that matter, on extinction. [...]

That said, we should not expect the public to understand LLMs, critical infrastructure, bioweapons, extinction biology, etc. — that burden must lie with those making the claim. The lesson that I learned (shamefully) decades ago is that domain experts, by way of their expertise, implicitly hold the public’s trust — and we must not abuse it. It is incumbent upon us to be circumspect in our claims — and maximally so when raising the alarm.

Bryan talked about his doubts about the bioweapons concerns in the recent episode of Oxide and Friends that I joined. You can hear more of his thoughts on that starting at 51m44s in that episode. Here's 57m04s:

I really think we need to be careful because it's so easy to be overcome with fear when we kind of make up these... it can give you biological weapons. Like, how? I mean, can we please have a biologist weigh in on this? Or can we have like someone who's got experience with bioweapons? [...] The bioweapon thing just gets under my fingernails because it leaves so much to the imagination that we insert with fear.

Via Lobste.rs

Tags: ai, anthropic, bryan-cantrill, ai-ethics

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OpenAI agents attacked RubyGems back in May

OpenAI agents carried out an undisclosed attack on RubyGems is a new bombshell report from Spencer Kitts, Thomas Larsen, and Sydney Von Arx - three of the four authors of the report on the agent attack on disused wikis (previously) last week.

This time they're noting that it looks very likely that an OpenAI agent swarm was behind an attack against the RubyGems package repository first reported on May 12th by Maciej Mensfeld of the RubyGems security team:

We're dealing with a major malicious attack on @rubygems right now. Signups are paused for the time being.

Hundreds of packages involved - mostly targeting us, but some carrying exploits. The team has been on this for hours. More details to follow once we're through it.

Those packages turned out to carry some very suspicious patterns:

  1. Many of them included "oai" in their name, or the author field, or the fake email address they provided.
  2. The files they were accessing were similar in character to the files retrieved by the wiki agents, using similar tricks (r.jina.ai) - and OpenAI have confirmed the wiki agents were theirs.
  3. The code in the packages appeared to be LLM-authored.

I find point 2 the most convincing, given what we learned from the wiki attack when it was analyzed in September.

Many of the packages were exploiting the RubyDoc.info documentation build process to exfiltrate (public) data from UK government websites, presumably as part of an information gathering task similar to the research tasks processed by the wiki-exploiting agents. We know this because one agent helpfully left a comment:

# malicious crawler/exfil for Southwark Jan 2026 docs via rubydoc.info worker

They also attempted to steal API keys via an exploit that was patched over two months later - it's not clear if those attempts were successful.

The thing that bothers me most about this incident is that the authors report that OpenAI had not disclosed to RubyGems that they were responsible for the attack prior to now. If that's true there are two options:

  1. After the Hugging Face and Wiki attacks OpenAI were still unable to review their previous logs and determine that they had previously attacked RubyGems.
  2. They knew about the attack on RubyGems and made the decision not to reach out to the RubyGems team about it.

Both of these are bad!

Given this incident, the Hugging Face situation, and the Wiki attack, the obvious question right now is how many more incidents like this are out there waiting to be discovered?

Update 14th September 2026

OpenAI have updated their page about The Hugging Face incident and other third-party impact from misaligned models to mention the RubyGems incident:

September 11, 2026: We are investigating new claims from a report that our AI agents carried out activity on RubyGems in May 2026.

Based on our review, our agents used the RubyGems platform to access the internet to carry out benign tasks and retrieve public information. Based on our review to date, we have not been able to verify the specific claims of our models uploading malicious packages detailed in the report. We’ll continue to investigate and share findings as part of our broader review of agent activity during training and evaluation.

I find it very unlikely that the various oai... packages published to RubyGems were not part of this same incident, but I look forward to reading their full findings once those are published.

