Vue normale

Il y a de nouveaux articles disponibles, cliquez pour rafraîchir la page.
À partir d’avant-hierFlux principal

Observer Theory

11 décembre 2023 à 21:44

The Concept of the Observer

We call it perception. We call it measurement. We call it analysis. But in the end it’s about how we take the world as it is, and derive from it the impression of it that we have in our minds.

We might have thought that we could do science “purely objectively” without any reference to observers or their nature. But what we’ve discovered particularly dramatically in our Physics Project is that the nature of us as observers is critical even in determining the most fundamental laws we attribute to the universe.

But what ultimately does an observer—say like us—do? And how can we make a theoretical framework for it? Much as we have a general model for the process of computation—instantiated by something like a Turing machine—we’d like to have a general model for the process of observation: a general “observer theory”.

Central to what we think of as an observer is the notion that the observer will take the raw complexity of the world and extract from it some reduced representation suitable for a finite mind. There might be zillions of photons impinging on our eyes, but all we extract is the arrangement of objects in a visual scene. Or there might be zillions of gas molecules impinging on a piston, yet all we extract is the overall pressure of the gas.

In the end, we can think of it fundamentally as being about equivalencing. There are immense numbers of different individual configurations for the photons or the gas molecules—that are all treated as equivalent by an observer who’s just picking out the particular features needed for some reduced representation.

There’s in a sense a certain duality between computation and observation. In computation one’s generating new states of a system. In observation, one’s equivalencing together different states.

That equivalencing must in the end be implemented “underneath” by computation. But in observer theory what we want to do is just characterize the equivalencing that’s achieved. For us as observers it might in practice be all about how our senses work, what our biological or cultural nature is—or what technological devices or structures we’ve built. But what makes a coherent concept of observer theory possible is that there seem to be general, abstract characterizations that capture the essence of different kinds of observers.

It’s not immediately obvious that anything suitable for a finite mind could ever be extracted from the complexity of the world. And indeed the Principle of Computational Equivalence implies that computational irreducibility (and its multicomputational generalization) will be ubiquitous. But within computational irreducibility there must always be slices of computational reducibility. And it’s these slices of reducibility that an observer must try to pick out—and that ultimately make it possible for a finite mind to develop a “useful narrative” about what happens in the world, that allows it to make decisions, predictions, and so on.

How “special” is what an observer does? At its core it’s just about taking a large set of possible inputs, and returning a much smaller set of possible outputs. And certainly that’s a conceptual idea that’s appeared in many fields under many different names: a contractive mapping, reduction to canonical form, a classifier, an acceptor, a forgetful functor, evolving to an attractor, extracting statistics, model fitting, lossy compression, projection, phase transitions, renormalization group transformations, coarse graining and so on. But here we want to think not about what’s “mathematically describable”, but instead about what in general is actually implemented—say by our senses, our measuring devices, or our ways of analyzing things.

At an ultimate level, everything that happens can be thought of as being captured by the ruliad—the unique object that emerges as the entangled limit of all possible computations. And in a vast generalization of ideas like that our brains—like any other material thing—are made of atoms, so too any observer must be embedded as some kind of structure within the ruliad. But a key concept of observer theory is that it’s possible to make conclusions about an observer’s impression of the world just by knowing about the capabilities—and assumptions—of the observer, without knowing in detail what the observer is “like inside”.

And so it is, for example, that in our Physics Project we seem to be able to derive—essentially from the structure of the ruliad—the core laws of twentieth-century physics (general relativity, quantum mechanics and the Second Law) just on the basis of two features of us as observers: that we’re computationally bounded, and that we believe we’re persistent in time (even though “underneath” we’re made of different atoms of space at every successive moment). And we can expect that if we were to include other features of us as observers (for example, that we believe there are persistent objects in the world, or that we believe we have free will) then we’d be able to derive more aspects of the universe as we experience it—or of natural laws we attribute to it.

But the notion of observers—and observer theory—isn’t limited purely to “physical observers”. It applies whenever we try to “get an impression” of something. And so, for example, we can also operate as “mathematical observers”, sampling the ruliad to build up conclusions about mathematical laws. Some features of us as physical observers—like the computational boundedness associated with the finiteness of our minds—inevitably carry over to us as mathematical observers. But other features do not. But the point of observer theory is to provide a general framework in which we can characterize observers—and then see the consequences of those characterizations for the impressions or conclusions observers will form.

The Operation of Observers

As humans we have senses like sight, hearing, touch, taste, smell and balance. And through our technology we also have access to a few thousand other kinds of measurements. So how basically do all these work?

The vast majority in effect aggregate a large number of small inputs to generate some kind of “average” output—which in the case of measurements is often specified as a (real) number. In a few cases, however, there’s instead a discrete choice between outputs that’s made on the basis of whether the total input exceeds a threshold (think: distributed consensus schemes, weighing balances, etc.)

But in all cases what’s fundamentally happening is that lots of different input configurations are all being equivalenced—or, more operationally, the dynamics of the system essentially make all equivalenced states evolve to the same “attractor state”.

As an example, let’s consider measuring the pressure of a gas. There are various ways to do this. But a very direct one is just to have a piston, and see how much force is exerted by the gas on this piston. So where does this force come from? At the lowest level it’s the result of lots of individual molecules bouncing off the surface of the piston, each transferring a tiny amount of momentum to it. If we looked at the piston at an atomic scale, we’d see it temporarily deform from each molecular impact. But the crucial point is that at a large scale the piston moves together, as a single rigid object—aggregating the effects of all those individual molecular impacts.

But why does it work this way? Essentially it’s because the intermolecular forces inside the piston are much stronger than the forces associated with molecules in the gas. Or, put more abstractly, there’s more coupling and coherence “inside the observer” than between the observer and what it’s observing.

We see the same basic pattern over and over again. There’s some form of transduction that couples the individual elements of what’s being observed to the observer. Then “within the observer” there’s something that in essence aggregates all these small effects. Sometimes that aggregation is “directly numerical”, as in the addition of lots of small momentum transfers. But sometimes it’s instead more explicitly like evolution to one attractor rather than another.

Consider, for example, the case of vision. An array of photons fall on the photoreceptor cells on our retinas, generating electrical signals transmitted through nerve fibers to our brains. Within the brain there’s then effectively a neural net that evolves to different attractors depending on what one’s looking at. Most of the time a small change in input image won’t affect what attractor one evolves to. But—much like with a weighing balance—there’s an “edge” at which even a small change can lead to a different output.

One can go through lots of different types of sensory systems and measuring devices. But the basic outline seems to always be the same. First, there’s a coupling between what is being sensed or measured and the thing that’s doing the sensing or measuring. Quite often that coupling involves transducing from one physical form to another—say from light to electricity, or from force to position. Sometimes then the crucial step of equivalencing different detailed inputs is achieved by simple “numerical aggregation”, most often by accumulation of objects (atoms, raindrops, etc.) or physical effects (forces, currents, etc.). But sometimes the equivalencing is instead achieved by a more obviously dynamical process.

It could amount to simple amplification, in which, say, the presence of a small element of input (say an individual particle) “tips over” some metastable system so that it goes into a certain final state. Or it could be more like a neural net where there’s a more complicated translation defined by hard-to-describe borders between basins of attraction leading to different attractors.

But, OK, so what’s the endpoint of a process of observation? Ultimately for us humans it’s an impression created in our minds. Of course that gets into lots of slippery philosophical issues. Yes, each of us has an “inner experience” of what’s going on in our mind. But anything else is ultimately an extrapolation. We make the assumption that other human minds also “see what we see”, but we can never “feel it from the inside”.

We can of course make increasingly detailed measurements—say of neural activity—to see how similar what’s going on is between one brain and another. But as soon as there’s the slightest structural—or situational—difference between the brains, we really can’t say exactly how their “impressions” will compare.

But for our purposes in constructing a general “observer theory” we’re basically going to make the assumption (or, in effect, “philosophical approximation”) that whenever a system does enough equivalencing, that’s tantamount to it “acting like an observer”, because it can then act as a “front end” that takes the “incoherent complexity of the world” and “collimates it” to the point where a mind will derive a definite impression from it.

Of course, there’s still a lot of subtlety here. There has to be “just enough equivalencing” and not too much. For example, if all inputs were always equivalenced to the same output, there’d be nothing useful observed. And in the end there’s somehow got to be some kind of match between the compression of input achieved by equivalencing, and the “capacity” of the mind that’s ultimately deriving an impression from it.

A crucial feature of anything that can reasonably be called a mind is that “something’s got to be going on in there”. It can’t be, for example, that the internal state of the system is fixed. There has to be some internal dynamics—some computational process that we can identify as the ongoing operation of the mind.

At an informational level we might say that there has to be more information processing going on inside than there is flow of information from the outside. Or, in other words, if we’re going to be meaningful “observers like us” we can’t just be bombarded by input we don’t process; we have to have some capability to “think about what we’re seeing”.

All of this comes back to the idea that a crucial feature of us as observers is that we are computationally bounded. We do computation; that’s why we can have an “inner sense of things going on”. But the amount of computation we do is tiny compared to the computation going on in the world around us. Our experience represents a heavily filtered version of “what’s happening outside”. And the essence of “being an observer like us” is that we’re effectively doing lots of equivalencing to get to that filtered version.

But can we imagine a future in which we “expand our minds”? Or perhaps encounter some alien intelligence with a fundamentally “less constrained mind”? Well, at some point there’s an issue with this. Because in a sense the idea that we have a coherent existence relies on us having “limited minds”. For without such constraints there wouldn’t be a coherent “self” that we could identify—with coherent inner experience.

Let’s say we’re shown some system—say in nature—“from the outside”. Can we tell if “there’s an observer in there”? Ultimately not, because in a sense we’d have to be “inside that observer” and be able to experience the impression of the world that it’s getting. But in much the same way as we extrapolate to believing that, say, other human minds are experiencing things like we’re experiencing, so also we can potentially extrapolate to say what we might think of as an observer.

And the core idea seems to be that an “observer” should be a subsystem whose “internal states” are affected by the rest of the system, but where many “external states” lead to the same internal state—and where there is rich dynamics “within the observer” that in effect operates only on its internal states. Ultimately—following the Principle of Computational Equivalence—both the outside and the inside of the “observer subsystem” can be expected to be equivalent in the computations they’re performing. But the point is that the coupling from outside the subsystem to inside effectively “coarse grains” what’s outside, so that the “inner computation” is operating on a much-reduced set of elements.

Why should any such “observer subsystems” exist? Presumably at some level it’s inevitable from the presence of pockets of computational reducibility within arbitrary computationally irreducible systems. But more important for us is that our very existence—and the possibility of our coherent inner experience—depends on us “operating as observers”. And—almost as a “self-fulfilling prophecy”—our behavior tends to perpetuate our ability to successfully do this. For example, we can think of us as choosing to put ourselves in situations and environments where we can “predict what’s going to happen” well enough to “survive as observers”. (At a mundane practical level we might do this by not living in places subject to unpredictable natural forces—or by doing things like building ourselves structures that shelter us from those forces.)

We’ve talked about observers operating by compressing the complexities of the world to “inner impressions” suitable for finite minds. And in typical situations that we describe as perception and measurement, the main way this happens is by fairly direct equivalencing of different states. But in a sense there’s a higher-level story that relies on formalization—and in essence computation—and that’s what we usually call “analysis”.

Let’s say we have some intricate structure—perhaps some nested, fractal pattern. A direct rendering of all the pixels in this pattern ultimately won’t be something well suited for a “finite mind”. But if we gave rules—or a program—for generating the pattern we’d have a much more succinct representation of it.

But now there’s a problem with computational irreducibility. Yes, the rules determine the pattern. But to get from these rules to the actual pattern can require an irreducible amount of computation. And to “reverse engineer the pattern” to find the rules can require even more computation.

Yes, there are particular cases—like repetitive and simple nested patterns—where there’s enough immediate computational reducibility that a computationally bounded system (or observer) can fairly easily “do the analysis” and “get the compression”. But in general it’s hard. And indeed in a sense it’s the whole mission of science to pick away at the problem, and try to find more ways to “reduce the complexities of the world” to “human-level narratives”.

Computational irreducibility limits the extent to which this can be successful. But the inevitable existence of pockets of reducibility even within computational irreducibility guarantees that progress can always in principle be made. As we invent more kinds of measuring devices we can extend our domain as observers. And the same is true when we invent more methods of analysis, or identify more principles in science.

But the overall picture remains the same: what’s crucial to “being an observer” is equivalencing many “states of the world”, either through perceiving or measuring only specific aspects of them, or through identifying “simplified narratives” that capture them. (In effect, perception and measurement tend to do “lossy compression”; analysis is more about “lossless compression” where the equivalencing is effectively not between possible inputs but between possible generative rules.)

How Observers Construct Their Perceived Reality

Our view of the world is ultimately determined by what we observe of it. We take what’s “out there in the world” and in effect “construct our perceived reality” by our operation as observers. Or, in other words, insofar as we have a narrative about “what’s going on in the world”, that’s something that comes from our operation as observers.

And in fact from our Physics Project we’re led to an extreme version of this—in which what’s “out there in the world” is just the whole ruliad, and in effect everything specific about our perceived reality must come from how we operate as observers and thus how we sample the ruliad.

But long before we get to this ultimate level of abstraction, there are lots of ways in which our nature as observers “builds” our perceived reality. Think about any material substance—like a fluid. Ultimately it’s made up of lots of individual molecules “doing their thing”. But observers like us aren’t seeing those molecules. Instead, we’re aggregating things to the point where we can just describe the system as a fluid, that operates according to the “narrative” defined by the laws of fluid mechanics.

But why do things work this way? Ultimately it’s the result of the repeated story of the interplay between underlying computational irreducibility, and the computational boundedness of us as observers. At the lowest level the motion of the molecules is governed by simple rules of mechanics. But the phenomenon of computational irreducibility implies that to work out the detailed consequences of “running these rules” involves an irreducible amount of computational work—which is something that we as computationally bounded observers can’t do. And the result of this is that we’ll end up describing the detailed behavior of the molecules as just “random”. As I’ve discussed at length elsewhere, this is the fundamental origin of the Second Law of thermodynamics. But for our purposes here the important point is that it’s what makes observers like us “construct the reality” of things like fluids. Our computational boundedness as observers makes us unable to trace all the detailed behavior of molecules, and leaves us “content” to describe fluids in terms of the “narrative” defined by the laws of fluid mechanics.

Our Physics Project implies that it’s the same kind of story with physical space. For in our Physics Project, space is ultimately “made” of a network of relations (or connections) between discrete “atoms of space”—that’s progressively being updated in what ends up being a computationally irreducible way. But we as computationally bounded observers can’t “decode” all the details of what’s happening, and instead we end up with a simple “aggregate” narrative, that turns out to correspond to continuum space operating according to the laws of general relativity.

The way both coherent notions of “matter” (or fluids) and spacetime emerge for us as observers can be thought of as a consequence of the equivalencing we do as observers. In both cases, there’s immense and computationally irreducible complexity “underneath”. But we’re ignoring most of that—by effectively treating different detailed behaviors as equivalent—so that in the end we get to a (comparatively) “simple narrative” more suitable for our finite minds. But we should emphasize that what’s “really going on in the system” is something much more complicated; it’s just that we as observers aren’t paying attention to that, so our perceived reality is much simpler.

OK, but what about quantum mechanics? In a sense that’s an extreme test of our description of how observers work, and the extent to which the operation of observers “constructs their perceived reality”.

The Case of Quantum Mechanics

In our Physics Project the underlying structure (hypergraph) that represents space and everything in it is progressively being rewritten according to definite rules. But the crucial point is that at any given stage there can be lots of ways this rewriting can happen. And the result is that there’s a whole tree of possible “states of the universe” that can be generated. So given this, why do we ever think that definite things happen in the universe? Why don’t we just think that there’s an infinite tree of branching histories for the universe?

Well, it all has to do with our nature as observers, and the equivalencing we do. At an immediate level, we can imagine looking at all those different possible branching paths for the evolution of the universe. And the key point is that even though they come from different paths of history, two states can just be the same. Sometimes it’ll be obvious that they’re same; sometimes one might have to determine, say, whether two hypergraphs are isomorphic. But the point is that to any observer (at least one that isn’t managing to look at arbitrary “implementation details”), the states will inevitably be considered equivalent.

But now there’s a bigger point. Even though “from the outside” there might be a whole branching and merging multiway graph of histories for the universe, observers like us can’t trace that. And in fact all we perceive is a single thread of history. Or, said another way, we believe that we have a single thread of experience—something closely related to our belief that (despite the changing “underlying elements” from which we are made) we are somehow persistent in time (at least during the span of our existence).

But operationally, how do we go from all those underlying branches of history to our perceived single thread of history? We can think of the states on different threads of history as being related by what we call a branchial graph, that joins states that have immediate common ancestors. And in the limit of many threads, we can think of these different states as being laid out “branchial space”. (In traditional quantum mechanics terms, this layout defines a “map of quantum entanglements”—with each piece of common ancestry representing an entanglement between states.)

In physical space—whether we’re looking at molecules in a fluid or atoms of space—we can think of us operating as observers who are physically large enough to span many underlying discrete elements, so that what we end up observing is just some kind of aggregate, averaged result. And it’s very much the same kind of thing in branchial space: we as observers tend to be large enough in branchial space to be spread across an immense number of branches of history, so that what we observe is just aggregate, averaged results across all those branches.

There’s lots of detailed complexity in what happens on different branches, just like there is in what happens to different molecules, or different atoms of space. And the reason is that there’s inevitably computational irreducibility, or, in this case, more accurately, multicomputational irreducibility. But as computationally bounded observers we just perceive aggregate results that “average out” the “underlying apparent randomness” to give a consistent single thread of experience.

And effectively this is what happens in the transition from quantum to classical behavior. Even though there are many possible detailed (“quantum”) threads of history that an object can follow, what we perceive corresponds to a single consistent “aggregate” (“classical”) sequence of behavior.

And this is typically true even at the level of our typical observation of molecules and chemical processes. Yes, there are many possible threads of history for, say, a water molecule. But most of our observations aggregate things to the point where we can talk about a definite shape for the molecule, with definite “chemical bonds”, etc.

But there is a special situation that actually looms large in typical discussions of quantum mechanics. We can think of it as the result of doing measurements that aren’t “aggregating threads of history to get an average”, but are instead doing something more like a weighing balance, always “tipping” one way or the other. In the language of quantum computing, we might say that we’re arranging things to be able to “measure a single qubit”. In terms of the equivalencing of states, we might say that we’re equivalencing lots of underlying states to specific canonical states (like “spin up” and “spin down”).

Why do we get one outcome rather than another? Ultimately we can think of it as all depending on the details of us as observers. To see this, let’s start from the corresponding question in physical space. We might ask why we observe some particular thing happening. Well, in our Physics Project everything about “what happens” is deterministic. But there’s still the “arbitrariness” of where we are in physical space. We’ll always basically see the same laws of physics, but the particulars of what we’ll observe depend on where we are, say on the surface of the Earth versus in interstellar space, etc.

Is there a “theory” for “where we are”? In some sense, yes, because we can go back and see why the molecules that make us up landed up in the particular place where they did. But what we can’t have an “external theory” for is just which molecules end up making up “us”, as we experience ourselves “from inside”. In our view of physics and the universe, it’s in some sense the only “ultimately subjective” thing: where our internal experience is “situated”.

And the point is that basically—even though it’s much less familiar—the same thing is going on at the level of quantum mechanics. Just as we “happen” to be at a certain place in physical space, so we’re at a certain place in branchial space. Looking back we can trace how we got here. But there’s no a priori way to determine “where our particular experience will be situated”. And that means we can’t know what the “local branchial environment” will be—and so, for example, what the outcome of “balance-like” measurements will be.

Just as in traditional discussions of quantum mechanics, the mechanics of doing the measurement—which we can think of as effectively equivalencing many underlying branches of history—will have an effect on subsequent behavior, and subsequent measurements.

But let’s say we look just at the level of the underlying multiway graph—or, more specifically, the multiway causal graph that records causal connections between different updating events. Then we can identify a complicated web of interdependence between events that are timelike, spacelike and branchlike separated. And this interdependence seems to correspond precisely to what’s expected from quantum mechanics.

In other words, even though the multiway graph is completely determined, the arbitrariness of “where the observer is” (particularly in branchial space), combined with the inevitable interdependence of different aspects of the multiway (causal) graph, seems sufficient to reproduce the not-quite-purely-probabilistic features of quantum mechanics.

In making observations in physical space, it’s common to make a measurement at one place or time, then make another measurement at another place or time, and, for example, see how they’re related. But in actually doing this, the observer will have to move from one place to the other, and persist from one time to another. And in the abstract it’s not obvious that that’s possible. For example, it could be that an observer won’t be able to move without changing—or, in other words, that “pure motion” won’t be possible for an observer. But in effect this is something we as observers assume about ourselves. And indeed, as I’ve discussed elsewhere, this is a crucial part of why we perceive spacetime to operate according to the laws of physics we know.

But what about in branchial space? We have much less intuition for this than for physical space. But we still effectively believe that pure motion is possible for us as observers in branchial space. It could be—like an observer in physical space, say, near a spacetime singularity—that an observer would get “shredded” when trying to “move” in branchial space. But our belief is that typically nothing like that happens. At some level being at different locations in branchial space presumably corresponds to picking different bases for our quantum states, or effectively to defining our experiments differently. And somehow our belief in the possibility of pure motion in branchial space seems related to our belief in the possibility of making arbitrary sequences choices in sets of experiments we do.

Observers of Abstract Worlds

We might have thought that the only thing ultimately “out there” for us to observe would be our physical universe. But actually there are important situations where we’re essentially operating not as observers of our familiar physical universe, but instead of what amount to abstract universes. And what we’ll see is that the ideas of observer theory seem to apply there too—except that now what we’re picking out and reducing to “internal impressions” are features not of the physical world but of abstract worlds.

Our Physics Project in a sense brings ideas about the physical and abstract worlds closer—and the concept of the ruliad ultimately leads to a deep unification between them. For what we now imagine is that the physical universe as we perceive it is just the result of the particular kind of sampling of the ruliad made by us as certain kinds of observers. And the point is that we as observers can make other kinds of samplings, leading to what we can describe as abstract universes. And one particularly prominent example of this is mathematics, or rather, metamathematics.

Imagine starting from all possible axioms for mathematics, then constructing the network of all possible theorems that can be derived from them. We can consider this as forming a kind of “metamathematical universe”. And the particular mathematics that some mathematician might study we can then think of as the result of a “mathematical observer” observing that metamathematical universe.

There are both close analogies and differences between this and the experience of a physical observer in the physical universe. Both ultimately correspond to samplings of the ruliad, but somewhat different ones.

In our Physics Project we imagine that physical space and everything in it is ultimately made up of discrete elements that we identify as “atoms of space”. But in the ruliad in general we can think of everything being made up of “pure atoms of existence” that we call emes. In the particular case of physics we interpret these emes as atoms of space. But in metamathematics we can think of emes as corresponding to (“subaxiomatic”) elements of symbolic structures—from which things like axioms or theorems can be constructed.

A central feature of our interaction with the ruliad for physics is that observers like us don’t track the detailed behavior of all the various atoms of space. Instead, we equivalence things to the point where we get descriptions that are reduced enough to “fit in our minds”. And something similar is going on in mathematics.

We don’t track all the individual subaxiomatic emes—or usually in practice even the details of fully formalized axioms and theorems. Instead, mathematics typically operates at a much higher and “more human” level, dealing not with questions like how real numbers can be built from emes—or even axioms—but rather with what can be deduced about the properties of mathematical objects like real numbers. In a physics analogy to the behavior of a gas, typical human mathematics operates not at the “molecular” level of individual emes (or even axioms) but rather at the “fluid dynamics” level of “human-accessible” mathematical concepts.

In effect, therefore, a mathematician is operating as an observer who equivalences many detailed configurations—ultimately of emes—in order to form higher-level mathematical constructs suitable for our computationally bounded minds. And while at the outset one might have imagined that anything in the ruliad could serve as a “possible mathematics”, the point is that observers like us can only sample the ruliad in particular ways—leading to only particular possible forms for “human-accessible” mathematics.

It’s a very similar story to the one we’ve encountered many times in thinking about physics. In studying gases, for example, we could imagine all sorts of theories based on tracking detailed molecular motions. But for observers like us—with our computational boundedness—we inevitably end up with things like the Second Law of thermodynamics, and the laws of fluid mechanics. And in mathematics the main thing we end up with is “higher-level mathematics”—mathematics that we can do directly in terms of typical textbook concepts, rather than constantly having to “drill down” to the level of axioms, or emes.

In physics we’re usually particularly concerned with issues like predicting how things will evolve through time. In mathematics it’s more about accumulating what can be considered true. And indeed we can think of an idealized mathematician as going through the ruliad and collecting in their minds a “bag” of theorems (or axioms) that they “consider to be true”. And given such a collection, they can essentially follow the “entailment paths” defined by computations in the ruliad to find more theorems to “add to their bag”. (And, yes, if they put in a false theorem then—because a false premise in the standard setup of logic implies everything—they’ll end up with an “infinite explosion of theorems”, that won’t fit in a finite mind.)

In observing the physical universe, we talk about our different possible senses (like vision, hearing, etc.) or different kinds of measuring devices. In observing the metamathematical universe the analogy is basically different possible kinds of theories or abstractions—say, algebraic vs. geometrical vs. topological vs. categorical, etc. (with new approaches being like new kinds of measuring devices).

Particularly when we think in terms of the ruliad we can expect a certain kind of ultimate unity in the metamathematical universe—but different theories and different abstractions will pick up different aspects of it, just as vision and hearing pick up different aspects of the physical universe. But in a sense observer theory gives us a global way to talk about this, and to characterize what kinds of observations observers like us can make—whether of the physical universe or the metamathematical one.

In physics we’ve then seen in our Physics Project how this allows us to find general laws that describe our perception of the physical world—and that turn out to reproduce the core known laws of physics. In mathematics we’re not as familiar with the concept of general laws, though the very fact that higher-level mathematics is possible is presumably in essence such a law, and perhaps the kinds of regularities seen in areas like category theory are others—as are the inevitable dualities we expect to be able to identify between different fields of mathematics. All these laws ultimately rely on the structure of the ruliad. But the crucial point is that they’re not talking about the “raw ruliad”; instead they’re talking about just certain samplings of the ruliad that can be done by observers like us, and that lead to certain kinds of “internal impressions” in terms of which these laws can be stated.

Mathematics represents a certain kind of abstract setup that’s been studied in a particularly detailed way over the centuries. But it’s not the only kind of “abstract setup” we can imagine. And indeed there’s even a much more familiar one: the use of concepts—and words—in human thinking and language.

We might imagine that at some time in the distant past our forebears could signify, say, rocks only by pointing at individual ones. But then there emerged the general notion of “rock”, captured by a word for “rock”. And once again this is a story of observers and equivalences. When we look at a rock, it presumably produces all sorts of detailed patterns of neuron firings in our brains, different for each particular rock. But somehow—presumably essentially through evolution to an attractor in the neural net in our brains—we equivalence all these patterns to extract our “inner impression” of the “concept of a rock”.

In the typical tradition of quantitative science we tend to be interested in doing measurements that lead to things like numerical results. But in representing the world using language we tend to be interested instead in creating symbolic structures that involve collections of discrete words embedded in a grammatical framework. Such linguistic descriptions don’t capture every detail; in a typical observer kind of way they broadly equivalence many things—and in a sense reduce the complexity of the world to a description in terms of a limited number of discrete words and linguistic forms.

Within any given person’s brain there’ll be “thoughts” defined by patterns of neuron firings. And the crucial role of language is to provide a way to robustly “package up” those thoughts, and for example represent them with discrete words, so they can be communicated to another person—and unpacked in that person’s brain to produce neuron firings that reproduce what amount to those same thoughts.

When we’re dealing with something like a numerical measurement we might imagine that it could have some kind of absolute interpretation. But words are much more obviously an “arbitrary basis” for communication. We could pick a different specific word (say from a different human language) but still “communicate the same thing”. All that’s required is that everyone who’s using the word agrees on its meaning. And presumably that normally happens because of shared “social” history between people who use a given word.

It’s worth pointing out that for this to work there has to be a certain separation of scales. The collective impression of the meaning of a word may change over time, but that change has to be slow compared to the rate at which the word is used in actual communication. In effect, the meaning of a word—as we humans might understand it—emerges from the aggregation of many individual uses.

In the abstract, there might not be any reason to think that there’d be a way to “understand words consistently”. But it’s a story very much like what we’ve encountered in both physics and mathematics. Even though there are lots of complicated individual details “underneath”, we as observers manage to pick out features that are “simple enough for us to understand”. In the case of molecules in a gas that might be the overall pressure of the gas. And in the case of words it’s a stable notion of “meaning”.

Put another way, the possibility of language is another example of observer theory at work. Inside our brains there are all sorts of complicated neuron firings. But somehow these can be “packaged up” into things like words that form “human-level narratives”.

There’s a certain complicated feedback loop between the world as we experience it and the words we use to describe it. We invent words for things that we commonly encounter (“chair”, “table”, …). Yet once we have a word for something we’re more able to form thoughts about it, or communicate about it. And that in turn makes us more likely to put instances of it in our environment. In other words, we tend to build our environment so that the way we have of making narratives about it works well—or, in effect, so our inner description of it can be as simple as possible, and it can be as predictable to us as possible.

We can view our experience of physics and of mathematics as being the result of us acting as physical observers and mathematical observers. Now we’re viewing our experience of the “conceptual universe” as being the result of us acting as “conceptual observers”. But what’s crucial is that in all these cases, we have the same intrinsic features as observers: computational boundedness and a belief in persistence. The computational boundedness is what makes us equivalence things to the point where we can have symbolic descriptions of the world, for example in terms of words. And the belief in persistence is what lets those words have persistent meanings.

And actually these ideas extend beyond just language—to paradigms, and general ways of thinking about things. When we define a word we’re in effect defining an abstraction for a class of things. And paradigms are somehow a generalization of this: ways of taking lots of specifics and coming up with a uniform framework for them. And when we do this, we’re in effect making a classic observer theory move—and equivalencing lots of different things to produce an “internal impression” that’s “simple enough” to fit in our finite minds.

In the End It’s All Just the Ruliad

Our tendency as observers is always to believe that we can separate our “inner experience” from what’s going on in the “outside world”. But in the end everything is just part of the ruliad. And at the level of the ruliad we as observers are ultimately “made of the same stuff” as everything else.

But can we imagine that we can point at one part of the ruliad and say “that’s an observer”, and at another part and say “that’s not”? At least to some extent the answer is presumably yes—at least if we restrict ourselves to “observers like us”. But it’s a somewhat subtle—and seemingly circular—story.

For example, one core feature of observers like us is that we have a certain persistence, or at least we believe we have a certain persistence. But, inevitably, at the level of the “raw ruliad”, we’re continually being made from different atoms of existence, i.e. different emes. So in what sense are we persistent? Well, the point is that an observer can equivalence those successive patterns of emes, so that what they observe is persistent. And, yes, this is at least on the face of it circular. And ultimately to identify what parts of the ruliad might be “persistent enough to be observers”, we’ll have to ground this circularity in some kind of further assumption.

What about the computational boundedness of observers like us, which forces us to do lots of equivalencing? At some level that equivalencing must be implemented by lots of different states evolving to the same states. But once again there’s circularity, because even to define what we mean by “the same states” (“Are isomorphic graphs the same?”, etc.) we have to be imagining certain equivalencing.

So how do we break out of the circularity? The key is presumably the presence of additional features that define “observers like us”. And one important class of such features has to do with scale.

We’re neither tiny nor huge. We involve enough emes that consistent averages can emerge. Yet we don’t involve so many emes that we span anything but an absolutely tiny part of the whole ruliad.

And actually a lot of our experience is determined by “our size as observers”. We’re large enough that certain equivalencing is inevitable. Yet we’re small enough that we can reasonably think of there being many choices for “where we are”.

The overall structure of the ruliad is a matter of formal necessity; there’s only one possible way for it to be. But there’s contingency in our character as observers. And for example in a sense there’s a fundamental constant of nature as we perceive it, which is our extent in the ruliad, say measured in emes (and appropriately projected into physical space, branchial space, etc.).

And the fact that this extent is small compared to the whole ruliad means that there are “many possible observers”—who we can think of as existing at different positions in the ruliad. And those different observers will look at the ruliad from different “points of view”, and thus develop different “internal impressions” of “perceived reality”.

But a crucial fact central to our Physics Project is that there are certain aspects of that perceived reality that are inevitable for observers like us—and that correspond to core laws of physics. But when it gets to more specific questions (“What does the night sky look like from where you are?”, etc.) different observers will inevitably have different versions of perceived reality.

So is there a way to translate from one observer to another? Essentially that’s a story of motion. What happens when an observer at one place in the ruliad “moves” to another place? Inevitably, the observer will be “made of different emes” if it’s at a different place. But will it somehow still “be the same”? Well, that’s a subtle question, that depends both on the background structure of the ruliad, and the nature of the observer.

If the ruliad is “too wild” (think: spacetime near a singularity) then the observer will inevitably be “shredded” as it “moves”. But computational irreducibility implies a certain overall regularity to most of the ruliad, making “pure motion” at least conceivable. But to achieve “pure motion” the observer still has to be “made of” something that is somehow robust—essentially some “lump of computational reducibility” that can “predictably survive” the underlying background of computational irreducibility.

In spacetime we can identify such “lumps” with things like black holes, and particles like electrons, photons, etc. (and, yes, in our models there’s probably considerable commonality between black holes and particles). It’s not yet clear quite what the analog is in branchial space, though a very simple example might involve persistence of qubits. And in rulial space, one kind of analog is the very notion of concepts. For in effect concepts (as represented for example by words) are the analog of particles in rulial space: they are the robust structures that can move across rulial space and “maintain their identity”, carrying “the same thoughts” to different minds.

So what does all this mean for what can constitute an observer in the ruliad? Observers in effect leverage computational reducibility to extract simplified features that can “fit in finite minds”. But observers themselves must also embody computational reducibility in order to maintain their own persistence and the persistence of the features they extract. Or in other words, observers must in a sense always correspond to “patches of regularity” in the ruliad.

But can any patch of regularity in the ruliad be thought of as an observer? Probably not usefully so. Because another feature of observers like us is that we are connected in some kind of collective “social” framework. Not only do we individually form internal impressions in our minds, but we also communicate these impressions. And indeed without such communication we wouldn’t, for example, be able to set up things like coherent languages with which to describe things.

What We Assume about Ourselves

A key implication of our Physics Project and the concept of the ruliad is that we perceive the universe to be the way we do because we are the way we are as observers. And the most fundamental aspect of observers like us is that we’re doing lots of equivalencing to reduce the “complexity of the world” to “internal impressions” that “fit into our minds”. But just what kinds of equivalencing are we actually doing? At some level a lot of that is defined by the things we believe—or assume—about ourselves and the way we interact with the world.

A very central assumption we make is that we’re somehow “stable observers” of a changing “outside world”. Of course, at some level we’re actually not “stable” at all: we’re built up from emes whose configuration is changing all the time. But our belief in our own stability—and, in effect, our belief in our “persistence in time”—makes us equivalence those configurations. And having done that equivalencing we perceive the universe to operate in a certain way, that turns out to align with the laws of physics we know.

But actually there’s more than just our assumption of persistence in time. For example, we also have an assumption of persistence in space: we assume that—at least on reasonably short timescales—we’re consistently “observing the universe from the same place”, and not, say, “continually darting around”. The network that represents space is continually changing “around us”. But we equivalence things so that we can assume that—in a first approximation—we are “staying in the same place”.

Of course, we don’t believe that we have to stay in exactly the same place all the time; we believe we’re able to move. And here we make what amounts to another “assumption of stability”: we assume that pure motion is possible for us as observers. In other words, we assume that we can “go to different places” and still be “the same us”, with the same properties as observers.

At the level of the “raw ruliad” it’s not at all obvious that such assumptions can be consistently made. But as we discussed above, the fact that for observers like us they can (at least to a good approximation) is a reflection of certain properties of us as observers—in particular of our physical scale, being large in terms of atoms of space but small in terms of the whole universe.

Related to our assumption about motion is our assumption that “space exists”—or that we can treat space as something coherent. Underneath, there’s all sorts of complicated dynamics of changing patterns of emes. But on the timescales at which we experience things we can equivalence these patterns to allow us to think of space as having a “coherent structure”. And, once again, the fact that we can do this is a consequence of physical scales associated with us as observers. In particular, the speed of light is “fast enough” that it brings information to us from the local region around us in much less time than it takes our brain to process it. And this means that we can equivalence all the different ways in which different pieces of information reach us, and we can consistently just talk about the state of a region of space at a given time.

Part of our assumption that we’re “persistent in time” is that our thread of experience is—at least locally—continuous, with no breaks. Yes, we’re born and we die—and we also sleep. But we assume that at least on scales relevant for our ongoing perception of the world, we experience time as something continuous.

More than that, we assume that we have just a single thread of experience. Or, in other words, that there’s always just “one us” going through time. Of course, even at the level of neurons in our brains all sorts of activity goes on in parallel. But somehow in our normal psychological state we seem to concentrate everything so that our “inner experience” follows just one “thread of history”, on which we can operate in a computationally bounded way, and form definite memories and have definite sequences of thoughts.

We’re not as familiar with branchial space as with physical space. But presumably our “fundamental assumption of stability” extends there as well. And when combined with our basic computational boundedness it then becomes inevitable that (as we discussed above) we’ll conflate different “quantum paths of history” to give us as observers a definite “classical thread of inner experience”.

Beyond “stability”, another very important assumption we implicitly make about ourselves is what amounts to an assumption of “independence”. We imagine that we can somehow separate ourselves off from “everything else”. And one aspect of this is that we assume we’re localized—and that most of the ruliad “doesn’t matter to us”, so that we can equivalence all the different states of the “rest of the ruliad”.

But there’s also another aspect of “independence”: that in effect we can choose to do “whatever we want” independent of the rest of the universe. And this means that we assume we can, for example, essentially “do any possible experiment”, make any possible measurement—or “go anywhere we want” in physical or branchial space, or indeed rulial space. We assume that we effectively have “free will” about these things—determined only by our “inner choices”, and independent of the state of the rest of the universe.

Ultimately, of course, we’re just part of the ruliad, and everything we do is determined by the structure of the ruliad and our history within it. But we can view our “belief of freedom” as a reflection of the fact that we don’t know a priori where we’ll be located in the ruliad—and even if we did, computational irreducibility would prevent us from making predictions about what we will do.

Beyond our assumptions about our own “independence from the rest of the universe”, there’s also the question of independence between different parts of what we observe. And quite central to our way of “parsing the world” is our typical assumption that we can “think about different things separately”. In other words, we assume it’s possible to “factor” what we see happening in the universe into independent parts.

In science, this manifests itself in the idea that we can do “controlled experiments” in which we study how something behaves in isolation from everything else. It’s not self-evident that this will be possible (and indeed in areas like ethics it might fundamentally not be), but we as observers tend to implicitly assume it.

And actually, we normally go much further. Because we typically assume that we can describe—and think about—the world “symbolically”. In other words, we assume that we can take all the complexity of the world and represent at least the parts of it that we care about in terms of discrete symbolic concepts, of the kind that appear in human (or computational) language. There’s lots of detail in the world that our limited collection of symbolic concepts doesn’t capture, and effectively “equivalences out”. But the point is that it’s this symbolic description that normally seems to form the backbone of the “inner narrative” we have about the world.

There’s another implicit assumption that’s being made here, however. And that’s that there’s some kind of stability in the symbolic concepts we’re using. Yes, any particular mind might parse the world using a particular set of symbolic concepts. But we make the implicit assumption that there are other minds out there that work like ours. And this makes us imagine that there can be some form of “objective reality” that’s just “always out there”, to be sampled by whatever mind might happen to come along.

Not only, therefore, do we assume our own stability as observers; we also assume a certain stability to what we perceive of “everything that’s out there”. Underneath, there’s all the wildness and complexity of the ruliad. But we assume that we can successfully equivalence things to the point where all we perceive is something quite stable—and something that we can describe as ultimately governed by consistent laws.

It could be that every part of the universe just “does its own thing”, with no overall laws tying everything together. But we make the implicit assumption that, no, the universe—at least as far as we perceive it—is a more organized and consistent place. And indeed it’s that assumption that makes it feasible for us to operate as observers like us at all, and to even imagine that we can usefully reduce the complexity of the world to something that “fits in our finite minds”.

The Cost of Observation

What resources does it take for an observer to make an observation? In most of traditional science, observation is at best added as an afterthought, and no account is taken of the process by which it occurs. And indeed, for example, in the traditional formalism of quantum mechanics, while “measurement” can have an effect on a system, it’s still assumed to be an “indivisible act” without any “internal process”.

But in observer theory, we’re centrally talking about the process of observation. And so it makes sense to try asking questions about the resources involved in this process.

We might start with our own everyday experience. Something happens out in the world. What resources—and, for example, how much time—does it take us to “form an impression of it”? Let’s say that out in the world a cat either comes into view or it doesn’t. There are signals that come to our brain from our eyes, effectively carrying data on each pixel in our visual field. Then, inside our brain, these signals are processed by a succession of layers of neurons, with us in the end concluding either “there’s a cat there”, or “there’s not”.

And from artificial neural nets we can get a pretty good idea of how this likely works. And the key to it—as we discussed above—is that there’s an attractor. Lots of different detailed configurations of pixels all evolve either to the “cat” or “no cat” final state. The different configurations have been equivalenced, so that only a “final conclusion” survives.

The story is a bit trickier though. Because “cat” or “no cat” really isn’t the final state of our brain; hopefully it’s not the “last thought we have”. Instead, our brain will continue to “think more thoughts”. So “cat”/”no cat” is at best some kind of intermediate waypoint in our process of thinking; an instantaneous conclusion that we’ll continue to “build on”.

And indeed when we consider measuring devices (like a piston measuring the pressure of a gas) we similarly usually imagine that they will “come to an instantaneous conclusion”, but “continue operating” and “producing more data”. But how long should we wait for each intermediate conclusion? How long, for example, will it take for the stresses generated by a particular pattern of molecules hitting a piston to “dissipate out”, and for the piston to be “ready to produce more data”?

There are lots of specific questions of physics here. But if our purpose is to build a formal observer theory, how should we think about such things? There is something of an analogy in the formal theory of computation. An actual computational system—say in the physical world—will just “keep computing”. But in formal computation theory it’s useful to talk about computations that halt, and about functions that can be “evaluated” and give a “definite answer”. So what’s the analog of this in observer theory?

Instead of general computations, we’re interested in computations that effectively “implement equivalences”. Or, put another way, we want computations that “destroy information”—and that have many incoming states but few outgoing ones. As a practical matter, we can either have the outgoing states explicitly represent whole equivalence classes, or they can just be “canonical representatives”—like in a network where at each step each element takes on whatever the “majority” or “consensus” value of its neighbors was.

But however it works, we can still ask questions about what computational resources were involved. How many steps did it take? How many elements were involved?

And with the idea that observers like us are “computationally bounded”, we expect limitations on these resources. But with this formal setup we can start asking just how far an observer like us can get, say in “coming to a conclusion” about the results of some computationally irreducible process.

An interesting case arises in putative quantum computers. In the model implied by our Physics Project, such a “quantum computer” effectively “performs many computations in parallel” on the separate branches of a multiway system representing the various threads of history of the universe. But if the observer tries to “come to a conclusion” about what actually happened, they have to “knit together” all those threads of history, in effect by implementing equivalences between them.

One could in principle imagine an observer who’d just follow all the quantum branches. But it wouldn’t be an observer like us. Because what seems to be a core feature of observers like us is that we believe we have just a single thread of experience. And to maintain that belief, our “process of observation” must equivalence all the different quantum branches.

How much “effort” will that be? Well, inevitably if a thread of history branched, our equivalencing has to “undo that branching”. And that suggests that the number of “elementary equivalencings” will have to be at least comparable to the number of “elementary branchings”—making it seem that the “effort of observation” will tend to be at least comparable to reduction of effort associated with parallelism in the “underlying quantum process”.

In general it’s interesting to compare the “effort of observation” with the “effort of computation”. With our concept of “elementary equivalencings” we have a way to measure both in terms of computational operations. And, yes, both could in principle be implemented by something like a Turing machine, though in practice the equivalencings might be most conveniently modeled by something like string rewriting.

And indeed one can often go much further, talking not directly in terms of equivalencings, but rather about processes that show attractors. There are different kinds of attractors. Sometimes—as in class 1 cellular automata—there are just a limited number of static, global fixed points (say, either all cells black or all cells white). But in other cases—such as class 3 cellular automata—the number of “output states” may be smaller than the number of “input states” but there may be no computationally simple characterization of them.

“Observers like us”, though, mostly seem to make use of the fixed points. We try to “symbolicize the world”, taking all the complexities “out there”, and reducing them to “discrete conclusions”, that we might for example describe using the discrete words in a language.

There’s an immediate subtlety associated with attractors of any kind, though. Typical physics is reversible, in the sense that any process (say two molecules scattering from each other) can run equally well forwards and backwards. But in an attractor one goes from lots of possible initial states to a smaller number of “attractor” final states. And there are two basic ways this can happen, even when there’s underlying reversibility. First, the system one’s studying can be “open”, in the sense that effects can “radiate” out of the region that one’s studying. And second, the states the system gets into can be “complicated enough” that, say, a computationally bounded observer will inevitably equivalence them. And indeed that’s the main thing that’s happening, for example, when a system “reaches thermodynamic equilibrium”, as described by the Second Law.

And actually, once again, there’s often a certain circularity. One is trying to determine whether an observer has “finished observing” and “come to a conclusion”. But one needs an observer to make that determination. Can we tell if we’ve finished “forming a thought”? Well, we have to “think about it”—in effect by forming another thought.

Put another way: imagine we are trying to determine whether a piston has “come to a conclusion” about pressure in a gas. Particularly if there’s microscopic reversibility, the piston and things around it will “continue wiggling around”, and it’ll “take an observer” to determine whether the “heat is dissipated” to the point where one can “read out the result”.

But how do we break out of what seems like an infinite regress? The point is that whatever mind is ultimately forming the impression that is “the observation” is inevitably the final arbiter. And, yes, this could mean that we’d always have to start discussing all sorts of details about photoreceptors and neurons and so on. But—as we’ve discussed at length—the key point that makes a general observer theory possible is that there are many conclusions that can be drawn for large classes of observers, quite independent of these details.

But, OK, what happens if we think about the raw ruliad? Now all we have are emes and elementary events updating the configuration of them. And in a sense we’re “fishing out of this” pieces that represent observers, and pieces that represent things they’re observing. Can we “assess the cost of observation” here? It really depends on the fundamental scale of what we consider to be observers. And in fact we might even think of our scale as observers (say measured in emes or elementary events) as defining a “fundamental constant of nature”—at least for the universe as we perceive it. But given this scale, we can for example ask for there to develop “consensus across it”, or at least for “every eme in it to have had time to communicate with every other”.

In an attempt to formalize the “cost of observation” we’ll inevitably have to make what seem like arbitrary choices, just as we would in setting up a scheme to determine when an ongoing computational process has “generated an answer”. But if we assume a certain boundedness to our choices, we can expect that we’ll be able to draw definite conclusions, and in effect be able to construct an analog of computational complexity theory for processes of observation.

The Future of Observer Theory

My goal here has been to explore some of the key concepts and principles needed to create a framework that we can call observer theory. But what I’ve done is just the beginning, and there is much still to be done in fleshing out the theory and investigating its implications.

One important place to start is in making more explicit models of the “mechanics of observation”. At the level of the general theory, it’s all about equivalencing. But how specifically is that equivalencing achieved in particular cases? There are many thousands of kinds of sensors, measuring devices, analysis methods, etc. All of these should be systematically inventoried and classified. And in each case there’s a metamodel to be made, that clarifies just how equivalencing is achieved, and, for example, what separation of physical (or other) scales make it possible.

Human experience and human minds are the inspiration—and ultimate grounding—for our concept of an observer. And insofar as neural nets trained on what amounts to human experience have emerged as somewhat faithful models for what human minds do, we can expect to use them as a fairly detailed proxy for observers like us. So, for example, we can imagine exploring things like quantum observers by studying multiway generalizations of neural nets. (And this is something that becomes easier if instead of organizing their data into real-number weights we can “atomize” neural nets into purely discrete elements.)

Such investigations of potentially realistic models provide a useful “practical grounding” for observer theory. But to develop a general observer theory we need a more formal notion of an observer. And there is no doubt a whole abstract framework—perhaps using methods from areas like category theory—that can be developed purely on the basis of our concept of observers being about equivalencing.

But to understand the connection of observer theory to things like science as done by us humans, we need to tighten up what it means to be an “observer like us”. What exactly are all the general things we “believe about ourselves”? As we discussed above, many we so much take for granted that it’s challenging for us to identify them as actually just “beliefs” that in principle don’t have to be that way.

But I suspect that the more we can tighten up our definition of “observers like us”, the more we’ll be able to explain why we perceive the world the way we do, and attribute to it the laws and properties we do. Is there some feature of us as observers, for example, that makes us “parse” the physical world as being three-dimensional? We could represent the same data about what’s out there by assigning a one-dimensional (“space-filling”) coordinate to everything. But somehow observers like us don’t do that. And instead, in effect, we “probe the ruliad” by sampling it in what we perceive as 3D slices. (And, yes, the most obvious coarse graining just considers progressively larger geodesic balls, say in the spatial hypergraphs that appear in our Physics Project—but that’s probably at best just an approximation to the sampling observers like us do.)

As part of our Physics Project we’ve discovered that the structure of the three main theories of twentieth-century physics (statistical mechanics, general relativity and quantum mechanics) can be derived from properties of the ruliad just by knowing that observers like us are computationally bounded and believe we’re persistent in time. But how might we reach, say, the Standard Model of particle physics—with all its particular values of parameters, etc.? Some may be inevitable, given the underlying structure of our theory. But others, one suspects, are in effect reflections of aspects of us as observers. They are “derivable”, but only given our particular character—or beliefs—as observers. And, yes, presumably things like the “constant of nature” that characterizes “our size in emes” will appear in the laws we attribute to the universe as we perceive it.