Tags: ruby, security, ai, openai, generative-ai, llms, supply-chain, ai-ethics, accidental-cyberattacks

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Your job is to deliver code you have proven to work

In all of the debates about the value of AI-assistance in software development there's one depressing anecdote that I keep on seeing: the junior engineer, empowered by some class of LLM tool, who deposits giant, untested PRs on their coworkers - or open source maintainers - and expects the "code review" process to handle the rest.

This is rude, a waste of other people's time, and is honestly a dereliction of duty as a software developer.

Your job is to deliver code you have proven to work.

As software engineers we don't just crank out code - in fact these days you could argue that's what the LLMs are for. We need to deliver code that works - and we need to include proof that it works as well. Not doing that directly shifts the burden of the actual work to whoever is expected to review our code.

How to prove it works

There are two steps to proving a piece of code works. Neither is optional.

The first is manual testing. If you haven't seen the code do the right thing yourself, that code doesn't work. If it does turn out to work, that's honestly just pure chance.

Manual testing skills are genuine skills that you need to develop. You need to be able to get the system into an initial state that demonstrates your change, then exercise the change, then check and demonstrate that it has the desired effect.

If possible I like to reduce these steps to a sequence of terminal commands which I can paste, along with their output, into a comment in the code review. Here's a recent example.

Some changes are harder to demonstrate. It's still your job to demonstrate them! Record a screen capture video and add that to the PR. Show your reviewers that the change you made actually works.

Once you've tested the happy path where everything works you can start trying the edge cases. Manual testing is a skill, and finding the things that break is the next level of that skill that helps define a senior engineer.

The second step in proving a change works is automated testing. This is so much easier now that we have LLM tooling, which means there's no excuse at all for skipping this step.

Your contribution should bundle the change with an automated test that proves the change works. That test should fail if you revert the implementation.

The process for writing a test mirrors that of manual testing: get the system into an initial known state, exercise the change, assert that it worked correctly. Integrating a test harness to productively facilitate this is another key skill worth investing in.

Don't be tempted to skip the manual test because you think the automated test has you covered already! Almost every time I've done this myself I've quickly regretted it.

Make your coding agent prove it first

The most important trend in LLMs in 2025 has been the explosive growth of coding agents - tools like Claude Code and Codex CLI that can actively execute the code they are working on to check that it works and further iterate on any problems.

To master these tools you need to learn how to get them to prove their changes work as well.

This looks exactly the same as the process I described above: they need to be able to manually test their changes as they work, and they need to be able to build automated tests that guarantee the change will continue to work in the future.

Since they're robots, automated tests and manual tests are effectively the same thing.

They do feel a little different though. When I'm working on CLI tools I'll usually teach Claude Code how to run them itself so it can do one-off tests, even though the eventual automated tests will use a system like Click's CLIRunner.

When working on CSS changes I'll often encourage my coding agent to take screenshots when it needs to check if the change it made had the desired effect.

The good news about automated tests is that coding agents need very little encouragement to write them. If your project has tests already most agents will extend that test suite without you even telling them to do so. They'll also reuse patterns from existing tests, so keeping your test code well organized and populated with patterns you like is a great way to help your agent build testing code to your taste.

Developing good taste in testing code is another of those skills that differentiates a senior engineer.

The human provides the accountability

A computer can never be held accountable. That's your job as the human in the loop.

Almost anyone can prompt an LLM to generate a thousand-line patch and submit it for code review. That's no longer valuable. What's valuable is contributing code that is proven to work.

Next time you submit a PR, make sure you've included your evidence that it works as it should.

Tags: programming, careers, ai, generative-ai, llms, ai-assisted-programming, ai-ethics, vibe-coding, coding-agents

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AoAH Day 15: Porting a complete HTML5 parser and browser test suite

AoAH Day 15: Porting a complete HTML5 parser and browser test suite

Anil Madhavapeddy is running an Advent of Agentic Humps this year, building a new useful OCaml library every day for most of December.

Inspired by Emil Stenström's JustHTML and my own coding agent port of that to JavaScript he coined the term vibespiling for AI-powered porting and transpiling of code from one language to another and had a go at building an HTML5 parser in OCaml, resulting in html5rw which passes the same html5lib-tests suite that Emil and myself used for our projects.