And, by the way, these considerations of “observers like us” extend beyond physical observers. Thus, for example, as we tighten up our characterization of what we’re like as mathematical observers, we can expect that this will constrain the “possible laws of our mathematical universe”. We might have thought that we could “pick whatever axioms we want”, in effect sampling the ruliad to get any mathematics we want. But, presumably, observers like us can’t do this—so that questions like “Is the continuum hypothesis true?” can potentially have definite answers for any observers like us, and for any coherent mathematics that we build.

But in the end, do we really have to consider observers whose characteristics are grounded in human experience? We already reflexively generalize our own personal experiences to those of other humans. But can we go further? We don’t have the internal experience of being a dog, an ant colony, a computer, or an ocean. And typically at best we anthropomorphize such things, trying to reduce the behavior we perceive in them to elements that align with our own human experience.

But are we as humans just stuck with a particular kind of “internal experience”? The growth of technology—and in particular sensors and measuring devices—has certainly expanded the range of inputs that can be delivered to our brains. And the growth of our collective knowledge about the world has expanded our ways of representing and thinking about things. Right now those are basically our only ways of modifying our detailed “internal experience”. But what if we were to connect directly—and internally—into our brains?

Presumably, at least at first, we’d need the “neural user interface” to be familiar—and we’d be forced into, for example, concentrating everything into a single thread of experience. But what if we allowed “multiway experience”? Well, of course our brains are already made up of billions of neurons that each do things. But it seems to be a core feature of human experience that we concentrate those things to give a single thread of experience. And that seems to be an essential feature of being an “observer like us”.

That kind of concentration also happens in a flock of birds, an ant colony—or a human society. In all these cases, each individual organism “does their thing”. But somehow collective “decisions” get made, with many different detailed situations getting equivalenced together to leave only the “final decision”. So that means that from the outside, the system behaves as we would expect of an “observer like us”. Internally, that kind of “observer behavior” is happening “above the experience” of each single individual. But still, at the level of the “hive mind” it’s behavior typical of an observer like us.

That’s not to say, though, that we can readily imagine what it’s like to be a system like this, or even to be one of its parts. And in the effort to explore observer theory an important direction is to try to imagine ourselves having a different kind of experience than we do. And from “within” that experience, try to see what kind of laws would we attribute, say, to the physical universe.

In the early twentieth century, particularly in the context of relativity and quantum mechanics, it became clear that being “more realistic” about the observer was crucial in moving forward in science. Things like computational irreducibility—and even more so, our Physics Project—take that another step.

One used to imagine that science should somehow be “fundamentally objective”, and independent of all aspects of the observer. But what’s become clear is that it’s not. And that the nature of us as observers is actually crucial in determining what science we “experience”. But the crucial point is that there are often powerful conclusions that can be drawn even without knowing all the details of an observer. And that’s a central reason for building a general observer theory—in effect to give an objective way of formally and robustly characterizing what one might consider to be the subjective element in science.

Note

There are no doubt many precursors of varying directness that can be found to the things I discuss here; I have not attempted a serious historical survey. In my own work, a notable precursor from 2002 is Chapter 10 of A New Kind of Science, entitled “Processes of Perception and Analysis”. I thank many people involved with our Wolfram Physics Project for related discussions, including Xerxes Arsiwalla, Hatem Elshatlawy and particularly Jonathan Gorard.

How to Think Computationally about AI, the Universe and Everything

27 octobre 2023 à 21:47

Transcript of a talk at TED AI on October 17, 2023, in San Francisco

Human language. Mathematics. Logic. These are all ways to formalize the world. And in our century there’s a new and yet more powerful one: computation.

And for nearly 50 years I’ve had the great privilege of building an ever taller tower of science and technology based on that idea of computation. And today I want to tell you some of what that’s led to.

There’s a lot to talk about—so I’m going to go quickly… sometimes with just a sentence summarizing what I’ve written a whole book about.

You know, I last gave a TED talk thirteen years ago—in February 2010—soon after Wolfram|Alpha launched.

TED Talk 2010

And I ended that talk with a question: is computation ultimately what’s underneath everything in our universe?

I gave myself a decade to find out. And actually it could have needed a century. But in April 2020—just after the decade mark—we were thrilled to be able to announce what seems to be the ultimate “machine code” of the universe.

Wolfram Physics Project

And, yes, it’s computational. So computation isn’t just a possible formalization; it’s the ultimate one for our universe.

It all starts from the idea that space—like matter—is made of discrete elements. And that the structure of space and everything in it is just defined by the network of relations between these elements—that we might call atoms of space. It’s very elegant—but deeply abstract.

But here’s a humanized representation:

A version of the very beginning of the universe. And what we’re seeing here is the emergence of space and everything in it by the successive application of very simple computational rules. And, remember, those dots are not atoms in any existing space. They’re atoms of space—that are getting put together to make space. And, yes, if we kept going long enough, we could build our whole universe this way.

Eons later here’s a chunk of space with two little black holes, that eventually merge, radiating ripples of gravitational radiation:

And remember—all this is built from pure computation. But like fluid mechanics emerging from molecules, what emerges here is spacetime—and Einstein’s equations for gravity. Though there are deviations that we just might be able to detect. Like that the dimensionality of space won’t always be precisely 3.

And there’s something else. Our computational rules can inevitably be applied in many ways, each defining a different thread of time—a different path of history—that can branch and merge:

But as observers embedded in this universe, we’re branching and merging too. And it turns out that quantum mechanics emerges as the story of how branching minds perceive a branching universe.

The little pink lines here show the structure of what we call branchial space—the space of quantum branches. And one of the stunningly beautiful things—at least for a physicist like me—is that the same phenomenon that in physical space gives us gravity, in branchial space gives us quantum mechanics.

In the history of science so far, I think we can identify four broad paradigms for making models of the world—that can be distinguished by how they deal with time.

4 paradigms

In antiquity—and in plenty of areas of science even today—it’s all about “what things are made of”, and time doesn’t really enter. But in the 1600s came the idea of modeling things with mathematical formulas—in which time enters, but basically just as a coordinate value.

Then in the 1980s—and this is something in which I was deeply involved—came the idea of making models by starting with simple computational rules and then just letting them run:

Can one predict what will happen? No, there’s what I call computational irreducibility: in effect the passage of time corresponds to an irreducible computation that we have to run to know how it will turn out.

But now there’s something even more: in our Physics Project things become multicomputational, with many threads of time, that can only be knitted together by an observer.

It’s a new paradigm—that actually seems to unlock things not only in fundamental physics, but also in the foundations of mathematics and computer science, and possibly in areas like biology and economics too.

You know, I talked about building up the universe by repeatedly applying a computational rule. But how is that rule picked? Well, actually, it isn’t. Because all possible rules are used. And we’re building up what I call the ruliad: the deeply abstract but unique object that is the entangled limit of all possible computational processes. Here’s a tiny fragment of it shown in terms of Turing machines:

OK, so the ruliad is everything. And we as observers are necessarily part of it. In the ruliad as a whole, everything computationally possible can happen. But observers like us can just sample specific slices of the ruliad.

And there are two crucial facts about us. First, we’re computationally bounded—our minds are limited. And second, we believe we’re persistent in time—even though we’re made of different atoms of space at every moment.

So then here’s the big result. What observers with those characteristics perceive in the ruliad necessarily follows certain laws. And those laws turn out to be precisely the three key theories of 20th-century physics: general relativity, quantum mechanics, and statistical mechanics and the Second Law.

It’s because we’re observers like us that we perceive the laws of physics we do.

We can think of different minds as being at different places in rulial space. Human minds who think alike are nearby. Animals further away. And further out we get to alien minds where it’s hard to make a translation.

How can we get intuition for all this? We can use generative AI to take what amounts to an incredibly tiny slice of the ruliad—aligned with images we humans have produced.

We can think of this as a place in the ruliad described using the concept of a cat in a party hat:

Zooming out, we see what we might call “cat island”. But pretty soon we’re in interconcept space. Occasionally things will look familiar, but mostly we’ll see things we humans don’t have words for.

In physical space we explore more of the universe by sending out spacecraft. In rulial space we explore more by expanding our concepts and our paradigms.

We can get a sense of what’s out there by sampling possible rules—doing what I call ruliology:

Even with incredibly simple rules there’s incredible richness. But the issue is that most of it doesn’t yet connect with things we humans understand or care about. It’s like when we look at the natural world and only gradually realize we can use features of it for technology. Even after everything our civilization has achieved, we’re just at the very, very beginning of exploring rulial space.

But what about AIs? Just like we can do ruliology, AIs can in principle go out and explore rulial space. But left to their own devices, they’ll mostly be doing things we humans don’t connect with, or care about.

The big achievements of AI in recent times have been about making systems that are closely aligned with us humans. We train LLMs on billions of webpages so they can produce text that’s typical of what we humans write. And, yes, the fact that this works is undoubtedly telling us some deep scientific things about the semantic grammar of language—and generalizations of things like logic—that perhaps we should have known centuries ago.

You know, for much of human history we were kind of like LLMs, figuring things out by matching patterns in our minds. But then came more systematic formalization—and eventually computation. And with that we got a whole other level of power—to create truly new things, and in effect to go wherever we want in the ruliad.

But the challenge is to do that in a way that connects with what we humans—and our AIs—understand.

And in fact I’ve devoted a large part of my life to building that bridge. It’s all been about creating a language for expressing ourselves computationally: a language for computational thinking.

The goal is to formalize what we know about the world—in computational terms. To have computational ways to represent cities and chemicals and movies and formulas—and our knowledge about them.

It’s been a vast undertaking—that’s spanned more than four decades of my life. It’s something very unique and different. But I’m happy to report that in what has been Mathematica and is now the Wolfram Language I think we have now firmly succeeded in creating a truly full-scale computational language.

In effect, every one of the functions here can be thought of as formalizing—and encapsulating in computational terms—some facet of the intellectual achievements of our civilization:

It’s the most concentrated form of intellectual expression I know: finding the essence of everything and coherently expressing it in the design of our computational language. For me personally it’s been an amazing journey, year after year building the tower of ideas and technology that’s needed—and nowadays sharing that process with the world on open livestreams.

A few centuries ago the development of mathematical notation, and what amounts to the “language of mathematics”, gave a systematic way to express math—and made possible algebra, and calculus, and ultimately all of modern mathematical science. And computational language now provides a similar path—letting us ultimately create a “computational X” for all imaginable fields X.

We’ve seen the growth of computer science—CS. But computational language opens up something ultimately much bigger and broader: CX. For 70 years we’ve had programming languages—which are about telling computers in their terms what to do. But computational language is about something intellectually much bigger: it’s about taking everything we can think about and operationalizing it in computational terms.

You know, I built the Wolfram Language first and foremost because I wanted to use it myself. And now when I use it, I feel like it’s giving me a superpower:

I just have to imagine something in computational terms and then the language almost magically lets me bring it into reality, see its consequences and then build on them. And, yes, that’s the superpower that’s let me do things like our Physics Project.

And over the past 35 years it’s been my great privilege to share this superpower with many other people—and by doing so to have enabled such an incredible number of advances across so many fields. It’s a wonderful thing to see people—researchers, CEOs, kids—using our language to fluently think in computational terms, crispening up their own thinking and then in effect automatically calling in computational superpowers.

And now it’s not just people who can do that. AIs can use our computational language as a tool too. Yes, to get their facts straight, but even more importantly, to compute new facts. There are already some integrations of our technology into LLMs—and there’s a lot more you’ll be seeing soon. And, you know, when it comes to building new things, a very powerful emerging workflow is basically to start by telling the LLM roughly what you want, then have it try to express that in precise Wolfram Language. Then—and this is a critical feature of our computational language compared to a programming language—you as a human can “read the code”. And if it does what you want, you can use it as a dependable component to build on.

OK, but let’s say we use more and more AI—and more and more computation. What’s the world going to be like? From the Industrial Revolution on, we’ve been used to doing engineering where we can in effect “see how the gears mesh” to “understand” how things work. But computational irreducibility now shows that won’t always be possible. We won’t always be able to make a simple human—or, say, mathematical—narrative to explain or predict what a system will do.

And, yes, this is science in effect eating itself from the inside. From all the successes of mathematical science we’ve come to believe that somehow—if only we could find them—there’d be formulas to predict everything. But now computational irreducibility shows that isn’t true. And that in effect to find out what a system will do, we have to go through the same irreducible computational steps as the system itself.

Yes, it’s a weakness of science. But it’s also why the passage of time is significant—and meaningful. We can’t just jump ahead and get the answer; we have to “live the steps”.

It’s going to be a great societal dilemma of the future. If we let our AIs achieve their full computational potential, they’ll have lots of computational irreducibility, and we won’t be able to predict what they’ll do. But if we put constraints on them to make them predictable, we’ll limit what they can do for us.

So what will it feel like if our world is full of computational irreducibility? Well, it’s really nothing new—because that’s the story with much of nature. And what’s happened there is that we’ve found ways to operate within nature—even though nature can still surprise us.

And so it will be with the AIs. We might give them a constitution, but there will always be consequences we can’t predict. Of course, even figuring out societally what we want from the AIs is hard. Maybe we need a promptocracy where people write prompts instead of just voting. But basically every control-the-outcome scheme seems full of both political philosophy and computational irreducibility gotchas.

You know, if we look at the whole arc of human history, the one thing that’s systematically changed is that more and more gets automated. And LLMs just gave us a dramatic and unexpected example of that. So does that mean that in the end we humans will have nothing to do? Well, if you look at history, what seems to happen is that when one thing gets automated away, it opens up lots of new things to do. And as economies develop, the pie chart of occupations seems to get more and more fragmented.

And now we’re back to the ruliad. Because at a foundational level what’s happening is that automation is opening up more directions to go in the ruliad. And there’s no abstract way to choose between them. It’s just a question of what we humans want—and it requires humans “doing work” to define that.

A society of AIs untethered by human input would effectively go off and explore the whole ruliad. But most of what they’d do would seem to us random and pointless. Much like now most of nature doesn’t seem like it’s “achieving a purpose”.

One used to imagine that to build things that are useful to us, we’d have to do it step by step. But AI and the whole phenomenon of computation tell us that really what we need is more just to define what we want. Then computation, AI, automation can make it happen.

And, yes, I think the key to defining in a clear way what we want is computational language. You know—even after 35 years—for many people the Wolfram Language is still an artifact from the future. If your job is to program it seems like a cheat: how come you can do in an hour what would usually take a week? But it can also be daunting, because having dashed off that one thing, you now have to conceptualize the next thing. Of course, it’s great for CEOs and CTOs and intellectual leaders who are ready to race onto the next thing. And indeed it’s impressively popular in that set.

In a sense, what’s happening is that Wolfram Language shifts from concentrating on mechanics to concentrating on conceptualization. And the key to that conceptualization is broad computational thinking. So how can one learn to do that? It’s not really a story of CS. It’s really a story of CX. And as a kind of education, it’s more like liberal arts than STEM. It’s part of a trend that when you automate technical execution, what becomes important is not figuring out how to do things—but what to do. And that’s more a story of broad knowledge and general thinking than any kind of narrow specialization.

You know, there’s an unexpected human-centeredness to all of this. We might have thought that with the advance of science and technology, the particulars of us humans would become ever less relevant. But we’ve discovered that that’s not true. And that in fact everything—even our physics—depends on how we humans happen to have sampled the ruliad.

Before our Physics Project we didn’t know if our universe really was computational. But now it’s pretty clear that it is. And from that we’re inexorably led to the ruliad—with all its vastness, so hugely greater than all the physical space in our universe.

So where will we go in the ruliad? Computational language is what lets us chart our path. It lets us humans define our goals and our journeys. And what’s amazing is that all the power and depth of what’s out there in the ruliad is accessible to everyone. One just has to learn to harness those computational superpowers. Which starts here. Our portal to the ruliad:

Generative AI Space and the Mental Imagery of Alien Minds

17 juillet 2023 à 22:47

Click on any image in this post to copy the code that produced it and generate the output on your own computer in a Wolfram notebook.

Generative AI Space and the Mental Imagery of Alien Minds

AIs and Alien Minds

How do alien minds perceive the world? It’s an old and oft-debated question in philosophy. And it now turns out to also be a question that rises to prominence in connection with the concept of the ruliad that’s emerged from our Wolfram Physics Project.

I’ve wondered about alien minds for a long time—and tried all sorts of ways to imagine what it might be like to see things from their point of view. But in the past I’ve never really had a way to build my intuition about it. That is, until now. So, what’s changed? It’s AI. Because in AI we finally have an accessible form of alien mind.

We typically go to a lot of trouble to train our AIs to produce results that are like we humans would do. But what if we take a human-aligned AI, and modify it? Well, then we get something that’s in effect an alien AI—an AI aligned not with us humans, but with an alien mind.

So how can we see what such an alien AI—or alien mind—is “thinking”? A convenient way is to try to capture its “mental imagery”: the image it forms in its “mind’s eye”. Let’s say we use a typical generative AI to go from a description in human language—like “a cat in a party hat”—to a generated image:

It’s exactly the kind of image we’d expect—which isn’t surprising, because it comes from a generative AI that’s trained to “do as we would”. But now let’s imagine taking the neural net that implements this generative AI, and modifying its insides—say by resetting weights that appear in its neural net.

By doing this we’re in effect going from a human-aligned neural net to some kind of “alien” one. But this “alien” neural net will still produce some kind of image—because that’s what a neural net like this does. But what will the image be? Well, in effect, it’s showing us the mental imagery of the “alien mind” associated with the modified neural net.

But what does it actually look like? Well, here’s a sequence obtained by progressively modifying the neural net—in effect making it “progressively more alien”:

At the beginning it’s still a very recognizable picture of “a cat in a party hat”. But it soon becomes more and more alien: the mental image in effect diverges further from the human one—until it no longer “looks like a cat”, and in the end looks, at least to us, rather random.

There are many details of how this works that we’ll be discussing below. But what’s important is that—by studying the effects of changing the neural net—we now have a systematic “experimental” platform for probing at least one kind of “alien mind”. We can think of what we’re doing as a kind of “artificial neuroscience”, probing not actual human brains, but neural net analogs of them.

And we’ll see many parallels to neuroscience experiments. For example, we’ll often be “knocking out” particular parts of our “neural net brain”, a little like how injuries such as strokes can knock out parts of a human brain. But we know that when a human brain suffers a stroke, this can lead to phenomena like “hemispatial neglect”, in which a stroke victim asked to draw a clock will end up drawing just one side of the clock—a little like the pictures of cats “degrade” when parts of the “neural net brain” are knocked out.

Of course, there are many differences between real brains and artificial neural nets. But most of the core phenomena we’ll observe here seem robust and fundamental enough that we can expect them to span very different kinds of “brains”—human, artificial and alien. And the result is that we can begin to build up intuition about what the worlds of different—and alien—minds can be like.

Generating Images with AIs

How does an AI manage to create a picture, say of a cat in a party hat? Well, the AI has to be trained on “what makes a reasonable picture”—and how to determine what a picture is of. Then in some sense what the AI does is to start generating “reasonable” pictures at random, in effect continually checking what the picture it’s generating seems to be “of”, and tweaking it to guide it towards being a picture of what one wants.

So what counts as a “reasonable picture”? If one looks at billions of pictures—say on the web—there are lots of regularities. For example, the pixels aren’t random; nearby ones are usually highly correlated. If there’s a face, it’s usually more or less symmetrical. It’s more common to have blue at the top of a picture, and green at the bottom. And so on. And the important technological point is that it turns out to be possible to use a neural network to capture regularities in images, and to generate random images that exhibit them.

Here are some examples of “random images” generated in this way:

And the idea is that these images—while each is “random” in its specifics—will in general follow the “statistics” of the billions of images from the web on which the neural network has been “trained”. We’ll be talking more about images like these later. But for now suffice it to say that while some may just look like abstract patterns, others seem to contain things like landscapes, human forms, etc. And what’s notable is that none just look like “random arrays of pixels”; they all show some kind of “structure”. And, yes, given that they’ve been trained from pictures on the web, it’s not too surprising that the “structure” sometimes includes things like human forms.

But, OK, let’s say we specifically want a picture of a cat in a party hat. From all of the almost infinitely large number of possible “well-structured” random images we might generate, how do we get one that’s of a cat in a party hat? Well, a first question is: how would we know if we’ve succeeded? As humans, we could just look and see what our image is of. But it turns out we can also train a neural net to do this (and, no, it doesn’t always get it exactly right):

How is the neural net trained? The basic idea is to take billions of images—say from the web—for which corresponding captions have been provided. Then one progressively tweaks the parameters of the neural net to make it reproduce these captions when it’s fed the corresponding images. But the critical point is the neural net turns out to do more: it also successfully produces “reasonable” captions for images it’s never seen before. What does “reasonable” mean? Operationally, it means captions that are similar to what we humans might assign. And, yes, it’s far from obvious that a computationally constructed neural net will behave at all like us humans, and the fact that it does is presumably telling us fundamental things about how human brains work.

But for now what’s important is that we can use this captioning capability to progressively guide images we produce towards what we want. Start from “pure randomness”. Then try to “structure the randomness” to make a “reasonable” picture, but at every step see in effect “what the caption would be”. And try to “go in a direction” that “leads towards” a picture with the caption we want. Or, in other words, progressively try to get to a picture that’s of what we want.

The way this is set up in practice, one starts from an array of random pixels, then iteratively forms the picture one wants:

Different initial arrays lead to different final pictures—though if everything works correctly, the final pictures will all be of “what one asked for”, in this case a cat in a party hat (and, yes, there are a few “glitches”):

We don’t know how mental images are formed in human brains. But it seems conceivable that the process is not too different. And that in effect as we’re trying to “conjure up a reasonable image”, we’re continually checking if it’s aligned with what we want—so that, for example, if our checking process is impaired we can end up with a different image, as in hemispatial neglect.

The Notion of Interconcept Space

That everything can ultimately be represented in terms of digital data is foundational to the whole computational paradigm. But the effectiveness of neural nets relies on the slightly different idea that it’s useful to treat at least many kinds of things as being characterized by arrays of real numbers. In the end one might extract from a neural net that’s giving captions to images the word “cat”. But inside the neural net it’ll operate with arrays of numbers that correspond in some fairly abstract way to the image you’ve given, and the textual caption it’ll finally produce.

And in general neural nets can typically be thought of as associating “feature vectors” with things—whether those things are images, text, or anything else. But whereas words like “cat” and “dog” are discrete, the feature vectors associated with them just contain collections of real numbers. And this means that we can think of a whole space of possibilities, with “cat” and “dog” just corresponding to two specific points.

So what’s out there in that space of possibilities? For the feature vectors we typically deal with in practice the space is many-thousand-dimensional. But we can for example look at the (nominally straight) line from the “dog point” to the “cat point” in this space, and even generate sample images of what comes between:

And, yes, if we want to, we can keep going “beyond cat”—and pretty soon things start becoming quite weird:

We can also do things like look at the line from a plane to a cat—and, yes, there’s strange stuff in there (wings hat ears?):

What about elsewhere? For example, what happens “around” our standard “cat in a party hat”? With the particular setup we’re using, there’s a 2304-dimensional space of possibilities. But as an example, we look at what we get on a particular 2D plane through the “standard cat” point:

Our “standard cat” is in the middle. But as we move away from the “standard cat” point, progressively weirder things happen. For a while there are recognizable (if perhaps demonic) cats to be seen. But soon there isn’t much “catness” in evidence—though sometimes hats do remain (in what we might characterize as an “all hat, no cat” situation, reminiscent of the Texan “all hat, no cattle”).

How about if we pick other planes through the standard cat point? All sorts of images appear:

Click to enlarge Click to enlarge
Click to enlarge Click to enlarge

But the fundamental story is always the same: there’s a kind of “cat island”, beyond which there are weird and only vaguely cat-related images—encircled by an “ocean” of what seem like purely abstract patterns with no obvious cat connection. And in general the picture that emerges is that in the immense space of possible “statistically reasonable” images, there are islands dotted around that correspond to “linguistically describable concepts”—like cats in party hats.

The islands normally seem to be roughly “spherical”, in the sense that they extend about the same nominal distance in every direction. But relative to the whole space, each island is absolutely tiny—something like perhaps a fraction 2–2000 ≈ 10–600 of the volume of the whole space. And between these islands there lie huge expanses of what we might call “interconcept space”.

What’s out there in interconcept space? It’s full of images that are “statistically reasonable” based on the images we humans have put on the web, etc.—but aren’t of things we humans have come up with words for. It’s as if in developing our civilization—and our human language—we’ve “colonized” only certain small islands in the space of all possible concepts, leaving vast amounts of interconcept space unexplored.

What’s out there is pretty weird—and sometimes a bit disturbing. Here’s what we see zooming in on the same (randomly chosen) plane around “cat island” as above:

Click to enlarge Click to enlarge
Click to enlarge Click to enlarge

What are all these things? In a sense, words fail us. They’re things on the shores of interconcept space, where human experience has not (yet) taken us, and for which human language has not been developed.

What if we venture further out into interconcept space—and for example just sample points in the space at random? It’s just like we already saw above: we’ll get images that are somehow “statistically typical” of what we humans have put on the web, etc., and on which our AI was trained. Here are a few more examples:

And, yes, we can pick out at least two basic classes of images: ones that seem like “pure abstract textures”, and ones that seem “representational”, and remind us of real-world scenes from human experience. There are intermediate cases—like “textures” with structures that seem like they might “represent something”, and “representational-seeming” images where we just can’t place what they might be representing.

But when we do see recognizable “real-world-inspired” images they’re a curious reflection of the concepts—and general imagery—that we humans find “interesting enough to put on the web”. We’re not dealing here with some kind of “arbitrary interconcept space”; we’re dealing with “human-aligned” interconcept space that’s in a sense anchored to human concepts, but extends between and around them. And, yes, viewed in these terms it becomes quite unsurprising that in the interconcept space we’re sampling, there are so many images that remind us of human forms and common human situations.

But just what were the images that the AI saw, from which it formed this model of interconcept space? There were a few billion of them, “foraged” from the web. Like things on the web in general, it’s a motley collection; here’s a random sample:

Some can be thought of as capturing aspects of “life as it is”, but many are more aspirational, coming from staged and often promotionally oriented photography. And, yes, there are lots of Net-a-Porter-style “clothing-without-heads” images. There are also lots of images of “things”—like food, etc. But somehow when we sample randomly in interconcept space it’s the human forms that most distinctively stand out, conceivably because “things” are not particularly consistent in their structure, but human forms always have a certain consistency of “head-body-arms, etc.” structure.

It’s notable, though, that even the most real-world-like images we find by randomly sampling interconcept space seem to typically be “painterly” and “artistic” rather than “photorealistic” and “photographic”. It’s a different story close to “concept points”—like on cat island. There more photographic forms are common, though as we go away from the “actual concept point”, there’s a tendency towards either a rather toy-like appearance, or something more like an illustration.

By the way, even the most “photographic” images the AI generates won’t be anything that comes directly from the training set. Because—as we’ll discuss later—the AI is not set up to directly store images; instead its training process in effect “grinds up” images to extract their “statistical properties”. And while “statistical features” of the original images will show up in what the AI generates, any detailed arrangement of pixels in them is overwhelmingly unlikely to do so.

But, OK, what happens if we start not at a “describable concept” (like “a cat in a party hat”), but just at a random point in interconcept space? Here are the kinds of things we see:

Click to enlarge Click to enlarge
Click to enlarge Click to enlarge

The images often seem to be a bit more diverse than those around “known concept points” (like our “cat point” above). And occasionally there’ll be a “flash” of something “representationally familiar” (perhaps like a human form) that’ll show up. But most of the time we won’t be able to say “what these images are of”. They’re of things that are somehow “statistically” like what we’ve seen, but they’re not things that are familiar enough that we’ve—at least so far—developed a way to describe them, say with words.

The Images of Interconcept Space

There’s something strangely familiar—yet unfamiliar—to many of the images in interconcept space. It’s fairly common to see pictures that seem like they’re of people:

But they’re “not quite right”. And for us as humans, being particularly attuned to faces, it’s the faces that tend to seem the most wrong—even though other parts are “wrong” as well.

And perhaps in commentary on our nature as a social species (or maybe it’s as a social media species), there’s a great tendency to see pairs or larger groups of people:

There’s also a strange preponderance of torso-only pictures—presumably the result of “fashion shots” in the training data (and, yes, with some rather wild “fashion statements”):

People are by far the most common identifiable elements. But one does sometimes see other things too:

Then there are some landscape-type scenes:

Some look fairly photographically literal, but others build up the impression of landscapes from more abstract elements:

Occasionally there are cityscape-like pictures:

And—still more rarely—indoor-like scenes:

Then there are pictures that look like they’re “exteriors” of some kind:

It’s common to see images built up from lines or dots or otherwise “impressionistically formed”:

And then there are lots of images of that seem like they’re trying to be “of something”, but it’s not at all clear what that “thing” is, and whether indeed it’s something we humans would recognize, or whether instead it’s something somehow “fundamentally alien”:

It’s also quite common to see what look more like “pure patterns”—that don’t really seem like they’re “trying to be things”, but more come across like “decorative textures”:

But probably the single most common type of images are somewhat uniform textures, formed by repeating various simple elements, though usually with “dislocations” of various kinds:

Across interconcept space there’s tremendous variety to the images we see. Many have a certain artistic quality to them—and a feeling that they are some kind of “mindful interpretation” of a perhaps mundane thing in the world, or a simple, essentially mathematical pattern. And to some extent the “mind” involved is a collective version of our human one, reflected in a neural net that has “experienced” some of the many images humans have put on the web, etc. But in some ways the mind is also a more alien one, formed from the computational structure of the neural net, with its particular features, and no doubt in some ways computationally irreducible behavior.

And indeed there are some motifs that show up repeatedly that are presumably reflections of features of the underlying structure of the neural net. The “granulated” appearance, with alternation between light and dark, for example, is presumably a consequence of the dynamics of the convolutional parts of the neural net—and analogous to the results of what amounts to iterated blurring and sharpening with a certain effective pixel scale (reminiscent, for example, of video feedback):

Making Minds Alien

We can think of what we’ve done so far as exploring what a mind trained from human-like experiences can “imagine” by generalizing from those experiences. But what might a different kind of mind imagine?

As a very rough approximation, we can think of just taking the trained “mind” we’ve created, and explicitly modifying it, then seeing what it now “imagines”. Or, more specifically, we can take the neural net we have been using, and start making changes to it, and seeing what effect that has on the images it produces.

We’ll discuss later the details of how the network is set up, but suffice it to say here that it involves 391 distinct internal modules, involving altogether nearly a billion numerical weights. When the network is trained, those numerical weights are carefully tuned to achieve the results we want. But what if we just change them? We’ll still (normally) get a network that can generate images. But in some sense it’ll be “thinking differently”—so potentially the images will be different.

So as a very coarse first experiment—reminiscent of many that are done in biology—let’s just “knock out” each successive module in turn, setting all its weights to zero. If we ask the resulting network to generate a picture of “a cat in a party hat”, here’s what we now get:

Let’s look at these results in a bit more detail. In quite a few cases, zeroing out a single module doesn’t make much of a difference; for example, it might basically only change the facial expression of the cat:

But it can also more fundamentally change the cat (and its hat):

It can change the configuration or position of the cat (and, yes, some of those paws are not anatomically correct):

Zeroing out other modules can in effect change the “rendering” of the cat:

But in other cases things can get much more mixed up, and difficult for us to parse:

Sometimes there’s clearly a cat there, but its presentation is at best odd:

And sometimes we get images that have definite structure, but don’t seem to have anything to do with cats:

Then there are cases where we basically just get “noise”, albeit with things superimposed:

But—much like in neurophysiology—there are some modules (like the very first and last ones in our original list) where zeroing them out basically makes the system not work at all, and just generate “pure random noise”.

As we’ll discuss below, the whole neural net that we’re using has a fairly complex internal structure—for example, with a few fundamentally different kinds of modules. But here’s a sample of what happens if one zeros out modules at different places in the network—and what we see is that for the most part there’s no obvious correlation between where the module is, and what effect zeroing it out will have:

So far, we’ve just looked at what happens if we zero out a single module at a time. Here are some randomly chosen examples of what happens if one zeros out successively more modules (one might call this a “HAL experiment” in remembrance of the fate of the fictional HAL AI in the movie 2001):

And basically once the “catness” of the images is lost, things become more and more alien from there on out, ending either in apparent randomness, or sometimes barren “zeroness”.

Rather than zeroing out modules, we can instead randomize the weights in them (perhaps a bit like the effect of a tumor rather than a stroke in a brain)—but the results are usually at least qualitatively similar:

Something else we can do is just to progressively mix randomness uniformly into every weight in the network (perhaps a bit like globally “drugging” a brain). Here are three examples where in each case 0%, 1%, 2%, … of randomness was added—all “fading away” in a very similar way:

And similarly, we can progressively scale down towards zero (in 1% increments: 100%, 99%, 98%, …) all the weights in the network:

Or we can progressively increase the numerical values of the weights—eventually in some sense “blowing the mind” of the network (and going a bit “psychedelic” in the process):

Minds in Rulial Space

We can think of what we’ve done so far as exploring some of the “natural history” of what’s out there in generative AI space—or as providing a small taste of at least one approximation to the kind of mental imagery one might encounter in alien minds. But how does this fit into a more general picture of alien minds and what they might be like?

With the concept of the ruliad we finally have a principled way to talk about alien minds—at least at a theoretical level. And the key point is that any alien mind—or, for that matter, any mind—can be thought of as “observing” or sampling the ruliad from its own particular point of view, or in effect, its own position in rulial space.

The ruliad is defined to be the entangled limit of all possible computations: a unique object with an inevitable structure. And the idea is that anything—whether one interprets it as a phenomenon or an observer—must be part of the ruliad. The key to our Physics Project is then that “observers like us” have certain general characteristics. We are computationally bounded, with “finite minds” and limited sensory input. And we have a certain coherence that comes from our belief in our persistence in time, and our consistent thread of experience. And what we then discover in our Physics Project is the rather remarkable result that from these characteristics and the general properties of the ruliad alone it’s essentially inevitable that we must perceive the universe to exhibit the fundamental physical laws it does, in particular the three big theories of twentieth-century physics: general relativity, quantum mechanics and statistical mechanics.

But what about more detailed aspects of what we perceive? Well, that will depend on more detailed aspects of us as observers, and of how our minds are set up. And in a sense, each different possible mind can be thought of as existing in a certain place in rulial space. Different human minds are mostly close in rulial space, animal minds further away, and more alien minds still further. But how can we characterize what these minds are “thinking about”, or how these minds “perceive things”?

From inside our own minds we can form a sense of what we perceive. But we don’t really have good ways to reliably probe what another mind perceives. But what about what another mind imagines? Well, that’s where what we’ve been doing here comes in. Because with generative AI we’ve got a mechanism for exposing the “mental imagery” of an “AI mind”.

We could consider doing this with words and text, say with an LLM. But for us humans images have a certain fluidity that text does not. Our eyes and brains can perfectly well “see” and absorb images even if we don’t “understand” them. But it’s very difficult for us to absorb text that we don’t “understand”; it usually tends to seem just like a kind of “word soup”.

But, OK, so we generate “mental imagery” from “minds” that have been “made alien” by various modifications. How come we humans can understand anything such minds make? Well, it’s bit like one person being able to understand the thoughts of another. Their brains—and minds—are built differently. And their “internal view” of things will inevitably be different. But the crucial idea—that’s for example central to language—is that it’s possible to “package up” thoughts into something that can be “transported” to another mind. Whatever some particular internal thought might be, by the time we can express it with words in a language, it’s possible to communicate it to another mind that will “unpack” it into different internal thoughts.

It’s a nontrivial fact of physics that “pure motion” in physical space is possible; in other words, that an “object” can be moved “without change” from one place in physical space to another. And now, in a sense, we’re asking about pure motion in rulial space: can we move something “without change” from one mind at one place in rulial space to another mind at another place? In physical space, things like particles—as well as things like black holes—are the fundamental elements that are imagined to move without change. So what’s now the analog in rulial space? It seems to be concepts—as often, for example, represented by words.

So what does that mean for our exploration of generative AI “alien minds”? We can ask whether when we move from one potentially alien mind to another concepts are preserved. We don’t have a perfect proxy for this (though we could make a better one by appropriately training neural net classifiers). But as a first approximation this is like asking whether as we “change the mind”—or move in rulial space—we can still recognize the “concept” the mind produces. Or, in other words, if we start with a “mind” that’s generating a cat in a party hat, will we still recognize the concepts of cat or hat in what a “modified mind” produces?

And what we’ve seen is that sometimes we do, and sometimes we don’t. And for example when we looked at “cat island” we saw a certain boundary beyond which we could no longer recognize “catness” in the image that was produced. And by studying things like cat island (and particularly its analogs when not just the “prompt” but also the underlying neural net is changed) it should be possible to map out how far concepts “extend” across alien minds.

It’s also possible to think about a kind of inverse question: just what is the extent of a mind in rulial space? Or, in other words, what range of points of view, ultimately about the ruliad, can it hold? Will it be “narrow-minded”, able to think only in particular ways, with particular concepts? Or will it be more “broad-minded”, encompassing more ways of thinking, with more concepts?

In a sense the whole arc of the intellectual development of our civilization can be thought of as corresponding to an expansion in rulial space: with us progressively being able to think in new ways, and about new things. And as we expand in rulial space, we are in effect encompassing more of what we previously would have had to consider the domain of an alien mind.

When we look at images produced by generative AI away from the specifics of human experience—say in interconcept space, or with modified rules of generation—we may at first be able to make little from them. Like inkblots or arrangements of stars we’ll often find ourselves wanting to say that what we see looks like this or that thing we know.

But the real question is whether we can devise some way of describing what we see that allows us to build thoughts on what we see, or “reason” about it. And what’s very typical is that we manage to do this when we come up with a general “symbolic description” of what we see, say captured with words in natural language (or, now, computational language). Before we have those words, or that symbolic description, we’ll tend just not to absorb what we see.

And so, for example, even though nested patterns have always existed in nature, and were even explicitly created by mosaic artisans in the early 1200s, they seem to have never been systematically noticed or discussed at all until the latter part of the 20th century, when finally the framework of “fractals” was developed for talking about them.

And so it may be with many of the forms we’ve seen here. As of today, we have no name for them, no systematic framework for thinking about them, and no reason to view them as important. But particularly if the things we do repeatedly show us such forms, we’ll eventually come up with names for them, and start incorporating them into the domain that our minds cover.

And in a sense what we’ve done here can be thought of as showing us a preview of what’s out there in rulial space, in what’s currently the domain of alien minds. In the general exploration of ruliology, and the investigation of what arbitrary simple programs in the computational universe do, we’re able to jump far across the ruliad. But it’s typical that what we see is not something we can connect to things we’re familiar with. In what we’re doing here, we’re moving only much smaller distances in rulial space. We’re starting from generative AI that’s closely aligned with current human development—having been trained from images that we humans have put on the web, etc. But then we’re making small changes to our “AI mind”, and looking at what it now generates.

What we see is often surprising. But it’s still close enough to where we “currently are” in rulial space that we can—at least to some extent—absorb and reason about what we’re seeing. Still, the images often don’t “make sense” to us. And, yes, quite possibly the AI has invented something that has a rich and “meaningful” inner structure. But it’s just that we don’t (yet) have a way to talk about it—and if we did, it would immediately “make perfect sense” to us.

So if we see something we don’t understand, can we just “train a translator”? At some level the answer must be yes. Because the Principle of Computational Equivalence implies that ultimately there’s a fundamental uniformity to the ruliad. But the problem is that the translator is likely to have to do an irreducible amount of computational work. And so it won’t be implementable by a “mind like ours”. Still, even though we can’t create a “general translator” we can expect that certain features of what we see will still be translatable—in effect by exploiting certain pockets of computational reducibility that must necessarily exist even when the system as a whole is full of computational irreducibility. And operationally what this means in our case is that the AI may in effect have found certain regularities or patterns that we don’t happen to have noticed but that are useful in exploring further from the “current human point” in rulial space.

It’s very challenging to get an intuitive understanding of what rulial space is like. But the approach we’ve taken here is for me a promising first effort in “humanizing” rulial space, and seeing just how we might be able to relate to what is so far the domain of alien minds.


Appendix: How Does the Generative AI Work?

In the main part of this piece, we’ve mostly just talked about what generative AI does, not how it works inside. Here I’ll go a little deeper into what’s inside the particular type of generative AI system that I’ve used in my explorations. It’s a method called stable diffusion, and its operation is in many ways both clever and surprising. As it’s implemented today it’s steeped in fairly complicated engineering details. To what extent these will ultimately be necessary isn’t clear. But in any case here I’ll mostly concentrate on general principles, and on giving a broad outline of how generative AI can be used to produce images.

The Distribution of Typical Images

At the core of generative AI is the ability to produce things of some particular type that “follow the patterns of” known things of that type. So, for example, large language models (LLMs) are intended to produce text that “follows the patterns” of text written by humans, say on the web. And generative AI systems for images are similarly intended to produce images that “follow the patterns” of images put on the web, etc.

But what kinds of patterns exist in typical images, say on the web? Here are some examples of “typical images”—scaled down to 32×32 pixels and taken from a standard set of 60,000 images:

And as a very first thing, we can ask what colors show up in these images. They’re not uniform in RGB space:

But what about the positions of different colors? Adjusting to accentuate color differences, the “average image” turns out to have a curious “HAL’s eye” look (presumably with blue for sky at the top, and brown for earth at the bottom):

But just picking pixels separately—even with the color distribution inferred from actual images—won’t produce images that in any way look “natural” or “realistic”:

And the immediate issue is that the pixels aren’t really independent; most pixels in most images are correlated in color with nearby pixels. And in a first approximation one can capture this for example by fitting the list of colors of all the pixels to a multivariate Gaussian distribution with a covariance matrix that represents their correlation. Sampling from this distribution gives images like these—that indeed look somehow “statistically natural”, even if there isn’t appropriate detailed structure in them:

So, OK, how can one do better? The basic idea is to use neural nets, which can in effect encode detailed long-range connections between pixels. In some way it’s similar to what’s done in LLMs like ChatGPT—where one has to deal with long-range connections between words in text. But for images it’s structurally a bit more difficult, because in some sense one has to “consistently fit together 2D patches” rather than just progressively extend a 1D sequence.

And the typical way this is done at first seems a bit bizarre. The basic idea is to start with a random array of pixels—corresponding in effect to “pure noise”—and then progressively to “reduce the noise” to end up with a “reasonable image” that follows the patterns of typical images, all the while guided by some prompt that says what one wants the “reasonable image” to be of.

Attractors and Inverse Diffusion

How does one go from randomness to definite “reasonable” things? The key is to use the notion of attractors. In a very simple case, one might have a system—like this “mechanical” example—where from any “randomly chosen” initial condition one also evolves to one of (here) two definite (fixed-point) attractors:

One has something similar in a neural net that’s for example trained to recognize digits:

Regardless of exactly how each digit is written, or noise that gets added to it, the network will take this input and evolve to an attractor corresponding to a digit.

Sometimes there can be lots of attractors. Like in this (“class 2”) cellular automaton evolving down the page, many different initial conditions can lead to the same attractor, but there are many possible attractors, corresponding to different final patterns of stripes:

The same can be true for example in 2D cellular automata, where now the attractors can be thought of as being different “images” with structure determined by the cellular automaton rule:

But what if one wants to arrange to have particular images as attractors? Here’s where the somewhat surprising idea of “stable diffusion” can be used. Imagine we start with two possible images, and , and then in a series of steps progressively add noise to them:

Here’s the bizarre thing we now want to do: train a neural net to take the image we get at a particular step, and “go backwards”, removing noise from it. The neural net we’ll use for this is somewhat complicated, with “convolutional” pieces that basically operate on blocks of nearby pixels, and “transformers” that get applied with certain weights to more distant pixels. Schematically in Wolfram Language the network looks at a high level like this:

And roughly what it’s doing is to make an informationally compressed version of each image, and then to expand it again (through what is usually called a “U-net” neural net). We start with an untrained version of this network (say just randomly initialized). Then we feed it a couple of million examples of noisy pictures of and , and the denoised outputs we want in each case.

Then if we take the trained neural net and successively apply it, for example, to a “noised ”, the net will “correctly” determine that the “denoised” version is a “pure ”:

But what if we apply this network to pure noise? The network has been set up to always eventually evolve either to the “” attractor or the “” attractor. But which it “chooses” in a particular case will depend on the details of the initial noise—so in effect the network will seem to be picking at random to “fish” either “” or “” out of the noise:

How does this apply to our original goal of generating images “like” those found for example on the web? Well, instead of just training our “denoising” (or “inverse diffusion”) network on a couple of “target” images, let’s imagine we train it on billions of images from the web. And let’s also assume that our network isn’t big enough to store all those images in any kind of explicit way.

In the abstract it’s not clear what the network will do. But the remarkable empirical fact is that it seems to manage to successfully generate (“from noise”) images that “follow the general patterns” of the images it was trained from. There isn’t any clear way to “formally validate” this success. It’s really just a matter of human perception: to us the images (generally) “look right”.

It could be that with a different (alien?) system of perception we’d immediately see “something wrong” with the images. But for purposes of human perception, the neural net seems to give “reasonable-looking” images—perhaps not least because the neural net operates at least approximately like our brains and our processes of perception seem to operate.

Injecting a Prompt

We’ve described how a denoising neural net seems to be able to start from some configuration of random noise and generate a “reasonable-looking” image. And from any particular configuration of noise, a given neural net will always generate the same image. But there’s no way to tell what that image will be of; it’s just something to empirically explore, as we did above.

But what if we want to “guide” the neural net to generate an image that we’d describe as being of a definite thing, like “a cat in a party hat”? We could imagine “continually checking” whether the image we’re generating would be recognized by a neural net as being of what we wanted. And conceptually that’s what we can do. But we also need a way to “redirect” the image generation if it’s “not going in the right direction”. And a convenient way to do this is to mix a “description of what we want” right into the denoising training process. In particular, if we’re training to “recover an ”, mix a description of the “” right alongside the image of the “”.

And here we can make use of a key feature of neural nets: that ultimately they operate on arrays of (real) numbers. So whether they’re dealing with images composed of pixels, or text composed of words, all these things eventually have to be “ground up” into arrays of real numbers. And when a neural net is trained, what it’s ultimately “learning” is just how to appropriately transform these “disembodied” arrays of numbers.

There’s a fairly natural way to generate an array of numbers from an image: just take the triples of red, green and blue intensity values for each pixel. (Yes, we could pick a different detailed representation, but it’s not likely to matter—because the neural net can always effectively “learn a conversion”.) But what about a textual description, like “a cat in a party hat”?

We need to find a way to encode text as an array of numbers. And actually LLMs face the same issue, and we can solve it in basically the same way here as LLMs do. In the end what we want is to derive from any piece of text a “feature vector” consisting of an array of numbers that provide some kind of representation of the “effective meaning” of the text, or at least the “effective meaning” relevant to describing images.

Let’s say we train a neural net to reproduce associations between images and captions, as found for example on the web. If we feed this neural net an image, it’ll try to generate a caption for the image. If we feed the neural net a caption, it’s not realistic for it to generate a whole image. But we can look at the innards of the neural net and see the array of numbers it derived from the caption—and then use this as our feature vector. And the idea is that because captions that “mean the same thing” should be associated in the training set with “the same kind of images”, they should have similar feature vectors.

So now let’s say we want to generate a picture of a cat in a party hat. First we find the feature vector associated with the text “a cat in a party hat”. Then this is what we keep mixing in at each stage of denoising to guide the denoising process, and end up with an image that the image captioning network will identify as “a cat in a party hat”.

The Latent Space “Trick”

The most direct way to do “denoising” is to operate directly on the pixels in an image. But it turns out there’s a considerably more efficient approach, which operates not on pixels but on “features” of the image—or, more specifically, on a feature vector which describes an image.

In a “raw image” presented in terms of pixels, there’s a lot of redundancy—which is why, for example, image formats like JPEG and PNG manage to compress raw images so much without even noticeably modifying them for purposes of typical human perception. But with neural nets it’s possible to do much greater compression, particularly if all we want to do is to preserve the “meaning” of an image, without worrying about its precise details.

And in fact as part of training a neural net to associate images with captions, we can derive a “latent representation” of images, or in effect a feature vector that captures the “important features” of the image. And then we can do everything we’ve discussed so far directly on this latent representation—decoding it only at the end into the actual pixel representation of the image.

So what does it look like to build up the latent representation of an image? With the particular setup we’re using here, it turns out that the feature vector in the latent representation still preserves the basic spatial arrangement of the image. The “latent pixels” are much coarser than the “visible” ones, and happen to be characterized by 4 numbers rather than the 3 for RGB. But we can decode things to see the “denoising” process happening in terms of “latent pixels”:

And then we can take the latent representation we get, and once again use a trained neural net to fill in a “decoding” of this in terms of actual pixels, getting out our final generated image.

An Analogy in Simple Programs

Generative AI systems work by having attractors that are carefully constructed through training so that they correspond to “reasonable outputs”. A large part of what we’ve done above is to study what happens to these attractors when we change the internal parameters of the system (neural net weights, etc.). What we’ve seen has been complicated, and, indeed, often quite “alien looking”. But is there perhaps a simpler setup in which we can see similar core phenomena?

By the time we’re thinking about creating attractors for realistic images, etc. it’s inevitable that things are going to be complicated. But what if we look at systems with much simpler setups? For example, consider a dynamical system whose state is characterized just by a single number—such as an iterated map on the interval, like x a x (1 – x).

Starting from a uniform array of possible x values, we can show down the page which values of x are achieved at successive iterations:

For a = 2.9, the system evolves from any initial value to a single attractor, which consists of a single fixed final value. But if we change the “internal parameter” a to 3.1, we now get two distinct final values. And at the “bifurcation point” a = 3 there’s a sudden change from one to two distinct final values. And indeed in our generative AI system it’s fairly common to see similar discontinuous changes in behavior even when an internal parameter is continuously changed.

As another example—slightly closer to image generation—consider (as above) a 1D cellular automaton that exhibits class 2 behavior, and evolves from any initial state to some fixed final state that one can think of as an attractor for the system:

Which attractor one reaches depends on the initial condition one starts from. But—in analogy to our generative AI system—we can think of all the attractors as being “reasonable outputs” for the system. But now what happens if we change the parameters of the system, or in this case, the cellular automaton rule? In particular, what will happen to the attractors? It’s like what we did above in changing weights in a neural net—but a lot simpler.