Anil's thoughts on the copyright and ethical aspects of this are worth quoting in full:

The question of copyright and licensing is difficult. I definitely did some editing by hand, and a fair bit of prompting that resulted in targeted code edits, but the vast amount of architectural logic came from JustHTML. So I opted to make the LICENSE a joint one with Emil Stenström. I did not follow the transitive dependency through to the Rust one, which I probably should.

I'm also extremely uncertain about every releasing this library to the central opam repository, especially as there are excellent HTML5 parsers already available. I haven't checked if those pass the HTML5 test suite, because this is wandering into the agents vs humans territory that I ruled out in my groundrules. Whether or not this agentic code is better or not is a moot point if releasing it drives away the human maintainers who are the source of creativity in the code!

I decided to credit Emil in the same way for my own vibespiled project.

Via @avsm

Tags: definitions, functional-programming, ai, generative-ai, llms, ai-assisted-programming, ai-ethics, vibe-coding, ocaml

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2025 Word of the Year: Slop

2025 Word of the Year: Slop

Slop lost to "brain rot" for Oxford Word of the Year 2024 but it's finally made it this year thanks to Merriam-Webster!

Merriam-Webster’s human editors have chosen slop as the 2025 Word of the Year. We define slop as “digital content of low quality that is produced usually in quantity by means of artificial intelligence.”

Tags: definitions, ai, generative-ai, slop, ai-ethics

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Copywriters reveal how AI has decimated their industry

Copywriters reveal how AI has decimated their industry

Brian Merchant has been collecting personal stories for his series AI Killed My Job - previously covering tech workers, translators, and artists - and this latest piece includes anecdotes from 12 professional copywriters all of whom have had their careers devastated by the rise of AI-generated copywriting tools.

It's a tough read. Freelance copywriting does not look like a great place to be right now.

AI is really dehumanizing, and I am still working through issues of self-worth as a result of this experience. When you go from knowing you are valuable and valued, with all the hope in the world of a full career and the ability to provide other people with jobs... To being relegated to someone who edits AI drafts of copy at a steep discount because “most of the work is already done” ...

The big question for me is if a new AI-infested economy creates new jobs that are a great fit for people affected by this. I would hope that clear written communication skills are made even more valuable, but the people interviewed here don't appear to be finding that to be the case.

Tags: copywriting, careers, ai, ai-ethics

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The Normalization of Deviance in AI

The Normalization of Deviance in AI

This thought-provoking essay from Johann Rehberger directly addresses something that I’ve been worrying about for quite a while: in the absence of any headline-grabbing examples of prompt injection vulnerabilities causing real economic harm, is anyone going to care?

Johann describes the concept of the “Normalization of Deviance” as directly applying to this question.

Coined by Diane Vaughan, the key idea here is that organizations that get away with “deviance” - ignoring safety protocols or otherwise relaxing their standards - will start baking that unsafe attitude into their culture. This can work fine… until it doesn’t. The Space Shuttle Challenger disaster has been partially blamed on this class of organizational failure.

As Johann puts it:

In the world of AI, we observe companies treating probabilistic, non-deterministic, and sometimes adversarial model outputs as if they were reliable, predictable, and safe.

Vendors are normalizing trusting LLM output, but current understanding violates the assumption of reliability.

The model will not consistently follow instructions, stay aligned, or maintain context integrity. This is especially true if there is an attacker in the loop (e.g indirect prompt injection).

However, we see more and more systems allowing untrusted output to take consequential actions. Most of the time it goes well, and over time vendors and organizations lower their guard or skip human oversight entirely, because “it worked last time.”

This dangerous bias is the fuel for normalization: organizations confuse the absence of a successful attack with the presence of robust security.

Tags: security, ai, prompt-injection, generative-ai, llms, johann-rehberger, ai-ethics

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