The particular rule we’re using here has 4 possible colors for each cell, and is defined by just 64 discrete values from 0 to 3. So let’s say we randomly change just one of those values at a time. Here are some examples of what we get, always starting from the same initial condition as in the first picture above:

With a couple of exceptions these seem to produce results that are at least “roughly similar” to what we got without changing the rule. In analogy to what we did above, the cat might have changed, but it’s still more or less a cat. But let’s now try “progressive randomization”, where we modify successively more values in the definition of the rule. For a while we again get “roughly similar” results, but then—much like in our cat examples above—things eventually “fall apart” and we get “much more random” results:

One important difference between “stable diffusion” and cellular automata is that while in cellular automata, the evolution can lead to continued change forever, in stable diffusion there’s an annealing process used that always makes successive steps “progressively smaller”—and essentially forces a fixed point to be reached.

But notwithstanding this, we can try to get a closer analogy to image generation by looking (again as above) at 2D cellular automata. Here’s an example of the (not-too-exciting-as-images) “final states” reached from three different initial states in a particular rule:

And here’s what happens if one progressively changes the rule:

At first one still gets “reasonable-according-to-the-original-rule” final states. But if one changes the rule further, things get “more alien”, until they look to us quite random.

In changing the rule, one is in effect “moving in rulial space”. And by looking at how this works in cellular automata, one can get a certain amount of intuition. (Changes to the rule in a cellular automaton seem a bit like “changes to the genotype” in biology—with the behavior of the cellular automaton representing the corresponding “phenotype”.) But seeing how “rulial motion” works in a generative AI that’s been trained on “human-style input” gives a more accessible and humanized picture of what’s going on, even if it seems still further out of reach in terms of any kind of traditional explicit formalization.

Thanks

This project is the first I’ve been able to do with our new Wolfram Institute. I thank our Fourmilab Fellow Nik Murzin and Ruliad Fellow Richard Assar for help. I also thank Jeff Arle, Nicolò Monti, Philip Rosedale and the Wolfram Research Machine Learning Group.

Will AIs Take All Our Jobs and End Human History—or Not? Well, It’s Complicated…

16 mars 2023 à 02:41

The Shock of ChatGPT

Just a few months ago writing an original essay seemed like something only a human could do. But then ChatGPT burst onto the scene. And suddenly we realized that an AI could write a passable human-like essay. So now it’s natural to wonder: How far will this go? What will AIs be able to do? And how will we humans fit in?

My goal here is to explore some of the science, technology—and philosophy—of what we can expect from AIs. I should say at the outset that this is a subject fraught with both intellectual and practical difficulty. And all I’ll be able to do here is give a snapshot of my current thinking—which will inevitably be incomplete—not least because, as I’ll discuss, trying to predict how history in an area like this will unfold is something that runs straight into an issue of basic science: the phenomenon of computational irreducibility.

But let’s start off by talking about that particularly dramatic example of AI that’s just arrived on the scene: ChatGPT. So what is ChatGPT? Ultimately, it’s a computational system for generating text that’s been set up to follow the patterns defined by human-written text from billions of webpages, millions of books, etc. Give it a textual prompt and it’ll continue in a way that’s somehow typical of what it’s seen us humans write.

The results (which ultimately rely on all sorts of specific engineering) are remarkably “human like”. And what makes this work is that whenever ChatGPT has to “extrapolate” beyond anything it’s explicitly seen from us humans it does so in ways that seem similar to what we as humans might do.

Inside ChatGPT is something that’s actually computationally probably quite similar to a brain—with millions of simple elements (“neurons”) forming a “neural net” with billions of connections that have been “tweaked” through a progressive process of training until they successfully reproduce the patterns of human-written text seen on all those webpages, etc. Even without training the neural net would still produce some kind of text. But the key point is that it won’t be text that we humans consider meaningful. To get such text we need to build on all that “human context” defined by the webpages and other materials we humans have written. The “raw computational system” will just do “raw computation”; to get something aligned with us humans requires leveraging the detailed human history captured by all those pages on the web, etc.

But so what do we get in the end? Well, it’s text that basically reads like it was written by a human. In the past we might have thought that human language was somehow a uniquely human thing to produce. But now we’ve got an AI doing it. So what’s left for us humans? Well, somewhere things have got to get started: in the case of text, there’s got to be a prompt specified that tells the AI “what direction to go in”. And this is the kind of thing we’ll see over and over again. Given a defined “goal”, an AI can automatically work towards achieving it. But it ultimately takes something beyond the raw computational system of the AI to define what us humans would consider a meaningful goal. And that’s where we humans come in.

What does this mean at a practical, everyday level? Typically we use ChatGPT by telling it—using text—what we basically want. And then it’ll fill in a whole essay’s worth of text talking about it. We can think of this interaction as corresponding to a kind of “linguistic user interface” (that we might dub a “LUI”). In a graphical user interface (GUI) there’s core content that’s being rendered (and input) through some potentially elaborate graphical presentation. In the LUI provided by ChatGPT there’s instead core content that’s being rendered (and input) through a textual (“linguistic”) presentation.

You might jot down a few “bullet points”. And in their raw form someone else would probably have a hard time understanding them. But through the LUI provided by ChatGPT those bullet points can be turned into an “essay” that can be generally understood—because it’s based on the “shared context” defined by everything from the billions of webpages, etc. on which ChatGPT has been trained.

There’s something about this that might seem rather unnerving. In the past, if you saw a custom-written essay you’d reasonably be able to conclude that a certain irreducible human effort was spent in producing it. But with ChatGPT this is no longer true. Turning things into essays is now “free” and automated. “Essayification” is no longer evidence of human effort.

Of course, it’s hardly the first time there’s been a development like this. Back when I was a kid, for example, seeing that a document had been typeset was basically evidence that someone had gone to the considerable effort of printing it on printing press. But then came desktop publishing, and it became basically free to make any document be elaborately typeset.

And in a longer view, this kind of thing is basically a constant trend in history: what once took human effort eventually becomes automated and “free to do” through technology. There’s a direct analog of this in the realm of ideas: that with time higher and higher levels of abstraction are developed, that subsume what were formerly laborious details and specifics.

Will this end? Will we eventually have automated everything? Discovered everything? Invented everything? At some level, we now know that the answer is a resounding no. Because one of the consequences of the phenomenon of computational irreducibility is that there’ll always be more computations to do—that can’t in the end be reduced by any finite amount of automation, discovery or invention.

Ultimately, though, this will be a more subtle story. Because while there may always be more computations to do, it could still be that we as humans don’t care about them. And that somehow everything we care about can successfully be automated—say by AIs—leaving “nothing more for us to do”.

Untangling this issue will be at the heart of questions about how we fit into the AI future. And in what follows we’ll see over and over again that what might at first essentially seem like practical matters of technology quickly get enmeshed with deep questions of science and philosophy.

Intuition from the Computational Universe

I’ve already mentioned computational irreducibility a couple of times. And it turns out that this is part of a circle of rather deep—and at first surprising—ideas that I believe are crucial to thinking about the AI future.

Most of our existing intuition about “machinery” and “automation” comes from a kind of “clockwork” view of engineering—in which we specifically build systems component by component to achieve objectives we want. And it’s the same with most software: we write it line by line to specifically do—step by step—whatever it is we want. And we expect that if we want our machinery—or software—to do complex things then the underlying structure of the machinery or software must somehow be correspondingly complex.

So when I started exploring the whole computational universe of possible programs in the early 1980s it was a big surprise to discover that things work quite differently there. And indeed even tiny programs—that effectively just apply very simple rules repeatedly—can generate great complexity. In our usual practice of engineering we haven’t seen this, because we’ve always specifically picked programs (or other structures) where we can readily foresee how they’ll behave, so that we can explicitly set them up to do what we want. But out in the computational universe it’s very common to see programs that just “intrinsically generate” great complexity, without us ever having to explicitly “put it in”.

And having discovered this, we realize that there’s actually a big example that’s been around forever: the natural world. And indeed it increasingly seems as if the “secret” that nature uses to make the complexity it so often shows is exactly to operate according to the rules of simple programs. (For about three centuries it seemed as if mathematical equations were the ultimate way to describe the natural world—but in the past few decades, and particularly poignantly with our recent Physics Project, it’s become clear that simple programs are in general a more powerful approach.)

How does all this relate to technology? Well, technology is about taking what’s out there in the world, and harnessing it for human purposes. And there’s a fundamental tradeoff here. There may be some system out in nature that does amazingly complex things. But the question is whether we can “slice off” certain particular things that we humans happen to find useful. A donkey has all sorts of complex things going on inside. But at some point it was discovered that we can use it “technologically” to do the rather simple thing of pulling a cart.

And when it comes to programs out in the computational universe it’s extremely common to see ones that do amazingly complex things. But the question is whether we can find some aspect of those things that’s useful to us. Maybe the program is good at making pseudorandomness. Or distributedly determining consensus. Or maybe it’s just doing its complex thing, and we don’t yet know any “human purpose” that this achieves.

One of the notable features of a system like ChatGPT is that it isn’t constructed in an “understand-every-step” traditional engineering way. Instead one basically just starts from a “raw computational system” (in the case of ChatGPT, a neural net), then progressively tweaks it until its behavior aligns with the “human-relevant” examples one has. And this alignment is what makes the system “technologically useful”—to us humans.

Underneath, though, it’s still a computational system, with all the potential “wildness” that implies. And free from the “technological objective” of “human-relevant alignment” the system might do all sorts of sophisticated things. But they might not be things that (at least at this time in history) we care about. Even though some putative alien (or our future selves) might.

OK, but let’s come back to the “raw computation” side of things. There’s something very different about computation from all other kinds of “mechanisms” we’ve seen before. We might have a cart that can move forward. And we might have a stapler that can put staples in things. But carts and staplers do very different things; there’s no equivalence between them. But for computational systems (at least ones that don’t just always behave in obviously simple ways) there’s my Principle of Computational Equivalence—which implies that all these systems are in a sense equivalent in the kinds of computations they can do.

This equivalence has many consequences. One of them is that one can expect to make something equally computationally sophisticated out of all sorts of different kinds of things—whether brain tissue or electronics, or some system in nature. And this is effectively where computational irreducibility comes from.

One might think that given, say, some computational system based on a simple program it would always be possible for us—with our sophisticated brains, mathematics, computers, etc.—to “jump ahead” and figure out what the system will do before it’s gone through all the steps to do it. But the Principle of Computational Equivalence implies that this won’t in general be possible—because the system itself can be as computationally sophisticated as our brains, mathematics, computers, etc. are. So this means that the system will be computationally irreducible: the only way to find out what it does is effectively just to go through the same whole computational process that it does.

There’s a prevailing impression that science will always eventually be able do better than this: that it’ll be able to make “predictions” that allow us to work out what will happen without having to trace through each step. And indeed over the past three centuries there’s been lots of success in doing this, mainly by using mathematical equations. But ultimately it turns out that this has only been possible because science has ended up concentrating on particular systems where these methods work (and then these systems have been used for engineering). But the reality is that many systems show computational irreducibility. And in the phenomenon of computational irreducibility science is in effect “deriving its own limitedness”.

Contrary to traditional intuition, try as we might, in many systems we’ll never be able find “formulas” (or other “shortcuts”) that describe what’s going to happen in the systems—because the systems are simply computationally irreducible. And, yes, this represents a limitation on science, and on knowledge in general. But while at first this might seem like a bad thing, there’s also something fundamentally satisfying about it. Because if everything were computationally reducible, we could always “jump ahead” and find out what will happen in the end, say in our lives. But computational irreducibility implies that in general we can’t do that—so that in some sense “something irreducible is being achieved” by the passage of time.

There are a great many consequences of computational irreducibility. Some—that I have particularly explored recently—are in the domain of basic science (for example, establishing core laws of physics as we perceive them from the interplay of computational irreducibility and our computational limitations as observers). But computational irreducibility is also central in thinking about the AI future—and in fact I increasingly feel that it adds the single most important intellectual element needed to make sense of many of the most important questions about the potential roles of AIs and humans in the future.

For example, from our traditional experience with engineering we’re used to the idea that to find out why something happened in a particular way we can just “look inside” a machine or program and “see what it did”. But when there’s computational irreducibility, that won’t work. Yes, we could “look inside” and see, say, a few steps. But computational irreducibility implies that to find out what happened, we’d have to trace through all the steps. We can’t expect to find a “simple human narrative” that “says why something happened”.

But having said this, one feature of computational irreducibility is that within any computationally irreducible systems there must always be (ultimately, infinitely many) “pockets of computational reducibility” to be found. So for example, even though we can’t say in general what will happen, we’ll always be able to identify specific features that we can predict. (“The leftmost cell will always be black”, etc.) And as we’ll discuss later we can potentially think of technological (as well as scientific) progress as being intimately tied to the discovery of these “pockets of reducibility”. And in effect the existence of infinitely many such pockets is the reason that “there’ll always be inventions and discoveries to be made”.

Another consequence of computational irreducibility has to do with trying to ensure things about the behavior of a system. Let’s say one wants to set up an AI so it’ll “never do anything bad”. One might imagine that one could just come up with particular rules that ensure this. But as soon as the behavior of the system (or its environment) is computationally irreducible one will never be able to guarantee what will happen in the system. Yes, there may be particular computationally reducible features one can be sure about. But in general computational irreducibility implies that there’ll always be a “possibility of surprise” or the potential for “unintended consequences”. And the only way to systematically avoid this is to make the system not computationally irreducible—which means it can’t make use of the full power of computation.

“AIs Will Never Be Able to Do That”

We humans like to feel special, and feel as if there’s something “fundamentally unique” about us. Five centuries ago we thought we lived at the center of the universe. Now we just tend to think that there’s something about our intellectual capabilities that’s fundamentally unique and beyond anything else. But the progress of AI—and things like ChatGPT—keep on giving us more and more evidence that that’s not the case. And indeed my Principle of Computational Equivalence says something even more extreme: that at a fundamental computational level there’s just nothing fundamentally special about us at all—and that in fact we’re computationally just equivalent to lots of systems in nature, and even to simple programs.

This broad equivalence is important in being able to make very general scientific statements (like the existence of computational irreducibility). But it also highlights how significant our specifics—our particular history, biology, etc.—are. It’s very much like with ChatGPT. We can have a generic (untrained) neural net with the same structure as ChatGPT, that can do certain “raw computation”. But what makes ChatGPT interesting—at least to us—is that it’s been trained with the “human specifics” described on billions of webpages, etc. In other words, for both us and ChatGPT there’s nothing computationally “generally special”. But there is something “specifically special”—and it’s the particular history we’ve had, particular knowledge our civilization has accumulated, etc.

There’s a curious analogy here to our physical place in the universe. There’s a certain uniformity to the universe, which means there’s nothing “generally special” about our physical location. But at least to us there’s still something “specifically special” about it, because it’s only here that we have our particular planet, etc. At a deeper level, ideas based on our Physics Project have led to the concept of the ruliad: the unique object that is the entangled limit of all possible computational processes. And we can then view our whole experience as “observers of the universe” as consisting of sampling the ruliad at a particular place.

It’s a bit abstract (and a long story, which I won’t go into in any detail here), but we can think of different possible observers as being both at different places in physical space, and at different places in rulial space—giving them different “points of view” about what happens in the universe. Human minds are in effect concentrated in a particular region of physical space (mostly on this planet) and a particular region of rulial space. And in rulial space different human minds—with their different experiences and thus different ways of thinking about the universe—are in slightly different places. Animal minds might be fairly close in rulial space. But other computational systems (like, say, the weather, which is sometimes said to “have a mind of its own”) are further away—as putative aliens might also be.

So what about AIs? It depends what we mean by “AIs”. If we’re talking about computational systems that are set up to do “human-like things” then that means they’ll be close to us in rulial space. But insofar as “an AI” is an arbitrary computational system it can be anywhere in rulial space, and it can do anything that’s computationally possible—which is far broader than what we humans can do, or even think about. (As we’ll talk about later, as our intellectual paradigms—and ways of observing things—expand, the region of rulial space in which we humans operate will correspondingly expand.)

But, OK, just how “general” are the computations that we humans (and the AIs that follow us) are doing? We don’t know enough about the brain to be sure. But if we look at artificial neural net systems—like ChatGPT—we can potentially get some sense. And in fact the computations really don’t seem to be that “general”. In most neural net systems data that’s given as input just “ripples once through the system” to produce output. It’s not like in a computational system like a Turing machine where there can be arbitrary “recirculation of data”. And indeed without such “arbitrary recirculation” the computation is necessarily quite “shallow” and can’t ultimately show computational irreducibility.

It’s a bit of a technical point, but one can ask whether ChatGPT, with its “re-feeding of text produced so far” can in fact achieve arbitrary (“universal”) computation. And I suspect that in some formal sense it can (or at least a sufficiently expanded analog of it can)—though by producing an extremely verbose piece of text that for example in effect lists successive (self-delimiting) states of a Turing machine tape, and in which finding “the answer” to a computation will take a bit of effort. But—as I’ve discussed elsewhere—in practice ChatGPT is presumably almost exclusively doing “quite shallow” computation.

It’s an interesting feature of the history of practical computing that what one might consider “deep pure computations” (say in mathematics or science) were done for decades before “shallow human-like computations” became feasible. And the basic reason for this is that for “human-like computations” (like recognizing images or generating text) one needs to capture lots of “human context”, which requires having lots of “human-generated data” and the computational resources to store and process it.

And, by the way, brains also seem to specialize in fundamentally shallow computations. And to do the kind of deeper computations that allow one to take advantage of more of what’s out there in the computational universe, one has to turn to computers. As we’ve discussed, there’s plenty out in the computational universe that we humans don’t (yet) care about: we just consider it “raw computation”, that doesn’t seem to be “achieving human purposes”. But as a practical matter it’s important to make a bridge between the things we humans do care about and think about, and what’s possible in the computational universe. And in a sense that’s at the core of the project I’ve put so much effort into in the Wolfram Language of creating a full-scale computational language that describes in computational terms the things we think about, and experience in the world.

OK, people have been saying for years: “It’s nice that computers can do A and B, but only humans can do X”. What X is supposed to be has changed—and narrowed—over the years. And ChatGPT provides us with a major unexpected new example of something more that computers can do.

So what’s left? People might say: “Computers can never show creativity or originality”. But—perhaps disappointingly—that’s surprisingly easy to get, and indeed just a bit of randomness “seeding” a computation can often do a pretty good job, as we saw years ago with our WolframTones music-generation system, and as we see today with ChatGPT’s writing. People might also say: “Computers can never show emotions”. But before we had a good way to generate human language we wouldn’t really have been able to tell. And now it already works pretty well to ask ChatGPT to write “happily”, “sadly”, etc. (In their raw form emotions in both humans and other animals are presumably associated with rather simple “global variables” like neurotransmitter concentrations.)

In the past people might have said: “Computers can never show judgement”. But by now there are endless examples of machine learning systems that do well at reproducing human judgement in lots of domains. People might also say: “Computers don’t show common sense”. And by this they typically mean that in a particular situation a computer might locally give an answer, but there’s a global reason why that answer doesn’t make sense, that the computer “doesn’t notice”, but a person would.

So how does ChatGPT do on this? Not too badly. In plenty of cases it correctly recognizes that “that’s not what I’ve typically read”. But, yes, it makes mistakes. Some of them have to do with it not being able to do—purely with its neural net—even slightly “deeper”computations. (And, yes, that’s something that can often be fixed by it calling Wolfram|Alpha as a tool.) But in other cases the problem seems to be that it can’t quite connect different domains well enough.

It’s perfectly capable of doing simple (“SAT-style”) analogies. But when it comes to larger-scale ones it doesn’t manage them. My guess, though, is that it won’t take much scaling up before it starts to be able to make what seem like very impressive analogies (that most of us humans would never even be able to make)—at which point it’ll probably successfully show broader “common sense”.

But so what’s left that humans can do, and AIs can’t? There’s—almost by definition—one fundamental thing: define what we would consider goals for what to do. We’ll talk more about this later. But for now we can note that any computational system, once “set in motion”, will just follow its rules and do what it does. But what “direction should it be pointed in”? That’s something that has to come from “outside the system”.

So how does it work for us humans? Well, our goals are in effect defined by the whole web of history—both from biological evolution and from our cultural development—in which we are embedded. But ultimately the only way to truly participate in that web of history is to be part of it.

Of course, we can imagine technologically emulating every “relevant” aspect of a brain—and indeed things like the success of ChatGPT may suggest that that’s easier to do than we might have thought. But that won’t be enough. To participate in the “human web of history” (as we’ll discuss later) we’ll have to emulate other aspects of “being human”—like moving around, being mortal, etc. And, yes, if we make an “artificial human” we can expect it (by definition) to show all the features of us humans.

But while we’re still talking about AIs as—for example—“running on computers” or “being purely digital” then, at least as far as we’re concerned, they’ll have to “get their goals from outside”. One day (as we’ll discuss) there will no doubt be some kind of “civilization of AIs”—which will form its own web of history. But at this point there’s no reason to think that we’ll still be able to describe what’s going on in terms of goals that we recognize. In effect the AIs will at that point have left our domain of rulial space. And—as we’ll discuss—they’ll be operating more like the kind of systems we see in nature, where we can tell there’s computation going on, but we can’t describe it, except rather anthropomorphically, in terms of human goals and purposes.

Will There Be Anything Left for the Humans to Do?

It’s been an issue that’s been raised—with varying degrees of urgency—for centuries: with the advance of automation (and now AI), will there eventually be nothing left for humans to do? Back in the early days of our species, there was lots of hard work of hunting and gathering to do, just to survive. But at least in the developed parts of the world, that kind of work is now at best a distant historical memory.

And yet at each stage in history—at least so far—there always seem to be other kinds of work that keep people busy. But there’s a pattern that increasingly seems to repeat. Technology in some way or another enables some new occupation. And eventually that occupation becomes widespread, and lots of people do it. But then there’s a technological advance, and the occupation gets automated—and people aren’t needed to do it anymore. But now there’s a new level of technology, that enables new occupations. And the cycle continues.

A century ago the increasingly widespread use of telephones meant that more and more people worked as switchboard operators. But then telephone switching was automated—and those switchboard operators weren’t needed anymore. But with automated switching there could be huge development of telecommunications infrastructure, opening up all sorts of new types of jobs, that in aggregate employ vastly more people than were ever switchboard operators.

Something somewhat similar happened with accounting clerks. Before there were computers, one needed to have people laboriously tallying up numbers. But with computers, that was all automated away. But with that automation came the ability to do more complex financial computations—which allowed for more complex financial transactions, more complex regulations, etc., which in turn led to all sorts of new types of jobs.

And across a whole range of industries, it’s been the same kind of story. Automation obsoletes some jobs, but enables others. There’s quite often a gap in time, and a change in the skills that are needed. But at least so far there always seems to have been a broad frontier of jobs that have been made possible—but haven’t yet been automated.

Will this at some point end? Will there come a time when everything we humans want (or at least need) is delivered automatically? Well, of course, that depends on what we want, and whether, for example, that evolves with what technology has made possible. But could we just decide that “enough is enough”; let’s stop here, and just let everything be automated?

I don’t think so. And the reason is ultimately because of computational irreducibility. We try to get the world to be “just so”, say set up so we’re “predictably comfortable”. Well, the problem is that there’s inevitably computational irreducibility in the way things develop—not just in nature, but in things like societal dynamics too. And that means that things won’t stay “just so”. There’ll always be something unpredictable that happens; something that the automation doesn’t cover.

At first we humans might just say “we don’t care about that”. But in time computational irreducibility will affect everything. So if there’s anything at all we care about (including, for example, not going extinct), we’ll eventually have to do something—and go beyond whatever automation was already set up.

It’s easy to find practical examples. We might think that when computers and people are all connected in a seamless automated network, there’d be nothing more to do. But what about the “unintended consequence” of computer security issues? What might have seemed like a case where “technology finished things” quickly creates a new kind of job for people to do. And at some level, computational irreducibility implies that things like this must always happen. There must always be a “frontier”. At least if there’s anything at all we want to preserve (like not going extinct).

But let’s come back to the situation here and now with AI. ChatGPT just automated all sorts of text-related tasks. It used to take lots of effort—and people—to write customized reports, letters, etc. But (at least so long as one’s dealing with situations where one doesn’t need 100% “correctness”) ChatGPT just automated a lot of that, so people aren’t needed for it anymore. But what will this mean? Well, it means that there’ll be a lot more customized reports, letters, etc. that can be produced. And that will lead to new kinds of jobs—managing, analyzing, validating etc. all that mass-customized text. Not to mention the need for prompt engineers (a job category that just didn’t exist until a few months ago), and what amount to AI wranglers, AI psychologists, etc.

But let’s talk about today’s “frontier” of jobs that haven’t been “automated away”. There’s one category that in many ways seems surprising to still be “with us”: jobs that involve lots of mechanical manipulation, like construction, fulfillment, food preparation, etc. But there’s a missing piece of technology here: there isn’t yet good general-purpose robotics (as there is general-purpose computing), and we humans still have the edge in dexterity, mechanical adaptability, etc. But I’m quite sure that in time—and perhaps quite suddenly—the necessary technology will be developed (and, yes, I have ideas about how to do it). And this will mean that most of today’s “mechanical manipulation” jobs will be “automated away”—and won’t need people to do them.

But then, just as in our other examples, this will mean that mechanical manipulation will become much easier and cheaper to do, and more of it will be done. Houses might routinely be built and dismantled. Products might routinely be picked up from wherever they’ve ended up, and redistributed. Vastly more ornate “food constructions” might become the norm. And each of these things—and many more—will open up new jobs.

But will every job that exists in the world today “on the frontier” eventually be automated? What about jobs where it seems like a large part of the value is just “having a human be there”? Jobs like flying a plane where one wants the “commitment” of the pilot being there in the plane. Caregiver jobs where one wants the “connection” of a human being there. Sales or education jobs where one wants “human persuasion” or “human encouragement”. Today one might think “only a human can make one feel that way”. But that’s typically based on the way the job is done now. And maybe there’ll be different ways found that allow the essence of the task to be automated, almost inevitably opening up new tasks to be done.

For example, something that in the past needed “human persuasion” might be “automated” by something like gamification—but then more of it can be done, with new needs for design, analytics, management, etc.

We’ve been talking about “jobs”. And that term immediately brings to mind wages, economics, etc. And, yes, plenty of what people do (at least in the world as it is today) is driven by issues of economics. But plenty is also not. There are things we “just want to do”—as a “social matter”, for “entertainment”, for “personal satisfaction”, etc.

Why do we want to do these things? Some of it seems intrinsic to our biological nature. Some of it seems determined by the “cultural environment” in which we find ourselves. Why might one walk on a treadmill? In today’s world one might explain that it’s good for health, lifespan, etc. But a few centuries ago, without modern scientific understanding, and with a different view of the significance of life and death, that explanation really wouldn’t work.

What drives such changes in our view of what we “want to do”, or “should do”? Some seems to be driven by the pure “dynamics of society”, presumably with its own computational irreducibility. But some has to do with our ways of interacting with the world—both the increasing automation delivered by the advance of technology, and the increasing abstraction delivered by the advance of knowledge.

And there seem to be similar “cycles” seen here as in the kinds of things we consider to be “occupations” or “jobs”. For a while something is hard to do, and serves as a good “pastime”. But then it gets “too easy” (“everybody now knows how to win at game X”, etc.), and something at a “higher level” takes its place.

About our “base” biologically driven motivations it doesn’t seem like anything has really changed in the course of human history. But there are certainly technological developments that could have an effect in the future. Effective human immortality, for example, would change many aspects of our motivation structure. As would things like the ability to implant memories or, for that matter, implant motivations.

For now, there’s a certain element of what we want to do that’s “anchored” by our biological nature. But at some point we’ll surely be able to emulate with a computer at least the essence of what our brains are doing (and indeed the success of things like ChatGPT makes it seems like the moment when that will happen is closer at hand than we might have thought). And at that point we’ll have the possibility of what amount to “disembodied human souls”.

To us today it’s very hard to imagine what the “motivations” of such a “disembodied soul” might be. Looked at “from the outside” we might “see the soul” doing things that “don’t make much sense” to us. But it’s like asking what someone from a thousand years ago would think about many of our activities today. These activities make sense to us today because we’re embedded in our whole “current framework”. But without that framework they don’t make sense. And so it will be for the “disembodied soul”. To us, what it does may not make sense. But to it, with its “current framework”, it will.

Could we “learn how to make sense of it”? There’s likely to be a certain barrier of computational irreducibility: in effect the only way to “understand the soul of the future” is to retrace its steps to get to where it is. So from our vantage point today, we’re separated by a certain “irreducible distance”, in effect in rulial space.

But could there be some science of the future that will at least tell us general things about how such “souls” behave? Even when there’s computational irreducibility we know that there will always be pockets of computational reducibility—and thus features of behavior that are predictable. But will those features be “interesting”, say from our vantage point today? Maybe some of them will be. Maybe they’ll show us some kind of metapsychology of souls. But inevitably they can only go so far. Because in order for those souls to even experience the passage of time there has to be computational irreducibility. If too much of what happens is too predictable, it’s as if “nothing is happening”—or at least nothing “meaningful”.

And, yes, this is all tied up with questions about “free will”. Even when there’s a disembodied soul that’s operating according to some completely deterministic underlying program, computational irreducibility means its behavior can still “seem free”—because nothing can “outrun it” and say what it’s going to be. And the “inner experience” of the disembodied soul can be significant: it’s “intrinsically defining its future”, not just “having its future defined for it”.

One might have assumed that once everything is just “visibly operating” as “mere computation” it would necessarily be “soulless” and “meaningless”. But computational irreducibility is what breaks out of this, and what allows there to be something irreducible and “meaningful” achieved. And it’s the same phenomenon whether one’s talking about our life now in the physical universe, or a future “disembodied” computational existence. Or in other words, even if absolutely everything—even our very existence—has been “automated by computation”, that doesn’t mean we can’t have a perfectly good “inner experience” of meaningful existence.

Generalized Economics and the Concept of Progress

If we look at human history—or, for that matter, the history of life on Earth—there’s a certain pervasive sense that there’s some kind of “progress” happening. But what fundamentally is this “progress”? One can view it as the process of things being done at a progressively “higher level”, so that in effect “more of what’s important” can happen with a given effort. This idea of “going to a higher level” takes many forms—but they’re all fundamentally about eliding details below, and being able to operate purely in terms of the “things one cares about”.

In technology, this shows up as automation, in which what used to take lots of detailed steps gets packaged into something that can be done “with the push of a button”. In science—and the intellectual realm in general—it shows up as abstraction, where what used to involve lots of specific details gets packaged into something that can be talked about “purely collectively”. And in biology it shows up as some structure (ribosome, cell, wing, etc.) that can be treated as a “modular unit”.

That it’s possible to “do things at a higher level” is a reflection of being able to find “pockets of computational reducibility”. And—as we mentioned above—the fact that (given underlying computational irreducibility) there are necessarily an infinite number of such pockets means that “progress can always go on forever”.

When it comes to human affairs we tend to value such progress highly, because (at least for now) we live finite lives, and insofar as we “want more to happen”, “progress” makes that possible. It’s certainly not self-evident that having more happen is “good”; one might just “want a quiet life”. But there is one constraint that in a sense originates from the deep foundations of biology.

If something doesn’t exist, then nothing can ever “happen to it”. So in biology, if one’s going to have anything “happen” with organisms, they’d better not be extinct. But the physical environment in which biological organisms exist is finite, with many resources that are finite. And given organisms with finite lives, there’s an inevitability to the process of biological evolution, and to the “competition” for resources between organisms.

Will there eventually be an “ultimate winning organism”? Well, no, there can’t be—because of computational irreducibility. There’ll in a sense always be more to explore in the computational universe—more “raw computational material for possible organisms”. And given any “fitness criterion” (like—in a Turing machine analog—“living longer before halting”) there’ll always be a way to “do better” with it.

One might still wonder, however, whether perhaps biological evolution—with its underlying process of random genetic mutation—could “get stuck” and never be able to discover some “way to do better”. And indeed simple models of evolution might give one the intuition that this would happen. But actual evolution seems more like deep learning with a large neural net—where one’s effectively operating in an extremely high-dimensional space where there’s typically always a “way to get there from here”, at least given enough time.

But, OK, so from our history of biological evolution there’s a certain built-in sense of “competition for scarce resources”. And this sense of competition has (so far) also carried over to human affairs. And indeed it’s the basic driver for most of the processes of economics.

But what if resources aren’t “scarce” anymore? What if progress—in the form of automation, or AI—makes it easy to “get anything one wants”? We might imagine robots building everything, AIs figuring everything out, etc. But there are still things that are inevitably scarce. There’s only so much real estate. Only one thing can be “the first ___”. And, in the end, if we have finite lives, we only have so much time.

Still, the more efficient—or high level—the things we do (or have) are, the more we’ll be able to get done in the time we have. And it seems as if what we perceive as “economic value” is intimately connected with “making things higher level”. A finished phone is “worth more” than its raw materials. An organization is “worth more” than its separate parts. But what if we could have “infinite automation”? Then in a sense there’d be “infinite economic value everywhere”, and one might imagine there’d be “no competition left”.

But once again computational irreducibility stands in the way. Because it tells us there’ll never be “infinite automation”, just as there’ll never be an ultimate winning biological organism. There’ll always be “more to explore” in the computational universe, and different paths to follow.

What will this look like in practice? Presumably it’ll lead to all sorts of diversity. So that, for example, a chart of “what the components of an economy are” will become more and more fragmented; it won’t just be “the single winning economic activity is ___”.

There is one potential wrinkle in this picture of unending progress. What if nobody cares? What if the innovations and discoveries just don’t matter, say to us humans? And, yes, there is of course plenty in the world that at any given time in history we don’t care about. That piece of silicon we’ve been able to pick out? It’s just part of a rock. Well, until we start making microprocessors out of it.

But as we’ve discussed, as soon as we’re “operating at some level of abstraction” computational irreducibility makes it inevitable that we’ll eventually be exposed to things that “require going beyond that level”.

But then—critically—there will be choices. There will be different paths to explore (or “mine”) in the computational universe—in the end infinitely many of them. And whatever the computational resources of AIs etc. might be, they’ll never be able to explore all of them. So something—or someone—will have to make a choice of which ones to take.

Given a particular set of things one cares about at a particular point, one might successfully be able to automate all of them. But computational irreducibility implies there will always be a “frontier”, where choices have to be made. And there’s no “right answer”; no “theoretically derivable” conclusion. Instead, if we humans are involved, this is where we get to define what’s going to happen.

How will we do that? Well, ultimately it’ll be based on our history—biological, cultural, etc. We’ll get to use all that irreducible computation that went into getting us to where we are to define what to do next. In a sense it’ll be something that goes “through us”, and that uses what we are. It’s the place where—even when there’s automation all around—there’s still always something us humans can “meaningfully” do.

How Can We Tell the AIs What to Do?

Let’s say we want an AI (or any computational system) to do a particular thing. We might think we could just set up its rules (or “program it”) to do that thing. And indeed for certain kinds of tasks that works just fine. But the deeper the use we make of computation, the more we’re going to run into computational irreducibility, and the less we’ll be able to know how to set up particular rules to achieve what we want.

And then, of course, there’s the question of defining what “we want” in the first place. Yes, we could have specific rules that say what particular pattern of bits should occur at a particular point in a computation. But that probably won’t have much to do with the kind of overall “human-level” objective that we typically care about. And indeed for any objective we can even reasonably define, we’d better be able to coherently “form a thought” about it. Or, in effect, we’d better have some “human-level narrative” to describe it.

But how can we represent such a narrative? Well, we have natural language—probably the single most important innovation in the history of our species. And what natural language fundamentally does is to allow us to talk about things at a “human level”. It’s made of words that we can think of as representing “human-level packets of meaning”. And so, for example, the word “chair” represents the human-level concept of a chair. It’s not referring to some particular arrangement of atoms. Instead, it’s referring to any arrangement of atoms that we can usefully conflate into the single human-level concept of a chair, and from which we can deduce things like the fact that we can expect to sit on it, etc.

So, OK, when we’re “talking to an AI” can we expect to just say what we want using natural language? We can definitely get a certain distance—and indeed ChatGPT helps us get further than ever before. But as we try to make things more precise we run into trouble, and the language we need rapidly becomes increasingly ornate, as in the “legalese” of complex legal documents. So what can we do? If we’re going to keep things at the level of “human thoughts” we can’t “reach down” into all the computational details. But yet we want a precise definition of how what we might say can be implemented in terms of those computational details.

Well, there’s a way to deal with this, and it’s one that I’ve personally devoted many decades to: it’s the idea of computational language. When we think about programming languages, they’re things that operate solely at the level of computational details, defining in more or less the native terms of a computer what the computer should do. But the point of a true computational language (and, yes, in the world today the Wolfram Language is the sole example) is to do something different: to define a precise way of talking in computational terms about things in the world (whether concretely countries or minerals, or abstractly computational or mathematical structures).

Out in the computational universe, there’s immense diversity in the “raw computation” that can happen. But there’s only a thin sliver of it that we humans (at least currently) care about and think about. And we can view computational language as defining a bridge between the things we think about and what’s computationally possible. The functions in our computational language (7000 or so of them in the Wolfram Language) are in effect like words in a human language—but now they have a precise grounding in the “bedrock” of explicit computation. And the point is to design the computational language so it’s convenient for us humans to think and express ourselves in (like a vastly expanded analog of mathematical notation), but so it can also be precisely implemented in practice on a computer.

Given a piece of natural language it’s often possible to give a precise, computational interpretation of it—in computational language. And indeed this is exactly what happens in Wolfram|Alpha. Give a piece of natural language and the Wolfram|Alpha NLU system will try to find an interpretation of it as computational language. And from this interpretation, it’s then up to the Wolfram Language to do the computation that’s specified, and give back the results—and potentially synthesize natural language to express them.

As a practical matter, this setup is useful not only for humans, but also for AIs—like ChatGPT. Given a system that produces natural language, the Wolfram|Alpha NLU system can “catch” natural language it is “thrown”, and interpret it as computational language that precisely specifies a potentially irreducible computation to do.

With both natural language and computational language one’s basically “directly saying what one wants”. But an alternative approach—more aligned with machine learning—is just to give examples, and (implicitly or explicitly) say “follow these”. Inevitably there has to be some underlying model for how to do that following—typically in practice just defined by “what a neural net with a certain architecture will do”. But will the result be “right”? Well, the result will be whatever the neural net gives. But typically we’ll tend to consider it “right” if it’s somehow consistent with what we humans would have concluded. And in practice this often seems to happen, presumably because the actual architecture of our brains is somehow similar enough to the architecture of the neural nets we’re using.

But what if we want to “know for sure” what’s going to happen—or, for example, that some particular “mistake” can never be made? Well then we’re presumably thrust back into computational irreducibility, with the result that there’s no way to know, for example, whether a particular set of training examples can lead to a system that’s capable of doing (or not doing) some particular thing.

OK, but let’s say we’re setting up some AI system, and we want to make sure it “doesn’t do anything bad”. There are several levels of issues here. The first is to decide what we mean by “anything bad”. And, as we’ll discuss below, that in itself is very hard. But even if we could abstractly figure this out, how should we actually express it? We could give examples—but then the AI will inevitably have to “extrapolate” from them, in ways we can’t predict. Or we could describe what we want in computational language. It might be difficult to cover “every case” (as it is in present-day human laws, or complex contracts). But at least we as humans can read what we’re specifying. Though even in this case, there’s an issue of computational irreducibility: that given the specification it won’t be possible to work out all its consequences.

What does all this mean? In essence it’s just a reflection of the fact that as soon as there’s “serious computation” (i.e. irreducible computation) involved, one isn’t going to be immediately able to say what will happen. (And in a sense that’s inevitable, because if one could say, it would mean the computation wasn’t in fact irreducible.) So, yes, we can try to “tell AIs what to do”. But it’ll be like many systems in nature (or, for that matter, people): you can set them on a path, but you can’t know for sure what will happen; you just have to wait and see.

A World Run by AIs

In the world today, there are already plenty of things that are being done by AIs. And, as we’ve discussed, there’ll surely be more in the future. But who’s “in charge”? Are we telling the AIs what to do, or are they telling us? Today it’s at best a mixture: AIs suggest content for us (for example from the web), and in general make all sorts of recommendations about what we should do. And no doubt in the future those recommendations will be even more extensive and tightly coupled to us: we’ll be recording everything we do, processing it with AI, and continually annotating with recommendations—say through augmented reality—everything we see. And in some sense things might even go beyond “recommendations”. If we have direct neural interfaces, then we might be making our brains just “decide” they want to do things, so that in some sense we become pure “puppets of the AI”.

And beyond “personal recommendations” there’s also the question of AIs running the systems we use, or in fact running the whole infrastructure of our civilization. Today we ultimately expect people to make large-scale decisions for our world—often operating in systems of rules defined by laws, and perhaps aided by computation, and even what one might call AI. But there may well come a time when it seems as if AIs could just “do a better job than humans”, say at running a central bank or waging a war.

One might ask how one would ever know if the AI would “do a better job”. Well, one could try tests, and run examples. But once again one’s faced with computational irreducibility. Yes, the particular tests one tries might work fine. But one can’t ultimately predict everything that could happen. What will the AI do if there’s suddenly a never-before-seen seismic event? We basically won’t know until it happens.

But can we be sure the AI won’t do anything “crazy”? Could we—with some definition of “crazy”—effectively “prove a theorem” that the AI can never do that? For any realistically nontrivial definition of crazy we’ll again run into computational irreducibility—and this won’t be possible.

Of course, if we’ve put a person (or even a group of people) “in charge” there’s also no way to “prove” that they won’t do anything “crazy”—and history shows that people in charge quite often have done things that, at least in retrospect, we consider “crazy”. But even though at some level there’s no more certainty about what people will do than about what AIs might do, we still get a certain comfort when people are in charge if we think that “we’re in it together”, and that if something goes wrong those people will also “feel the effects”.

But still, it seems inevitable that lots of decisions and actions in the world will be taken directly by AIs. Perhaps it’ll be because this will be cheaper. Perhaps the results (based on tests) will be better. Or perhaps, for example, things will just have to be done too quickly and in numbers too large for us humans to be in the loop.

But, OK, if a lot of what happens in our world is happening through AIs, and the AIs are effectively doing irreducible computations, what will this be like? We’ll be in a situation where things are “just happening” and we don’t quite know why. But in a sense we’ve very much been in this situation before. Because it’s what happens all the time in our interaction with nature.

Processes in nature—like, for example, the weather—can be thought of as corresponding to computations. And much of the time there’ll be irreducibility in those computations. So we won’t be able to readily predict them. Yes, we can do natural science to figure out some aspects of what’s going to happen. But it’ll inevitably be limited.

And so we can expect it to be with the “AI infrastructure” of the world. Things are happening in it—as they are in the weather—that we can’t readily predict. We’ll be able to say some things—though perhaps in ways that are closer to psychology or social science than to traditional exact science. But there’ll be surprises—like maybe some strange AI analog of a hurricane or an ice age. And in the end all we’ll really be able to do is to try to build up our human civilization so that such things “don’t fundamentally matter” to it.

In a sense the picture we have is that in time there’ll be a whole “civilization of AIs” operating—like nature—in ways that we can’t readily understand. And like with nature, we’ll coexist with it.

But at least at first we might think there’s an important difference between nature and AIs. Because we imagine that we don’t “pick our natural laws”—yet insofar as we’re the ones building the AIs we imagine we can “pick their laws”. But both parts of this aren’t quite right. Because in fact one of the implications of our Physics Project is precisely that the laws of nature that we perceive are the way they are because we are observers who are the way we are. And on the AI side, computational irreducibility implies that we can’t expect to be able to determine the final behavior of the AIs just from knowing the underlying laws we gave them.

But what will the “emergent laws” of the AIs be? Well, just like in physics, it’ll depend on how we “sample” the behavior of the AIs. If we look down at the level of individual bits, it’ll be like looking at molecular dynamics (or the behavior of atoms of space). But typically we won’t do this. And just like in physics, we’ll operate as computationally bounded observers—measuring only certain aggregated features of an underlying computationally irreducible process. But what will the “overall laws of AIs” be like? Maybe they’ll show close analogies to physics. Or maybe they’ll seem more like psychological theories (superegos for AIs?). But we can expect them in many ways to be like large-scale laws of nature of the kind we know.

Still, there’s one more difference between at least our interaction with nature and with AIs. Because we have in effect been “co-evolving” with nature for billions of years—yet AIs are “new on the scene”. And through our co-evolution with nature we’ve developed all sorts of structural, sensory and cognitive features that allow us to “interact successfully” with nature. But with AIs we don’t have these. So what does this mean?

Well, our ways of interacting with nature can be thought of as leveraging pockets of computational reducibility that exist in natural processes—to make things seem at least somewhat predictable to us. But without having found such pockets for AIs, we’re likely to be faced with much more “raw computational irreducibility”—and thus much more unpredictability. It’s been a conceit of modern times that—particularly with the help of science—we’ve been able to make more and more of our world predictable to us, though in practice a large part of what’s led to this is the way we’ve built and controlled the environment in which we live, and the things we choose to do.

But for the new “AI world”, we’re effectively starting from scratch. And to make things predictable in that world may be partly a matter of some new science, but perhaps more importantly a matter of choosing how we set up our “way of life” around the AIs there. (And, yes, if there’s lots of unpredictability we may be back to more ancient points of view about the importance of fate—or we may view AIs as a bit like the Olympians of Greek mythology, duking it out among themselves and sometimes having an effect on mortals.)

Governance in an AI World

Let’s say the world is effectively being run by AIs, but let’s assume that we humans have at least some control over what they do. Then what principles should we have them follow? And what, for example, should their “ethics” be?

Well, the first thing to say is that there’s no ultimate, theoretical “right answer” to this. There are many ethical and other principles that AIs could follow. And it’s basically just a choice which ones should be followed.

When we talk about “principles” and “ethics” we tend to think more in terms of constraints on behavior than in terms of rules for generating behavior. And that means we’re dealing with something more like mathematical axioms, where we ask things like what theorems are true according to those axioms, and what are not. And that means there can be issues like whether the axioms are consistent—and whether they’re complete, in the sense that they can “determine the ethics of anything”. But now, once again, we’re face to face with computational irreducibility, here in the form of Gödel’s theorem and its generalizations.

And what this means is that it’s in general undecidable whether any given set of principles is inconsistent, or incomplete. One might “ask an ethical question”, and find that there’s a “proof chain” of unbounded length to determine what the answer to that question is within one’s specified ethical system, or whether there is even a consistent answer.

One might imagine that somehow one could add axioms to “patch up” whatever issues there are. But Gödel’s theorem basically says that it’ll never work. It’s the same story as so often with computational irreducibility: there’ll always be “new situations” that can arise, that in this case can’t be captured by a finite set of axioms.

OK, but let’s imagine we’re picking a collection of principles for AIs. What criteria could we use to do it? One might be that these principles won’t inexorably lead to a simple state—like one where the AIs are extinct, or have to keep looping doing the same thing forever. And there may be cases where one can readily see that some set of principles will lead to such outcomes. But most of the time, computational irreducibility (here in the form of things like the halting problem) will once again get in the way, and one won’t be able to tell what will happen, or successfully pick “viable principles” this way.

So this means that there are going to be a wide range of principles that we could in theory pick. But presumably what we’ll want is to pick ones that make AIs give us humans some sort of “good time”, whatever that might mean.

And a minimal idea might be to get AIs just to observe what we humans do, and then somehow imitate this. But most people wouldn’t consider this the right thing. They’d point out all the “bad” things people do. And they’d perhaps say “let’s have the AIs follow not what we actually do, but what we aspire to do”.

But where should we get these aspirations from? Different people, and different cultures, can have very different aspirations—with very different resulting principles. So whose should we pick? And, yes, there are pitifully few—if any—principles that we truly find in common everywhere. (Though, for example, the major religions all tend to share things like respect for human life, the Golden Rule, etc.)

But do we in fact have to pick one set of principles? Maybe some AIs can have some principles, and some can have others. Maybe it should be like different countries, or different online communities: different principles for different groups or in different places.

Right now that doesn’t seem plausible, because technological and commercial forces have tended to make it seem as if powerful AIs always have to be centralized. But I expect that this is just a feature of the present time, and not something intrinsic to any “human-like” AI.

So could everyone (and maybe every organization) have “their own AI” with its own principles? For some purposes this might work OK. But there are many situations where AIs (or people) can’t really act independently, and where there have to be “collective decisions” made.

Why is this? In some cases it’s because everyone is in the same physical environment. In other cases it’s because if there’s to be social cohesion—of the kind needed to support even something like a language that’s useful for communication—then there has to be certain conceptual alignment.

It’s worth pointing out, though, that at some level having a “collective conclusion” is effectively just a way of introducing certain computational reducibility to make it “easier to see what to do”. And potentially it can be avoided if one has enough computation capability. For example, one might assume that there has to be a collective conclusion about which side of the road cars should drive on. But that wouldn’t be true if every car had the computation capability to just compute a trajectory that would for example optimally weave around other cars using both sides of the road.

But if we humans are going to be in the loop, we presumably need a certain amount of computational reducibility to make our world sufficiently comprehensible to us that we can operate in it. So that means there’ll be collective—“societal”—decisions to make. We might want to just tell the AIs to “make everything as good as it can be for us”. But inevitably there will be tradeoffs. Making a collective decision one way might be really good for 99% of people, but really bad for 1%; making it the other way might be pretty good for 60%, but pretty bad for 40%. So what should the AI do?

And, of course, this is a classic problem of political philosophy, and there’s no “right answer”. And in reality the setup won’t be as clean as this. It may be fairly easy to work out some immediate effects of different courses of action. But inevitably one will eventually run into computational irreducibility—and “unintended consequences”—and so one won’t be able to say with certainty what the ultimate effects (good or bad) will be.

But, OK, so how should one actually make collective decisions? There’s no perfect answer, but in the world today, democracy in one form or another is usually viewed as the best option. So how might AI affect democracy—and perhaps improve on it? Let’s assume first that “humans are still in charge”, so that it’s ultimately their preferences that matter. (And let’s also assume that humans are more or less in their “current form”: unique and unreplicable discrete entities that believe they have independent minds.)

The basic setup for current democracy is computationally quite simple: discrete votes (or perhaps rankings) are given (sometimes with weights of various kinds), and then numerical totals are used to determine the winner (or winners). And with past technology this was pretty much all that could be done. But now there are some new elements. Imagine not casting discrete votes, but instead using computational language to write a computational essay to describe one’s preferences. Or imagine having a conversation with a linguistically enabled AI that can draw out and debate one’s preferences, and eventually summarize them in some kind of feature vector. Then imagine feeding computational essays or feature vectors from all “voters” to some AI that “works out the best thing to do”.

Well, there are still the same political philosophy issues. It’s not like 60% of people voted for A and 40% for B, so one chose A. It’s much more nuanced. But one still won’t be able to make everyone happy all the time, and one has to have some base principles to know what to do about that.

And there’s a higher-order problem in having an AI “rebalance” collective decisions all the time based on everything it knows about people’s detailed preferences (and perhaps their actions too): for many purposes—like us being able to “keep track of what’s going on”—it’s important to maintain consistency over time. But, yes, one could deal with this by having the AI somehow also weigh consistency in figuring out what to do.

But while there are no doubt ways in which AI can “tune up” democracy, AI doesn’t seem—in and of itself—to deliver any fundamentally new solution for making collective decisions, and for governance in general.

And indeed, in the end things always seem to come down to needing some fundamental set of principles about how one wants things to be. Yes, AIs can be the ones to implement these principles. But there are many possibilities for what the principles could be. And—at least if we humans are “in charge”—we’re the ones who are going to have to come up with them.

Or, in other words, we need to come up with some kind of “AI constitution”. Presumably this constitution should basically be written in precise computational language (and, yes, we’re trying to make it possible for the Wolfram Language to be used), but inevitably (as yet another consequence of computational irreducibility) there’ll be “fuzzy” definitions and distinctions, that will rely on things like examples, “interpolated” by systems like neural nets. Maybe when such a constitution is created, there’ll be multiple “renderings” of it, which can all be applied whenever the constitution is used, with some mechanism for picking the “overall conclusion”. (And, yes, there’s potentially a certain “observer-dependent” multicomputational character to this.)

But whatever its detailed mechanisms, what should the AI constitution say? Different people and groups of people will definitely come to different conclusions about it. And presumably—just as there are different countries, etc. today with different systems of laws—there’ll be different groups that want to adopt different AI constitutions. (And, yes, the same issues about collective decision making apply again when those AI constitutions have to interact.)

But given an AI constitution, one has a base on which AIs can make decisions. And on top of this one imagines a huge network of computational contracts that are autonomously executed, essentially to “run the world”.

And this is perhaps one of those classic “what could possibly go wrong?” moments. An AI constitution has been agreed on, and now everything is being run efficiently and autonomously by AIs that are following it. Well, once again, computational irreducibility rears its head. Because however carefully the AI constitution is drafted, computational irreducibility implies that one won’t be able to foresee all its consequences: “unexpected” things will always happen—and some of them will undoubtedly be things “one doesn’t like”.

In human legal systems there’s always a mechanism for adding “patches”—filling in laws or precedents that cover new situations that have come up. But if everything is being autonomously run by AIs there’s no room for that. Yes, we as humans might characterize “bad things that happen” as “bugs” that could be fixed by adding a patch. But the AI is just supposed to be operating—essentially axiomatically—according to its constitution, so it has no way to “see that it’s a bug”.

Similar to what we discussed above, there’s an interesting analogy here with human law versus natural law. Human law is something we define and can modify. Natural law is something the universe just provides us (notwithstanding the issues about observers discussed above). And by “setting an AI constitution and letting it run” we’re basically forcing ourselves into a situation where the “civilization of the AIs” is some “independent stratum” in the world, that we essentially have to take as it is, and adapt to.

Of course, one might wonder if the AI constitution could “automatically evolve”, say based on what’s actually seen to happen in the world. But one quickly returns to the exact same issues of computational irreducibility, where one can’t predict whether the evolution will be “right”, etc.

So far, we’ve assumed that in some sense “humans are in charge”. But at some level that’s an issue for the AI constitution to define. It’ll have to define whether AIs have “independent rights”—just like humans (and, in many legal systems, some other entities too). Closely related to the question of independent rights for AIs is whether an AI can be considered autonomously “responsible for its actions”—or whether such responsibility must always ultimately rest with the (presumably human) creator or “programmer” of the AI.

Once again, computational irreducibility has something to say. Because it implies that the behavior of the AI can go “irreducibly beyond” what its programmer defined. And in the end (as we discussed above) this is the same basic mechanism that allows us humans to effectively have “free will” even when we’re ultimately operating according to deterministic underlying natural laws. So if we’re going to claim that we humans have free will, and can be “responsible for our actions” (as opposed to having our actions always “dictated by underlying laws”) then we’d better claim the same for AIs.

So just as a human builds up something irreducible and irreplaceable in the course of their life, so can an AI. As a practical matter, though, AIs can presumably be backed up, copied, etc.—which isn’t (yet) possible for humans. So somehow their individual instances don’t seem as valuable, even if the “last copy” might still be valuable. As humans, we might want to say “those AIs are something inferior; they shouldn’t have rights”. But things are going to get more entangled. Imagine a bot that no longer has an identifiable owner but that’s successfully befriending people (say on social media), and paying for its underlying operation from donations, ads, etc. Can we reasonably delete that bot? We might argue that “the bot can feel no pain”—but that’s not true of its human friends. But what if the bot starts doing “bad” things? Well, then we’ll need some form of “bot justice”—and pretty soon we’ll find ourselves building a whole human-like legal structure for the AIs.

So Will It End Badly?

OK, so AIs will learn what they can from us humans, then they’ll fundamentally just be running as autonomous computational systems—much like nature runs as an autonomous computational system—sometimes “interacting with us”. What will they “do to us”? Well, what does nature “do to us”? In a kind of animistic way, we might attribute intentions to nature, but ultimately it’s just “following its rules” and doing what it does. And so it will be with AIs. Yes, we might think we can set things up to determine what the AIs will do. But in the end—insofar as the AIs are really making use of what’s possible in the computational universe—there’ll inevitably be computational irreducibility, and we won’t be able to foresee what will happen, or what consequences it will have.

So will the dynamics of AIs in fact have “bad” effects—like, for example, wiping us out? Well, it’s perfectly possible nature could wipe us out too. But one has the feeling that—extraterrestrial “accidents” aside—the natural world around us is at some level enough in some kind of “equilibrium” that nothing too dramatic will happen. But AIs are something new. So maybe they’ll be different.

And one possibility might be that AIs could “improve themselves” to produce a single “apex intelligence” that would in a sense dominate everything else. But here we can see computational irreducibility as coming to the rescue. Because it implies that there can never be a “best at everything” computational system. It’s a core result of the emerging field of metabiology: that whatever “achievement” you specify, there’ll always be a computational system somewhere out there in the computational universe that will exceed it. (A simple example is that there’s always a Turing machine that can be found that will exceed any upper bound you specify on the time it takes to halt.)

So what this means is that there’ll inevitably be a whole “ecosystem” of AIs—with no single winner. Of course, while that might be an inevitable final outcome, it might not be what happens in the shorter term. And indeed the current tendency to centralize AI systems has a certain danger of AI behavior becoming “unstabilized” relative to what it would be with a whole ecosystem of “AIs in equilibrium”.

And in this situation there’s another potential concern as well. We humans are the product of a long struggle for life played out over the course of the history of biological evolution. And insofar as AIs inherit our attributes we might expect them to inherit a certain “drive to win”—perhaps also against us. And perhaps this is where the AI constitution becomes important: to define a “contract” that supersedes what AIs might “naturally” inherit from effectively observing our behavior. Eventually we can expect the AIs to “independently reach equilibrium”. But in the meantime, the AI constitution can help break their connection with our “competitive” history of biological evolution.

Preparing for an AI World

We’ve talked quite a bit about the ultimate future course of AIs, and their relation to us humans. But what about the short term? How today can we prepare for the growing capabilities and uses of AIs?

As has been true throughout history, people who use tools tend to do better than those who don’t. Yes, you can go on doing by direct human effort what has now been successfully automated, but except in rare cases you’ll increasingly be left behind. And what’s now emerging is an extremely powerful combination of tools: neural-net-style AI for “immediate human-like tasks”, along with computational language for deeper access to the computational universe and computational knowledge.

So what should people do with this? The highest leverage will come from figuring out new possibilities—things that weren’t possible before but have now “come into range” as a result of new capabilities. And as we discussed above, this is a place where we humans are inevitably central contributors—because we’re the ones who must define what we consider has value for us.

So what does this mean for education? What’s worth learning now that so much has been automated? I think the fundamental answer is how to think as broadly and deeply as possible—calling on as much knowledge and as many paradigms as possible, and particularly making use of the computational paradigm, and ways of thinking about things that directly connect with what computation can help with.

In the course of human history a lot of knowledge has been accumulated. But as ways of thinking have advanced, it’s become unnecessary to learn directly that knowledge in all its detail: instead one can learn things at a higher level, abstracting out many of the specific details. But in the past few decades something fundamentally new has come on the scene: computers and the things they enable.

For the first time in history, it’s become realistic to truly automate intellectual tasks. The leverage this provides is completely unprecedented. And we’re only just starting to come to terms with what it means for what and how we should learn. But with all this new power there’s a tendency to think something must be lost. Surely it must still be worth learning all those intricate details—that people in the past worked so hard to figure out—of how to do some mathematical calculation, even though Mathematica has been able to do it automatically for more than a third of a century?

And, yes, at the right time it can be interesting to learn those details. But in the effort to understand and best make use of the intellectual achievements of our civilization, it makes much more sense to leverage the automation we have, and treat those calculations just as “building blocks” that can be put together in “finished form” to do whatever it is we want to do.

One might think this kind of leveraging of automation would just be important for “practical purposes”, and for applying knowledge in the real world. But actually—as I have personally found repeatedly to great benefit over the decades—it’s also crucial at a conceptual level. Because it’s only through automation that one can get enough examples and experience that one’s able to develop the intuition needed to reach a higher level of understanding.

Confronted with the rapidly growing amount of knowledge in the world there’s been a tremendous tendency to assume that people must inevitably become more and more specialized. But with increasing success in the automation of intellectual tasks—and what we might broadly call AI—it becomes clear there’s an alternative: to make more and more use of this automation, so people can operate at a higher level, “integrating” rather than specializing.

And in a sense this is the way to make the best use of our human capabilities: to let us concentrate on setting the “strategy” of what we want to do—delegating the details of how to do it to automated systems that can do it better than us. But, by the way, the very fact that there’s an AI that knows how to do something will no doubt make it easier for humans to learn how to do it too. Because—although we don’t yet have the complete story—it seems inevitable that with modern techniques AIs will be able to successfully “learn how people learn”, and effectively present things an AI “knows” in just the right way for any given person to absorb.

So what should people actually learn? Learn how to use tools to do things. But also learn what things are out there to do—and learn facts to anchor how you think about those things. A lot of education today is about answering questions. But for the future—with AI in the picture—what’s likely to be more important is to learn how to ask questions, and how to figure out what questions are worth asking. Or, in effect, how to lay out an “intellectual strategy” for what to do.

And to be successful at this, what’s going to be important is breadth of knowledge—and clarity of thinking. And when it comes to clarity of thinking, there’s again something new in modern times: the concept of computational thinking. In the past we’ve had things like logic, and mathematics, as ways to structure thinking. But now we have something new: computation.

Does that mean everyone should “learn to program” in some traditional programming language? No. Traditional programming languages are about telling computers what to do in their terms. And, yes, lots of humans do this today. But it’s something that’s fundamentally ripe for direct automation (as examples with ChatGPT already show). And what’s important for the long term is something different. It’s to use the computational paradigm as a structured way to think not about the operation of computers, but about both things in the world and abstract things.

And crucial to this is having a computational language: a language for expressing things using the computational paradigm. It’s perfectly possible to express simple “everyday things” in plain, unstructured natural language. But to build any kind of serious “conceptual tower” one needs something more structured. And that’s what computational language is about.

One can see a rough historical analog in the development of mathematics and mathematical thinking. Up until about half a millennium ago, mathematics basically had to be expressed in natural language. But then came mathematical notation—and from it a more streamlined approach to mathematical thinking, that eventually made possible all the various mathematical sciences. And it’s now the same kind of thing with computational language and the computational paradigm. Except that it’s a much broader story, in which for basically every field or occupation “X” there’s a “computational X” that’s emerging.

In a sense the point of computational language (and all my efforts in the development of the Wolfram Language) is to be able to let people get “as automatically as possible” to computational X—and to let people express themselves using the full power of the computational paradigm.

Something like ChatGPT provides “human-like AI” in effect by piecing together existing human material (like billions of words of human-written text). But computational language lets one tap directly into computation—and gives the ability to do fundamentally new things, that immediately leverage our human capabilities for defining intellectual strategy.

And, yes, while traditional programming is likely to be largely obsoleted by AI, computational language is something that provides a permanent bridge between human thinking and the computational universe: a channel in which the automation is already done in the very design (and implementation) of the language—leaving in a sense an interface directly suitable for humans to learn, and to use as a basis to extend their thinking.

But, OK, what about the future of discovery? Will AIs take over from us humans in, for example, “doing science”? I, for one, have used computation (and many things one might think of as AI) as a tool for scientific discovery for nearly half a century. And, yes, many of my discoveries have in effect been “made by computer”. But science is ultimately about connecting things to human understanding. And so far it’s taken a human to knit what the computer finds into the whole web of human intellectual history.

One can certainly imagine, though, that an AI—even one rather like ChatGPT—could be quite successful in taking a “raw computational discovery” and “explaining” how it might relate to existing human knowledge. One could also imagine that the AI would be successful at identifying what aspects of some system in the world could be picked out to describe in some formal way. But—as is typical for the process of modeling in general—a key step is to decide “what one cares about”, and in effect in what direction to go in extending one’s science. And this—like so much else—is inevitably tied into the specifics of the goals we humans set ourselves.

In the emerging AI world there are plenty of specific skills that won’t make sense for (most) humans to learn—just as today the advance of automation has obsoleted many skills from the past. But—as we’ve discussed—we can expect there to “be a place” for humans. And what’s most important for us humans to learn is in effect how to pick “where next to go”—and where, out of all the infinite possibilities in the computational universe, we should take human civilization.

Afterword: Looking at Some Actual Data

OK, so we’ve talked quite a bit about what might happen in the future. But what about actual data from the past? For example, what’s been the actual history of the evolution of jobs? Conveniently, in the US, the Census Bureau has records of people’s occupations going back to 1850. Of course, many job titles have changed since then. Switchmen (on railroads), chainmen (in surveying) and sextons (in churches) aren’t really things anymore. And telemarketers, aircraft pilots and web developers weren’t things in 1850. But with a bit of effort, it’s possible to more or less match things up—at least if one aggregates into large enough categories.

So here are pie charts of different job categories at 50-year intervals:

And, yes, in 1850 the US was firmly an agricultural economy, with just over half of all jobs being in agriculture. But as agriculture got more efficient—with the introduction of machinery, irrigation, better seeds, fertilizers, etc.—the fraction dropped dramatically, to just a few percent today.

After agriculture, the next biggest category back in 1850 was construction (along with other real-estate-related jobs, mainly maintenance). And this is a category that for a century and a half hasn’t changed much in size (at least so far), presumably because, even though there’s been greater automation, this has just allowed buildings to be more complex.

Looking at the pie charts above, we can see a clear trend towards greater diversification in jobs (and indeed the same thing is seen in the development of other economies around the world). It’s an old theory in economics that increasing specialization is related to economic growth, but from our point of view here, we might say that the very possibility of a more complex economy, with more niches and jobs, is a reflection of the inevitable presence of computational irreducibility, and the complex web of pockets of computational reducibility that it implies.

Beyond the overall distribution of job categories, we can also look at trends in individual categories over time—with each one in a sense providing a certain window onto history:

One can definitely see cases where the number of jobs decreases as a result of automation. And this happens not only in areas like agriculture and mining, but also for example in finance (fewer clerks and bank tellers), as well as in sales and retail (online shopping). Sometimes—as in the case of manufacturing—there’s a decrease of jobs partly because of automation, and partly because the jobs move out of the US (mainly to countries with lower labor costs).

There are cases—like military jobs—where there are clear “exogenous” effects. And then there are cases like transportation+logistics where there’s a steady increase for more than half a century as technology spreads and infrastructure gets built up—but then things “saturate”, presumably at least partly as a result of increased automation. It’s a somewhat similar story with what I’ve called “technical operations”—with more “tending to technology” needed as technology becomes more widespread.

Another clear trend is an increase in job categories associated with the world becoming an “organizationally more complicated place”. Thus we see increases in management, as well as administration, government, finance and sales (which all have recent decreases as a result of computerization). And there’s also a (somewhat recent) increase in legal.

Other areas with increases include healthcare, engineering, science and education—where “more is known and there’s more to do” (as well as there being increased organizational complexity). And then there’s entertainment, and food+hospitality, with increases that one might attribute to people leading (and wanting) “more complex lives”. And, of course, there’s information technology which takes off from nothing in the mid-1950s (and which had to be rather awkwardly grafted into the data we’re using here).

So what can we conclude? The data seems quite well aligned with what we discussed in more general terms above. Well-developed areas get automated and need to employ fewer people. But technology also opens up new areas, which employ additional people. And—as we might expect from computational irreducibility—things generally get progressively more complicated, with additional knowledge and organizational structure opening up more “frontiers” where people are needed. But even though there are sometimes “sudden inventions”, it still always seems to take decades (or effectively a generation) for there to be any dramatic change in the number of jobs. (The few sharp changes visible in the plots seem mostly to be associated with specific economic events, and—often related—changes in government policies.)

But in addition to the different jobs that get done, there’s also the question of how individual people spend their time each day. And—while it certainly doesn’t live up to my own (rather extreme) level of personal analytics—there’s a certain amount of data on this that’s been collected over the years (by getting time diaries from randomly sampled people) in the American Heritage Time Use Study. So here, for example, are plots based on this survey for how the amount of time spent on different broad activities has varied over the decades (the main line shows the mean—in hours—for each activity; the shaded areas indicate successive deciles):

And, yes, people are spending more time on “media & computing”, some mixture of watching TV, playing videogames, etc. Housework, at least for women, takes less time, presumably mostly as a result of automation (appliances, etc.). (“Leisure” is basically “hanging out” as well as hobbies and social, cultural, sporting events, etc.; “Civic” includes volunteer, religious, etc. activities.)

If one looks specifically at people who are doing paid work

one notices several things. First, the average number of hours worked hasn’t changed much in half a century, though the distribution has broadened somewhat. For people doing paid work, media & computing hasn’t increased significantly, at least since the 1980s. One category in which there is systematic increase (though the total time still isn’t very large) is exercise.

What about people who—for one reason or another—aren’t doing paid work? Here are corresponding results in this case:

Not so much increase in exercise (though the total times are larger to begin with), but now a significant increase in media & computing, with the average recently reaching nearly 6 hours per day for men—perhaps as a reflection of “more of life going online”.

But looking at all these results on time use, I think the main conclusion that over the past half century, the ways people (at least in the US) spend their time have remained rather stable—even as we’ve gone from a world with almost no computers to a world in which there are more computers than people.

Alien Intelligence and the Concept of Technology

Par : Bailey Long
16 juin 2022 à 23:58

The Nature of Alien Intelligence

“We’re going to launch lots of tiny spacecraft into interstellar space, have them discover alien intelligence, then bring back its technology to advance human technology by a million years”. I’ve heard some pretty wacky startup pitches over the years, but this might possibly be the all-time winner.

But as I thought about it, I realized that beyond the “absurdly extreme moonshot” character of this pitch, there’s some science that I’ve done that makes it clear that it’s also fundamentally philosophically confused. The nature of the confusion is interesting, however, and untangling it will give us an opportunity to illuminate some deep features of both intelligence and technology—and in the end suggest a way to think about the long-term trajectory of the very concept of technology and its relation to our universe.

Let’s start with a scenario. Let’s say one of the little spacecraft comes across a planet where it sees complicated swirling patterns:

The Jupiter Great Red Spot
&#10005

The spacecraft sends out a probe to “make contact”. The swirling pattern “responds” by changing slightly. The spacecraft analyzes the change, and sends out another probe. And pretty soon there’s a whole “conversation” going on between the spacecraft and the planet. But, you might say, that’s nothing like an “intelligence” there; there’s just a “pure physical system” that operates through physical laws.

OK, but now let’s imagine the spacecraft has returned to Earth and is checking it out. It detects complicated patterns of radio signals. It sends out a radio signal of its own. Something on Earth responds. A “conversation” ensues. Maybe the spacecraft is “talking to” a cellphone tower, doing automated handshakes with it. Maybe it reached a ham radio operator, and is exchanging Morse code with them. Or maybe—in an ultimate version of code injection—there’s a computer that’s interpreting the spacecraft’s signals as a program, and is sending back the results of running the program.

It all seems quite sophisticated—and at some level worthy of the technological civilization we’ve built up here on Earth. But let’s zoom out a bit. There’s something coming from the spacecraft, that’s causing something to happen on Earth, that’s causing something to be returned to the spacecraft.

And ultimately whatever is happening on Earth must be a physical process of some kind—operating according to the laws of physics. So what’s the difference between this and those swirling “just physics” patterns that the spacecraft found on the other planet? Everything is ultimately “just physics” after all.

OK, you might say, that’s surely true. But on Earth, even though we might have started from physics, we’ve somehow now “ascended” through chemistry and biology and technology to get to something that’s fundamentally more sophisticated. But here we run into an important—if at first surprising—piece of basic science: my Principle of Computational Equivalence.

Let’s say we represent all those “physical processes” as computations (and our Physics Project implies that all of physics is indeed ultimately computational). Now we can compare the computations that correspond to the planet with the swirling patterns to the ones that correspond to our Earth with us humans in the loop.

And what the Principle of Computational Equivalence tells us is that they’re ultimately equivalent. The computations associated with the swirling patterns are ultimately just as sophisticated as the ones we achieve with our brains and our technology here on Earth. It’s far from obvious that this would be true. But it’s something one discovers when one explores the computational universe of possible programs.

One might think that simple programs would produce only simple behavior, and that somehow the behavior would get progressively more complex with more complicated programs. But that’s not what one finds. Instead, there’s increasing evidence that almost any program that doesn’t show obviously simple behavior can in fact show behavior that is as sophisticated as anything.

It’s been known for about a century that there exist computation universal systems capable of being “programmed” to do essentially any computation. But what the Principle of Computational Equivalence says is that sophisticated computation is not only possible—even for simple programs—but is something that happens generically and ubiquitously.

So what does this mean for our spacecraft? It means that what the spacecraft sees on Earth can be computationally no more sophisticated than what it sees on the planet with the swirling patterns. Yes, we consider there to be “intelligence” here on Earth. But what the Principle of Computational Equivalence tells us is that ultimately there’s nothing abstractly different going on from what’s going on in the swirling patterns.

So if we characterize what’s going on here on Earth as an example of “intelligence” we really should say that those swirling patterns are also “examples of intelligence”. And, yes, it doesn’t seem much like human intelligence. But at an abstract computational level it’s really operating like intelligence—but to us humans it’s “alien intelligence”.

There’s a common saying: “The weather has a mind of its own”. And what the Principle of Computational Equivalence tells us is that, yes, fluid dynamics in the atmosphere—and all the swirling patterns associated with it—are examples of computation that are just as sophisticated as those associated with human minds.

But, OK, so there’s a sense in which the weather “has a mind of its own”. But it’s definitely not a “human-like mind”. Yes, the weather does sophisticated computations. But there’s no obvious way to attribute to those computations the purposes and intentions and other typical features of how we describe what goes on in a human mind. So if indeed we’re going to talk about the weather as being an intelligence, for us humans we have to consider it an “alien intelligence”.

We started off talking about spacecraft going out into the cosmos to discover alien intelligence. But what the Principle Computational Equivalence is telling us is that actually there’s what we can think of as alien intelligence all around us. Yes, we humans have managed to get to the point where we do all sorts of sophisticated computations. But computations of just the same sophistication are being done in all sorts of systems that don’t have that whole human tower of biology and technology.

For a long time it’s been a mystery why we’ve never detected alien intelligence out there in the cosmos. But actually I think there’s no lack of “alien intelligence”; indeed it’s all around us. But the point is that it really is alien. At an abstract computational level it’s like our intelligence. But in its details it’s not aligned with our intelligence. Abstractly it’s intelligence, but it’s not human-like intelligence. It’s alien intelligence.

The Role of Science and Technology

OK, so we can think of lots of systems as being examples of “alien intelligence”. But how does that alien intelligence connect to our human intelligence? Sometimes it’s close enough that we humans can immediately “anthropomorphize” the system to “understand what it’s doing in human terms”. But often we need to put effort into “making a bridge”. And in fact we can view that as being what science and technology are ultimately trying to do.

Let’s say we’re looking at swirling patterns in a fluid. The fluid is doing what it does, in effect continually running a computation that generates its behavior. But how can we “align” that with what’s going on in our brains? That’s where science comes in. Because what science is trying to do is to extract some kind of “human-relatable narrative” from the actual behavior of a system out there in the world. Or in some sense it’s trying to provide a “channel” through which we can “communicate” with the “alien intelligence” that is embodied in what’s out there in the world.

So what about technology? Fundamentally technology is about trying to take what exists out there in the world, and apply it to achieve human purposes. We have a fluid. Now we use it to create hydraulic technology that achieves some practical human purpose. We can see the history of technology as being a progressive effort to identify things out there in the world (metal ore, photoelectricity, liquid crystals, …) that can be sampled and fashioned in such a way as to achieve certain purposes we want.

And insofar as we think of what’s out there in the world as being like alien intelligence, what technology is doing is finding ways to corral that intelligence into achieving human purposes. The truth is that in most of our technology today, we’re not letting that intelligence really do anything close to what it’s capable of. We’re keeping it tightly constrained to take only steps that we can readily understand and foresee. It’s a bit like having a horse with a harness that constrains it to just walk slowly in a straight line—even though without the harness the horse could gallop around and do all sorts of elaborate things, albeit things that we might not readily be able to understand or foresee.

So let’s come back to the spacecraft. It’s reached a planet. And it’s interacting with what’s there. Perhaps there’s some weird electrical storm going on. And, yes, we can think of that as an example of alien intelligence. But if the mission of the spacecraft is to discover technology then what it needs to do is to figure out whether there’s some way to interact with the electrical storm so as to achieve some human purpose.

The storm does what the storm does. But maybe by moving some piece of metal around in just the right way it’s possible to get the storm to charge a battery. Or, more elaborately, perhaps processes in the storm could be used like an analog computer, say to compute solutions to equations. And perhaps—having seen the storm on this planet—it’s even possible to “bottle it up” and replicate it, say in a piece of consumer electronics.

One way to describe what’s going on is just to say rather prosaically that we discovered a phenomenon on the planet, that we were able to use for technology. But more colorfully we could say that we encountered an alien intelligence, we found a way to communicate with it, and then we “brought back” technology from it.

The original startup pitch was about spacecraft getting technology by discovering alien intelligence out in the cosmos. But really the whole spacecraft thing is a distraction. Because actually—as we’ve discussed—there’s plenty we can describe as “alien intelligence” all around us, even right here on Earth. And the issue is in a sense just how to “communicate with it” and find ways to “harness it” for our technological purposes.

We’ve learned in the past century that we can use electrons in semiconductors as a way to build computers. But what about other physical processes? Maybe flowing fluids, for example. Can we use that “alien intelligence” to make a new kind of computer? In the end, the point is that any technology is about finding and harnessing “alien intelligence”. That’s basically just what technology is, and always has been.

The whole “alien intelligence” part of the story, though, is much more relevant when we’re thinking of technology that makes serious use of what we can identify as sophisticated computation. If we’re just using a system from nature for its physical mass, it doesn’t really feel as if we’re using its “intelligence”. But as soon as we try, for example, to base a general computer on it, it’s a quite different story.

In getting technology from the universe we’re basically picking out certain aspects of what exists and choosing to apply these for our purposes. In doing science it seems like we have “less choice” about what aspects of the universe we deal with. After all, we might imagine that science is trying to give us a way to understand anything that’s out there in the universe. But in reality it’s much more like technology. The “scientific narratives” that we understand—at least at a given time in history—are ones that we’re in a sense “primed for”. Yes, something like fluid turbulence might give us “in-your-face” exposure to something computationally sophisticated that’s far from what we normally talk about. But what science mostly concentrates on is creating narratives that are aligned with our existing scientific understanding and discussions—much as technology is set up to be about things that are aligned with our existing human purposes.

Extracting Technology from the Ruliad

One might imagine that—wherever it ultimately comes from—technology must at least always in the end be based on the laws of physics. But what’s emerging from our Physics Project is that actually the story is considerably more complicated than that.

It all begins with the ruliad: the object that represents the entangled limit of all possible computations. The ruliad is a unique, formally necessary object, that in a sense embodies all conceivable existence. And inevitably we are embedded within the ruliad, sampling certain aspects of it to form our perception of reality.

In principle there are all sorts of kinds of observers of the ruliad, with all sorts of kinds of perceptions of reality. But the key point that has emerged as a foundation of our Physics Project is that “observers like us” have certain general characteristics—specifically that we assume that we are persistent through time, and also that we are computationally bounded—and from these characteristics alone, we can abstractly deduce from the structure of the ruliad that we must “experience” core standard laws of known physics.

The ruliad in a sense contains all possible physicses. But it’s our particular kind of sampling of the ruliad that leads us to the particular laws of physics that we currently know. An “alien intelligence” might sample the ruliad quite differently, and thus in effect “experience” quite different laws of physics.

Somewhere underneath everything we can think of there being a giant hypergraph of individual atoms of existence—but with the means of perception observers like us have, we inevitably “coarse grain” to the point where, for example, we experience this as continuous space. Another kind of observer, with different characteristics, might, for example, not do that coarse graining, might never experience continuous space, and might have a completely different perception of how the universe works.

In some sense, therefore, physics is much more like technology than we might expect. There isn’t an “absolute physics”. There’s just the physics that we as observers extract from the ruliad. Much like there’s particular technology that we choose to build from the “raw material” that exists. Put another way, both physics and technology are ultimately things we “extract” from the ruliad, in effect by making certain choices.

How we “extract” physics seems, however, much more constrained. For example, we as humans have only certain particular senses through which we are biologically set up to experience the world. Yet we have the feeling that in technology we can in effect “construct whatever we want”—although inevitably “what we want” is also still at least influenced by how we are biologically set up.

We’re very used to the idea that over time technology progresses—as we invent more, and work out new ways to use our “raw material” to achieve human purposes. But physics as a science progresses too. And in a sense what’s happening there is that we’re expanding our character as observers to be able to perceive and experience more of “what’s going on”—ultimately in the ruliad.

Part of that expansion is actually a matter of technology. We’re building telescopes and microscopes and amplifiers that allow us to extend our raw human senses to be sensitive to more things. But there’s also another part of the expansion that is in effect intellectual: we’re developing new conceptual frameworks that allow us to “corral” things we see happening in the world into forms that “fit narratives” we’ve constructed.

And the important point here is that neither our technology nor our physics is fixed. They’re in a sense co-evolving—gradually allowing more and more of the ruliad to be pulled into our narratives and our purposes. Or, put another way, what we observe is gradually expanding to encompass more and more of the ruliad, and to be able to make use of more and more of it.

Reaching Out across Rulial Space

How are “different intelligences” manifest in the ruliad? We can imagine organizing the ruliad to be laid out in some form of rulial space. And from each point in rulial space one in effect gets a “different perspective” on the ruliad. And that’s at least the beginning of the story of how “different intelligences” exist and experience the ruliad.

It’s similar to what happens with physical space: from different places in physical space one gets a different perspective on the universe. In physical space we have a concept of motion: that observers like us can move from one place in space to another while in effect maintaining our coherence and integrity.

How does this work in rulial space? We can think of different points in rulial space as corresponding to different computations, with different rules. So rulial motion in effect corresponds to making a translation between one computation and another. At the outset, it’s not obvious this would even in principle be possible. But the Principle of Computational Equivalence implies that it ultimately will be. The computations at different points in rulial space will (almost always) be equivalent in their sophistication—and as is typical with universal computation—it’ll therefore in principle be possible to have an “interpretation process” that translates between them.

But the big question is whether this can be achieved in practice. Just how far can a particular observer translate in rulial space while maintaining their coherence and integrity?

The ruliad is a complex and (if sampled across slices in time) continually changing thing. But a critical feature is that there can be structures that have a certain persistence within it. In physical space these are things like particles (as well as black holes) that behave like “stable lumps of space”—or like stable lumps in certain projections of the ruliad. In rulial space there can presumably also be structures with a certain persistence: “particles” of rulial space. And these “particles” somehow correspond to features that “survive across different computational perspectives”—or in effect represent “robust concepts”.

When we talk about “different intelligences” a very familiar example is different human minds. And in a sense we can think of different human minds as being laid out in rulial space—with each mind being at a different rulial position, and thus having a different computational rule by which it operates, and a different “experience of the ruliad”.

So how can these minds “communicate”? Ultimately it is through “rulial motion”. But potentially the most robust form of rulial motion is through rulial particles—which we’ve identified above with the abstract idea of “robust concepts”. Put in a practical way: different (human) minds operate internally in different ways. But they can still “communicate” by exchanging something that in effect “survives translation” between one mind and another: rulial particles corresponding to robust concepts (say expressed in a language).

But, OK, we can imagine rulial space with lots of human minds laid out at different places, with ones that communicate more easily closer together. So what about “alien intelligences”? Well, each one is somewhere in rulial space. But they may be far away from where our human minds are.

We can imagine our rulial particles—or “robust concepts”—being able to reach a certain distance in rulial space. The human idea of “excitement” might for example be able to reach the place in rulial space where we’d find the minds of dogs. But what about the weather, for example? Well, as an alien intelligence, it’s presumably much further away in rulial space—and, anthropomorphize it as we might—it’s not clear what its notion of “excitement” would be.

It’s an often-asked question why—with our spacecraft and radio telescopes and everything else—we haven’t ever run across what we consider to be “naturally occurring” alien intelligences. In the past we might have imagined that the answer is that there just isn’t anything like “intelligence” (outside of us humans) to be found in any part of the universe that we can probe. But the Principle of Computational Equivalence says that’s fundamentally not true, and that in fact “abstract intelligence” is thoroughly ubiquitous among systems with all but the most obviously simple behavior.

So to “find” alien intelligence it’s not that we need a more powerful radio telescope (or a better spacecraft) that can reach further in physical space. Rather, the issue is to be able to reach far enough in rulial space. Or, put another way, even if we view the weather as “having a mind of its own”, the rulial distance between “its mind” and our human minds may be too great for us to be able to “understand” and “communicate with it”.

So what will it take for us to “bridge this rulial gap”? At some level it’s just about building the right science and technology. We can think of science as being about defining a way to “translate” from the computational rules by which some particular system operates to the computational way our human minds operate. Or, in terms of rulial space, finding a way to “move” from the rulial position of the system to the rulial position of our minds—and translating from the way a system works to a “human narrative” that represents it.

Centuries ago we might have just said “the planets do what they do”; maybe their motion in space is driven by an “alien intelligence” that we don’t understand. But then along came mathematical science and we were able to “translate” from the intrinsic computation done by the planets to a mathematical description that we internalized enough to consider it a human narrative that we understand.

In some sense at any given time in intellectual history our minds “reach out a certain distance in rulial space”. We’ve developed conceptual frameworks that allow us to maintain a coherent understanding of a certain range of things—with that range growing as we invent new frameworks. At one time our “domain of understanding”—or the region of rulial space that we could reach—didn’t encompass the behavior of electricity. But our “intellectual expansion” in rulial space eventually reached this, and the result is that we can now use electricity as “raw material” from which to construct technology.

One way we “expand our reach in rulial space” is in effect conceptual: by expanding what we understand. But another way is by being able to “sense” or “measure” more. When we invent radio—or, for that matter, gravitational wave detection—there are immediately new kinds of processes that we manage to “connect to human experience”. Or, put another way, there are more distant parts of the ruliad that we’re able to reach.

More prosaically, we can say that if we want to be able to use something for technology, we’d better be able to detect that it’s there, and we’d better be able to understand it well enough that we can see how it could align with our human purposes. We can think of the ruliad as being full of alien intelligences—with plenty of capabilities to “mine”. But to be able to actually mine something for our technological purposes we have to be able to reach it across rulial space; we have to be able to connect it to us.

So what does this mean for the original startup pitch? Yes, it’s a good idea to “mine alien intelligences” for technology. In fact, that’s basically where technology always comes from. But there’s no need to send out spacecraft, “discover” alien intelligence, and so on. There are “alien intelligences” all around us; the issue is just to reach them across rulial space, and be able to “communicate” with them. But what we’ve argued is that the process of progressively reaching out in rulial space is just the general process of progressively advancing science (and the technology on which it depends).

So, yes, by all means explore more of what’s out there in the world, with more, different kinds of sensors and measurements. Then try to “understand” what you see enough to be able to tell how to align it with human purposes, and make technology out of it. But there’s no pressing need for interstellar spacecraft in this picture. It’s just a matter of doing more science to expand our domain in the ruliad, and mine more of rulial space.

The Evolution of Purpose and the Colonization of Rulial Space

We can think of technology as being about setting up things that exist in the world (or ultimately in the ruliad) to achieve human purposes. And we’ve talked about how the advance of science and technology allows us to progressively reach further in rulial space to get “raw material” for our technology. But we’ve said that technology is intended to “achieve human purposes”. So what might those purposes ultimately be?

Our purposes have certainly evolved over the course of human history. In today’s world, we might view it as purposeful to walk on a treadmill, or to trade cryptocurrencies. But it would be challenging to explain the purpose of such things to someone from even a few hundred years ago.

In a sense, purposes evolve as we build new conceptual frameworks, and as we set up technology that allows us to do new things. More abstractly, we might say that purposes are also something defined by places in rulial space. So when we talk about the evolution of purposes, what we’re really asking is where in rulial space our history and development has led us, and will lead us in the future.

And certainly in the vastness of the whole ruliad, our existing human purposes occupy just an infinitesimally tiny part. Think, for example, of the natural world even as we are currently aware of it. The vast majority of things in it do not seem in any way aligned with our purposes—and we have not been able to mine them for technology. Historically, however, there’s been progressive expansion in the domain of our purposes. There was a time when we knew about magnetic rocks, but had no purpose for magnetism. But over the course of time, from compasses to actuators to memories, more and more human purposes have emerged that connect to the phenomenon of magnetism.

And in a sense we can view the whole core trajectory of human progress as being about the expansion of the region of rulial space—and the ruliad—that represents our purposes. So how will this evolve?

As I’ve discussed extensively before, there seem to be two central features that we as entities in the ruliad have. First, that we are computationally bounded. And second, that we believe we are persistent in time. Computational boundedness is essentially the statement that the region of rulial space that we occupy is limited. In some sense our minds can coherently span a certain region of rulial space, but it’s a bounded region.

What about persistence in time? It means that even though we are always being reconstructed out of different atoms of existence (and different atoms of space), we conflate things to the point where we experience a single continuous thread of existence.

Taken together, these features suggest a picture of us being a kind of “blob” that gradually moves around in rulial space. Does it matter that there isn’t just a single human mind? Well, yes. Without some kind of “observer” there’s no real way to even define what it means to have a “blob”. And in the end it’s a story of consistency of observers observing observers. But the result is that we can think of our whole collective “flotilla” of human purposes as being something localized that moves around in rulial space, expanding the region of the ruliad that it reaches.

But just how far can this go? Imagine that at some time in the distant future we have successfully explored—and “colonized”—much of rulial space. To do this we’d certainly have to have broken out of the particular constraints of our biological construction, and made use of “additional raw material” in the ruliad.

But what would it mean to be spread across a large swath of rulial space? Our very notion of existence seems to depend on localization in rulial space. The thing that we view as “us” is something particular and coherent. To be “bigger” in rulial space is to deny that particularity and coherence, and to become something generic that does not represent any kind of “specific entity that exists”.

In a sense, it’s a pyrrhic view of the ultimate limit of our technological and other evolution. As we progress, we gradually “mine” more and more of the ruliad, pulling it into the domain of technology and of our “human” (or post-human) purposes. But in doing so, we eventually transcend the very characteristics that we identify with existence. In other words, if we go too far with our expansion in the ruliad, we simply cease to exist, at least in the sense that we currently define existence.

Put another way, if we “absorb” more and more “alien intelligence” there’s eventually no longer any coherent “us”. Of course, the very notion of coherence is something we’re basically defining from our current human view of things. And no doubt there are other definitions that could be given. But they’re certainly far away from our current place in rulial space, and it’s not even clear they can be reached without some kind of “discontinuity of motion” that would in effect fundamentally break their connection to us as we are now.

Face to Face with Alien Intelligence, Out in Rulial Space

At a fundamental level, the ruliad is a purely computational object, that we can think of as being made of pure, abstract atoms of existence (or “emes”). When observers like us sample the ruliad we can attribute to it the characteristics that correspond to our perception of physical reality. And a notable feature of that sampling is that it supports the idea of pure motion in physical space. In other words, it allows for the possibility that structures can “maintain their perceived physical integrity” while being “re-formed” out of different atoms of space, which themselves are interpretations of the pure atoms of existence in the ruliad.

But as soon as we start thinking about any kind of serious motion in rulial (rather than physical) space it no longer makes sense to talk about anything like “maintaining physical integrity”, not least because in different places in rulial space the very notion of physics changes. But wherever we are in the ruliad we can still think about what’s going on as computation. We might have some way of observing or sampling the ruliad that gives us some perception of reality—like physics, or mathematics. But if we “atomize” things down to the lowest level, we’ll always find raw computation.

As “physical observers like us” we only have limited capabilities to probe or manipulate the raw ruliad and affect what we perceive as physical reality. We can move physical objects around, maintaining what we observe of their structure. In principle we could imagine deconstructing objects into individual atoms of existence, then recreating them “transporter style” somewhere else in physical space. But as of now, we don’t know how to do this, and most likely it’s not possible for observers like us—because it would require “outcomputing” computationally irreducible features of the structure of space down at the level of individual atoms of space, which is far from what computationally bounded observers like us can expect to do.

But what about raw computation, of the kind that ultimately makes up the ruliad? There the story is different. Because we’re no longer constrained by our character as physical observers, so we’re free to in effect “make up any computation we want”. To explore the physical universe we need physical motion or something like it. And at least for observers like us the only way to achieve this seems to be to progressively move structures across physical space. But to find out what can happen in the computational universe we can effectively just write down any rule (i.e. any program) that appears “anywhere in the ruliad”, and run it.

Of course, when we run a rule on a practical computer, it’s just an emulation of what’s happening in the raw ruliad. But it’s just an abstract rule—so although it will run astronomically slower, its ultimate behavior in our emulation will inevitably be identical to what it is when implemented in terms of individual atoms of existence in the “raw ruliad”.

In principle we could take the same approach in emulating the elements that make up our physical reality. But observers like us are so big relative to the raw elements of the ruliad that we can’t expect our emulations to be at a scale where we can faithfully reproduce what we perceive. (Needless to say, in practice we can still get good approximations, and this is a particularly fertile application of our Physics Project.)

But when we’re dealing with “raw computation” down at the lowest level of the raw ruliad, we can expect to faithfully emulate it. And so it is that we can just pick a cellular automaton or a Turing machine or some other kind of computational system—that in effect comes from anywhere in the ruliad—and emulate it to find out what it does. There’s no “object we have to move” to be able to “look at that part of the ruliad”. We’re emulating things down at the level of individual atoms of existence, and seeing what happens.

We can think about our computational experiments as letting us “jump” to find out what it’s like anywhere in the ruliad. And as we “suddenly materialize” somewhere in the ruliad it’s as if we’re immediately “face to face” with whatever “alien intelligence” there is at that place in the ruliad.

But what can “observers like us” expect to make of that alien intelligence? Well, to be able “communicate” or even “relate” we somehow have to be able to “bridge the gap in rulial space”. And since we just “jumped to a place in rulial space” we don’t immediately have any “progressive path” that “incrementally” takes us from our familiar position in rulial space to wherever the alien intelligence is.

But what does that feel like in practice? The whole idea of ruliology is just to go anywhere we want in the computational universe or in the ruliad, and see what happens when we run the rules we find there. And it’s indeed routine to find that what they do seems quite “alien”. Still, they often have certain essential features that for example remind us of the natural world as we observe it. But our standard methods of science (and mathematics)—developed on the basis of being “observers like we are today”—don’t readily allow us to “understand” the behavior of these systems chosen in the course of doing ruliology. To us they usually just seem to be “showing computational irreducibility”, and behaving in ways that we can effectively get no handle on.

But still, we can in a sense view these programs “out there in the computational universe” (and in effect strewn around the ruliad) as showing us what’s possible. They’re like alien intelligences that we know exist, but that we don’t yet understand, and don’t yet know how to harness or relate to. We can see them as some kind of beacons of possible technology of the future—of things that “exist in the ruliad”, but that we haven’t yet been able to connect to human purposes.

But so how might we make this connection? Well, as it happens, I’ve devoted much of my life to what can be viewed as the construction of a systematic bridge between what’s “computationally possible” and what we humans think of as important. For that’s the story of what I call computational language—and indeed of the whole intellectual structure that is the Wolfram Language.

There’s infinite potential content in the ruliad. But one can view the goal of the Wolfram Language as being to represent—in a way that’s optimized for us humans to understand—those parts that we humans consider important. The language lets us use the concepts of computation not only to crystallize our existing thinking, but also to expand what we can think about, in effect letting us reach out further in rulial space. Computational language is the general way that we “tame the ruliad”—extend the frontier of “human colonization” in the ruliad, and in the end “mine” more and more of the ruliad for “useful technology”.

Just in terms of its practical place in the world today I’ve often said that the Wolfram Language is like an “artifact from the future”. But now we see a deep sense in which this is true. The raw ruliad is just “out there”, with “infinite potential”, but as something whose fundamental character has nothing to do with us humans. But what computational language is about is delivering what one can think of as the ultimate “meta-artifact”: something that progressively turns the raw ruliad into “human-recognizable technology”.

Much of this progress involves the specific, systematic design of the Wolfram Language. But there are also forays that in effect jump further out into rulial space. For example, we’ve often enumerated large collections of simple programs, identifying ones that satisfy a certain criterion. And sometimes that feels a lot like “leveraging alien intelligence” without “understanding” it. The rule 30 cellular automaton, for example, is a good pseudorandom generator, even though we don’t really “understand” even fairly basic things about it.

And, yes, computational language is what we need to concretely “state a criterion”, in effect expressing what we’re thinking about in computational terms—that we can use, for example, to let us explicitly search the ruliad for an “alien intelligence” that does what we want.

What does it look like out in the “raw ruliad”? It’s easy to start just looking at simple programs, say picked at random. And, yes, they have all sorts of elaborate behavior:

&#10005

But what is this behavior “achieving”? Yes, it’s following the particular underlying rules that have been given. But we don’t have any immediate way to connect it to “human purposes”. And in general we can expect that to make that connection what’s needed is for those purposes themselves to “expand”.

Maybe at some moment we call what’s produced “art”, and assign it some “aesthetic purpose”. Maybe at some point we see that it satisfies some engineering purpose that we’ve just realized we should care about. But in general, computational language is the way we can make the connection between “raw computational processes” out there in the ruliad, and our patterns of thinking about things. It’s the ultimate way for us to “communicate with alien intelligence”.

The Launch of a Rulial Space Program

We began with the far-out startup pitch of sending spacecraft to discover alien intelligence and bring its technology back to Earth. But what we’ve realized is that actually no spacecraft—of the ordinary kind—are needed. There’s “alien intelligence” to be found everywhere; you don’t have to travel to interstellar space to find it. But the challenge is to connect the “alien intelligence” to human purposes, and extract from it what we consider “useful technology”. Or, put another way, the issue is not about traversing physical space, but rather about traversing rulial space.

With our spacecraft we humans have so far reached about a 20-trillionth of the way across the physical universe. But no doubt we’ve reached a far smaller fraction of the way across the ruliad. As our science, knowledge and technology increase, we gradually reach further into rulial space. But whether it’s our failure to communicate with cetaceans or our inability to make computers out of, say, fluids, it’s clear that by many measures the distance we’ve gone so far is not so large.

In a sense the startup idea of “harnessing alien intelligence” is the meta-idea of all technology—that in our terms we can state as being to connect what’s “computationally possible” in the ruliad with purposes we humans want to achieve. And I’ve argued that the ultimate meta-technology for doing this is not spacecraft but computational language. Because computational language is what we need to make a bridge between what we care about, and “raw computation” out in the ruliad.

It’s difficult to send physical spacecraft out into interstellar space. But it’s actually a lot easier to probe the much richer possibilities of the ruliad—because in a sense it’s straightforward to put a “rulial spacecraft” anywhere. We just have to pick a rule (or program), then see what the “world” it generates is. But the challenge is then in a sense one of interpretation. What is happening in that world? Can we relate it to things we care about?

At the outset, all we’re likely to see at some “random place” in the ruliad is rampant computational irreducibility. But it’s a fundamental fact that wherever there’s computational irreducibility, there must also be slices of computational reducibility to be found. In the ordinary physical universe that we experience, those are basically our perceived laws of physics. But even in a random sample of the ruliad we can expect there’ll be computational reducibility to be found. It’ll typically be “alien stuff”, though. It might have the character of science, but it won’t be like our existing science. And most likely it won’t align with anything we currently think we care about.

But that is the great challenge and promise of mounting a “rulial space program”. To be confronted not with what we might recognize as “new life and new civilizations”, but with things for which we have no description and no current way of thinking. Perhaps we might view it merely as humbling to encounter such things, and to realize how small a part of the ruliad we yet understand. But we can also view it as a beacon of where we could go. And we can view a whole “rulial space program” as a way of systematizing the ultimate project of exploring all formally possible processes. Or we could think about it not just as defining a single “startup opportunity”—but rather as defining the “meta-opportunity” of all possible technology startups….

❌
❌